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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1.1 The nature of the European pharmacuetical market and industry 
1. In 1984 pharmaceutical sales within the Community, including Spain 
and Portugal, were approximately ECU25, 750m at manufacturers • prices 
(Ta!Jle 1), forming 9.5 per cent of health care costs and 0.79 per cent 
of combined gross domestic product (GOP). Of this total, 88 per cent 
of sales by value were obtained through a doctor's prescription, 14 
per cent being consumed in hospitals and 74 per cent being dispensed 
through retail pharmacies. Only 12 per cent were bought over the 
counter, 
2. There are large variations in the consumption of pharmaceuticals 
between the member states in the Community. Differences in income are 
only partly res pons ib le. Equally important are differences in 
attitudes to drugs and in traditions of medical practice. These 
variations affect both the levels of consumption and the types of 
product consumed. There are strong similarities between Belgium, 
France, Italy and Spain, on the one hand, and Denmark, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and the UK on the other. The FRG has elements in common 
with both. 
3. The supply of pharmaceuticals within the Community is highly 
internationalised. Taking the Community as a whole, 43 per cent of 
sales are by indigenous companies to their own national market. In 
every country the locally owned industry has a disproportionately 
large share of the local market. Only in France and the FRG, however, 
does it amount to more than 50 per cent. Supplies from companies based 
in other Community countries make up a further 23 per cent of the 
total, while 34 per cent come from firms based outside the Community, 
primarily in the USA and Switzerland. 
4. Foreign companies supply drugs either through trade or by 1 oca 1 
production. In the Community the latter is the more important, 
amounting to about 40 per cent of all pharmaceuticals supplied. US and 
Swiss firms depend overwhelmingly on local production to supply their 
markets, while British and German companies also have substantial 
foreign facilities. Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands are the only 
Community countries which are supplied mainly by imports from abroad. 
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TABLE 1 PHARf~ACEUTICAL CONSUMPTION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1984 
Country Total Per As % As % By type and outlet (%) Average Relative 
sales capita GOP health price 
ECU ECU care OTC Ethical (UK=lOO) 
(1) 
BELGIUM 880 90 0.81 
DENMARK 370 74 0.50 
FRANCE 5600 102 0.81 
FRG 7660 125 0.89 
GREECE 449 45 0.95 
IRELAND 160 46 0.67 
ITALY 4440 78 0.91 
NETHER- 660 46 0.38 
LANDS 
PORTUGAL 350 35 1.08 
SPAIN 1830 48 0.81 
UK 3510 62 0.59 
TOTAL 25750 0.78 
(1) at manufacturers• prices 
(2) 1983 
(3) including dispensing doctors 
costs 
(2) 
8.6 
7.0 
8.8 
11.0 
20.2 
8.8 
12.4 
4.1 
18.9 
12.1 
9.6 
9.5 
12 
15 
9 
16 
through through 
retail hospitals 
pharmacies 
(3) 
76 12 
70 15 
78 13 
66 18 
+--83--+ 17 
5 80 15 
8 79 13 
... n/a .. 
+---93---. 7 
+---88--+ 12 
20 67 13 
12 74 14 
(4) using the 1983 indices of the EC statistical office 
(5) per capita spending/average price. 
( 4) 
103 
154 
76 
164 
73 
115 
57 
145 
low 
low 
100 
91 
volume 
Per 
capita 
(UK=100) 
(5) 
140 
77 
216 
122 
99 
65 
221 
51 
n/a 
n/a 
100 
152 
Source: Authors• estimates based on IMF and IMS data and OECD: Measuring Health Care 
1960-1983 
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5. Production of pharmaceuticals within the European Community 
amounted in 1984 to ECU39,300m (Table 2). The sector is dominated by 
large companies with the resources to develop new active substances 
(NAS). The cost of doing so is currently at least ECU75m per NAS to 
reach the market, and requires annual sales of ECU150m or more. There 
are 60 such firms operating in the Community, of which 33 are based 
there. Of the remainder, 20 are American, four are S\'liss and three 
Swedish. 
6. These companies have a strong international orientation and operate 
on a world-wide basis. They are generally organised on multinational 
lines. Within the Community, marketing is always organised on a 
country-by-country basis. The manufacture of active ingredients is 
confined to a 1 imited number of sites, but conversion into dosage 
forms is extensively decentralised. Basic and commercially sensitive 
research is highly centralised most commonly in the country of origin. 
Clinical and formulation development work, however, is often 
dispersed. 
7. Many smaller companies operate in the Community. Most of them 
concentrate on generics or OTC products or exploit local markets with 
well-established remedies. Their innovative capacity is limited, and 
their focus national rather than international. Firms of this kind 
have 20-30 per cent of the market in France, the FRG, Italy and Spain, 
although they have largely disappeared in the UK. 
8. On the basis of shares of the world market and of success in 
innovation, the pharmaceutical industry of the USA leads. That of 
Switzerland, although much smaller, is also in the first class. Among 
the companies based within the European member nations those of the 
FRG and the UK are very strong. French firms are less well placed, 
being excessively dependent on sales in the home marke't and in the 
franc zone, and the same is true, mutatis mutandis, of those of Italy. 
The research-based companies of Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark 
have elements of competitive strength but are handicapped by their 
moderate size. The indigenous companies of the other Community nations 
are uniformly weak. 
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TABLE 2 PHARMACEUTICAL OUTPUT IN EUROPEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1984 
COUNTRY PHARI~A 
COMPANIES 
NUMBER 
( 1) 
BELGIUM 80 
DENMARK 39 
FRANCE 331 
FRG 308 
GREECE 90 
IRELAND 153 
ITALY 365 
NETHER- 47 
LANDS 
PORTUGAL 96 
SPAIN 370 
UK 333 
TOTAL 2212 
(1) Manufacturers only 
( 2) 1983 
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTION 
TOTAL VALUE TRADING AS % 
ECUrn ADDED PROFIT CHEMICAL 
% AS % SALES 
(2) SALES (2) 
(3) 
1290 49 20 9.4 
870 44 19 36.4 
8530 30 5 19.6 
10140 46 12 12.4 
405 20 
1040 69 52.4 
6300 41 11 21.0 
1050 
410 
2570 42 14 19.3 
6700 52 30 16.8 
34300 43 14 16.8 
(3) Authors' estimates based on 1983 Eurostat data. 
Source: IMS, Eurostat, National sources 
R&D 
EXPENDITURE 
TOTAL AS % 
$m PHARIVA 
SALES 
125 10 
65 7 
1090 13 
1430 14 
<1 
15 5 
380 6 
110 11 
<1 
-40 2 
910 14 
4165 11 
EMPLOYMENT 
(000) 
10 
8 
66 
87 
3 
4 
64 
10 
3 
32 
66 
353 
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9. The pharmaceutical industry is subject to a very large degree of 
government regulation. The admission of new products to national 
markets is strictly controlled. Proof of safety, efficacy and quality 
is universally required. Regulation of this type is carried out on a 
r.ational basis, alth,ough a considerable degree of uniformity within 
the Community has been attained through the various directives issued 
by the Commission since 1965. 
10. Pricing policies designed to limit pharmaceutical expenditure are 
also normal in the member countries. They result from the heavy 
involvement of European governments and national agencies in the 
provision of health care. Only in the FRG and the Netherlands are 
prices largely uncontrolled. Elsewhere, they are fixed by various 
forms of official action (paragraphs 27-32). Positive lists, which 
limit reimbursement to specified products, and negative lists, which 
exclude certain drugs or therapeutic categories, are widely used. 
Average price levels vary very considerably within the Community. 
Differences of this kind have existed for many years. Prices are set 
on a national basis and little progress towards harmonisation has been 
made. 
11. Other barriers towards the unification of the European market and 
industry are relatively unimportant. Tariffs and direct import 
restrictions have been eliminated, except in the cases of Portugal and 
Spain, where they are being phased out. Patent protection has been 
unified. Direct assistance to the local pharmaceutical industry in the 
form of subsidies and tax concessions is only significant in the case 
of Ireland. The discriminatory use of registration procedures and 
price controls is considered below. 
12. Government regulation of the industry means that it forms apart of 
. 
the political agenda. National administrations have divided aims. They 
wish to limit health care spending, of which pharmaceuticals form a 
minor but readily controlled part; at the same time they want to 
promote high-technology industries, of which the pharmaceutical sector 
is a successful example. There is therefore an inherent conflict of 
objectives. 
- 14 -
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13. In practice, Greece, Portugal and Spain, without a research-based 
industry, favour the interests of consumers unambiguously. Belgium and 
the Netherlands are inclined in the same direction; although they have 
such a sector, they appear to attach only a secondary importance to 
it. The FRG values its major companies, but is committed to a detached 
attitude to all types of industry. Denmark and the UK have a generally 
supportive attitude towards their own firms, which, however, make most 
of their sales abroad. The governments of France, and, to a lesser 
extent Italy, attach an equally strong importance to the interests of 
both consumers and producers, which have proved difficult to 
reconcile. 
1.2 Registration and its problems 
14. The object of registration is to make sure that a drug is safe, 
effective and of adequate quality before it is put on sale. The onus 
is on the applicant to satisfy the authority; the role of the latter 
is to evaluate the evidence put before it. 
15. During the past 20 years the requirements of national regulatory 
authorities have converged as a result of action by the European 
Commission. There are now few differences in technical standards 
between them. All Community countries accept evidence obtained abroad 
and follow common guidelines. All provide abbreviated forms of 
registration for projects based on known ingredients. A uniform 
120-day decision period has been agreed, to which 90 days are added if 
the product is referred to an advisory committee. 
16. In practice, however, there are substantial differences between 
one country and another. Methods of evaluation vary, as do perceptions 
of the weight to be put on particular kinds of evidence. A large 
element of judgement is involved, which must be influenced by the 
local traditions of medical practice. Local clinical trials may not be 
officially required, but are often advisable to familiarise local 
opinion leaders with a new product. 
- 15 - - 7 -
17. There are also considerable delays in processing applications. 
Currently only France approaches the 120-day 1 imit on occasion. The 
FRG and the UK take about two years, and Italy and Spain three or 
more. The Community average is currently 18-24 months. Such delays 
have tended to increase in recent years. They are attributed in the 
main to a lack of resources on the part of national registration 
authorities, aggravated in several nations by a large increase in the 
number of applications for generic products. 
18. The large research-based companies respond to this situation by 
preparing the necessary dossier centrally, usually with the US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), the most demanding of authorities, in 
mind. The experimental work is organised so as to satisfy all 
requirements; thus, if local clinical testing is needed, it will be 
included in the overall programme. The dossier is then modified to 
suit the needs of each authority. They consider this to be a 
satisfactory if not ideal way to work. 
19. The direct costs of multiple registration within the Community are 
1 imited. Based on the extra staff employed by the major firms, a 
figure of ECU40-55m seems reasonable. Extra clinical testing is not 
considered to be serious burden; as already noted, the results 
contribute to the central dossier, while the testing itself may help 
towards a favourable decision by the licensing authority and towards a 
better reception when the product reaches the market. 
20. More important are the effects of delays in the registration 
process. Since it takes 9-12 years to develop an NAS, the opportunity 
costs of the money tied up in the process are considerable. A further 
de 1 ay increases the pen a 1 ty correspondingly. Estimates based on data 
supplied by the FDA suggest that in 1984/5 the total costs imposed by 
the general failure to observe the 120-day limit were in the range of 
ECU30-200m, depending on the discount rate chosen, with a most 
probable range of ECU57-82m, corresponding to rates of eight and ten 
per cent respectively. 
21. Another serious problem arising from delays in approval is the 
loss of revenue while the product is in patent. As yet there is no 
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general patent term restoration in the Community, and effective pdtent 
lives, weighted by national sales, average nine years. Estimates 
derived from average sales of new active substances during the years 
following their introduction suggest that the failure to meet the 
120-day limit caused gross losses of ECU360-640m to their originators. 
The net losses are smaller, in part because costs of production must 
be deducted, and in part because of the continued sales of products 
which would otherwise be made obsolete. 
22. The penalties due to the differences between member nations are 
less serious. As has been noted, with the partial exception of France, 
all greatly exceed the 120-day limit. If the minimum practicable time 
for the approva 1 of an NAS under current conditions is taken to be 
one year, then the opportunity costs of delay drop to ECU20-28m and 
the net loss of sales to ECU100-175m. As far as registration is 
concerned, the total cost of the non-Europe is therefore ECU160-260m 
or 0.5-0.6 per cent of industry costs within the Community (table 3). 
Effective unification of the market would most benefit US companies 
since they introduce the largest number of new active substances. 
23. Approaches to a more unified system of registration have focussed 
on two major alternatives 
pan-European registration 
cons i derab 1 e prob 1 ems with 
- mutual recognition between states and 
agency. Research-based companies see 
both these approaches. There are doubts 
about the equality of the countries involved. There is some feeling 
that north European agencies carry more weight than south European 
ones. The differences of medical culture were thought to raise 
difficulties of mutual acceptability. Registration is not, however, 
thought to be used in a deliberately discriminatory way. 
24. A single European agency would have the advantages of impartiality 
and uniformity of approach. In principle it could provide rapid 
decisions. It might, however, be excessively rigid and bureaucratic; 
the precedent of the FDA, EAG found, was not thought to be 
encouraging. There was some anxiety about the standards to be used; 
these would have to be high, but many feared a combination of the most 
severe elements of all national agencies. There was also concern about 
the political acceptability to the individual nations of a central 
authority. 
- 17 -
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25. It does not appear that d central registration authority would be 
much cheaper to run than the present system. The national agencies 
employ the equivalent about 1500 ~taff at a cost of ECU55-70m to which 
accommodation and related overheads should be added. Allowing for the 
higher salaries prevailing in the USA, this sum is comparable with the 
cost of the dru'gs and biologics division of the FDA. The European 
national registration agencies are generally under-staffed and savings 
through the creation of a single authority would therefore be limited. 
26. From the standpoint of the pharmaceutical industry the key issue 
is the speed of the registration process. Any change which lengthened 
it would be opposed. Consumers would also benefit from the more rapid 
approval of new substances provided that safety standards were not 
lowered. 
27. The CPMP procedure in force between 1978 and 1985 was not widely 
used because of doubts among large innovative companies about its 
advantages. The current procedure has arised considerably more 
enthusiasm, especially as it is thought to be potentially faster than 
the normal route. 
1.3 Pricing systems, prices and price competition 
28. As already noted, policies intended to control pharmaceutical 
expenditure are found in a 11 member states of the Community. The 
methods used vary very widely as do average price levels. The only 
common factors are that all systems incorporate an element of patient 
copayment and the over-the-counter ( OTC) products are exempt from 
regulation. 
29. At one extreme, the FRG leaves pharmaceutical firms free to set 
prices as they wish. Total expenditure is limited by' strong pressure 
on companies to limit price increases and on doctors to economise and 
by a negative list which excludes certain categories of comfort drugs 
from the reimbursement system. The situation in the Netherlands is 
very similar. Prices are high in both countries. 
- 18 -
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30. In the UK the profitability of pharmaceutical companies is 
controlled. A target level is set for the sector as a whole; the 
target for each firm depends on its research effort and on its 
contribution to the British economy. Subject to these constraints 
companies are allowed to set the prices at which their products are 
introduced. Irish prices are in practice tied to those in the UK. In 
both countries they are in the middle range. 
31. In principle firms may set their own prices in France, but in 
practice admission to the national reimbursement system is strictly 
controlled. Products are dealt with on an individual basis. The price 
agreed between the manufacturer and the reimbursement authority 
depends on those of competitive products and on the company's local 
activities in France. Belgium has a similar system. Prices are low in 
both countries, and especially in France. 
32. Denmark, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain control the prices of 
individual drugs by the use of cost-plus methods, and maintain 
positive lists. Prices are high in Denmark, below average in Italy and 
very low in the other three countries. 
33. In every Community country except the FRG, the price at which a 
product is introduced cannot subsequently be changed without official 
permission. Such permission is often delayed, refused or made 
contingent on the company expanding its local activities. 
34. As far as the adequacy of price levels is concerned, the attitude 
of the research-based companies is that sales in the Community market 
should ideally make a substantial contribution to world overhead 
costs, and in particular to the cost of innovation, and to profits. 
Prices in Denmark, the FRG and the Netherlands are considered to be 
'satisfactory' form this point of view and those in the UK and Ireland 
'adequate•. 
35. Prices elsewhere are considered to be less than adequate. Those 
prevailing in France are thought to be strikingly low as were those in 
Italy until recently. Prices in Portugal and Spain are even lower. 
Nevertheless, the major firms continue to sell their products in these 
countries. The reason for this behaviour is that production costs are 
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relatively low, especially at the margin, while most other costs are 
fixed in the short run. It is therefore worth selling in any market in 
which direct costs dre covered and some contribution is made to 
overheads. 
36. Official data suggests strongly that total costs vary considerably 
between member countries. In Italy, Portugal and Spain, lm'i prices are 
offset to some extent by low costs and in the FRG high prices are 
accompanied by high cost. The UK is unusual in combining above average 
prices with below-average costs, while the reverse is true of France. 
All measures suggest that prices in France are uncomfortably low from 
the standpoint of the French-based industry, which depends heavily on 
its local market. In contrast the UK industry is markedly profitable. 
37. Consumer advocates claim, in opposition to the standpoint of the 
industry, that pharmaceutical prices are generally excessive and that 
the industry is inefficient in its use of resources. Central costs are 
inflated and conceal unnecessary activity, especially in marketing and 
administration. Prices would be more firmly controlled; alternatively, 
competition should be stimulated. 
38. In relation to national income, total expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals is relatively low in Denmark and the Netherlands, and, 
to a lesser extent, in Ireland and the UK. It is high in France, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. These variations result primarily 
from different attitudes to drugs rather than from differences in 
prices. For historical and cultural reasons the propensity to consume 
medicines is unusually high in southern Europe and low in northern 
Europe (paragraph 2). Such attitudes are difficult to change and must 
therefore influence national policies concerning the control of 
pharmaceutical expenditure. 
39. In relation to national price levels, pharmaceutical products are 
unusually cheap in France, and were so, until recently, in Italy. This 
is not the case in Greece, Portugal and Spain. It is arguable that in 
the former countries prices are strictly controlled in order to limit 
total expenditure because it is impossible to reduce the volume of 
consumption. In the latter nations, however, low prices correspond to 
- 20 -
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low incorres. Prices in Denmark, the FRG and the Netherlands are high 
compared to other prices, perhaps because of the combination of free 
pricing, ccmprehen~ive health care services and a restrained attitude 
to medicines (table 1 and paragraph 38). 
40. In so far as comparison with other parts of the chemical industry 
is possible, the pharmaceutical industry of the Community appears to 
use its rE:~ources with equal efficiency. In most member countries, 
however - France is the principal exception - it appears to be 
appreciably more profitable. 
41. This is probably due to the ways in which price competition is 
limited by the arrangements for getting drugs to those who need them. 
Most products are available only on prescription (paragraph 1) and 
doctors see their prime duty as well-being of the patient rather than 
economy. The majority of the bill is paid by the state or the 
insurance agency. In most countries the distribution system 
incorporates definite monopoly elements. There is therefore scope for 
higher than normal profits. 
42. To this extent consumer organisations have grounds for their 
criticisms. As presently constituted, the arrangements for 
discovering, making and distributing drugs are as a whole rather more 
expensive than is strictly necessary. The extra profits realised by 
the industry, however, do not appear large while the future benefits 
to be derived from its continued activities are very considerable. It 
is also arguable (paragraph 46) that price competition is increasing 
in certain significant parts of the pharmaceutical market. Moreover, 
it is obvious that radical alterations to the system would require a 
major political effort. 
43. There is clear evidence that pr1c1ng systems may operate in a 
discriminatory way. As already mentioned (paragraphs 30-33), 
individual prices and profit margins depend in several member 
countries on the scale and nature of a company•s local activities. 
This obviously discriminates in favour of indigenous firms; it also 
promotes the unnecessary decentralisation of particular functions, with 
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potential losses in economies of production (paragraphs 53-54). 
44. Market distortions arise from the sharp differences in price 
level. The most obvious sign is parallel importing from low-price to 
high-price areas. It is seen in Denmark, the FRG, the Netherlands and 
the UK, the main sources of supply being France and Italy. The scale 
of this practice is quite small, however - it accounts for no more than 
0.5 per cent of total Community sales - and has not increased recently. 
It is seen by the industry as an irritant rather than as a major 
threat. 
45. Although prices do not play a major role in the competition 
between pharmaceutical products (paragraph 41), they nevertheless have 
an appreciable if subordinate part. In countries which permit free 
pricing, in-patent products are introduced at prices explicitly 
related to those charged by their competitors. Therapeutic advantages 
justify a premium price of up to 25 per cent over other medicines in 
the same therapeutic class. 
46. A vigorous market in out-of-patent genric products has recently 
developed in those member countries where prices are high. Prices have 
been forced down and reductions in expenditure realised. Such products 
account for eight per cent by value of the UK market and ten per cent 
of that of the FRG and the Netherlands. It may be noted, however, that 
the market is highly imperfect and the originator is normally able to 
retain much of his sales even when charging a premium price. Official 
action to encourage generic products has been a sine gua non for the 
development of a successful generic sector. 
47. The industry welcomes the transparency directive which it sees as 
a step to reduce and perhaps eliminate discriminatory practices and, 
in particular, pressures to enlarge local activities beyond what is 
commercially desirable. Progress towards convergence of national price 
levels within the Community is widely anticipated. There is some 
anxiety about the basis on which this might take place. The directive 
has been less enthusiastically received by consumer advocates, who 
consider that it will do little to limit the profits of the industry. 
- 22 -
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1.4 The operation of the multinational system 
48. The major pharmaceutical companies op~rating 
organised on a multinational basis (paragraph 4). 
in Europe are 
This cou 1 d be 
sub-optimal frcm an economic standpoint. The need to carry out 
operations in many locations could give to losses in economics of 
scale. The coordination of such an organisation could prove 
excessively expensive. 
49. The research-oriented companies that there would be no worthwhile 
economies of scale in research from the unification of the Community 
market. There are indeed such economies in serious innovative 
research but they have already been realised. Such activity is 
normally concentrated in the firm's country of or1g1n. Where a 
company has major research centres abroad, they have been placed there 
in order to exploit local expertise. Within the Community such 
centres are placed in the UK or, less frequently, in France. In a 
unified market there would be no immediate change in this policy. 
50. Local development work is more decentralised. It does not appear, 
however, that this activity would be much affected by unification. 
Formulation research for specific markets is best carried out on the 
spot, where local advice and information is most effective and tests 
may be most readily arranged. As has already been seen (paragraphs 
16, 18), local clinical research has promotional and even political 
functions as well as scientific ones, and may therefore be 
indispensable in practice. 
51. The scope for economies in marketing are also very limited. 
Traditions of medical practice and patterns of consumptions vary 
markedly between member countries (paragraphs 1, 2) and different 
. 
approaches are necessary for each market. Even more to the point, the 
key person in marketing is the sa 1 esman who ca 11 s on doctors to 
promote his company's products. If he is suitably persuasive, he must 
by definition be a native of the country in which he works. In 
practice marketing is always organised on a national basis, and no 
firm interviewed could see any alternative. 
- 23 -
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52. The possibility of economies in production are more considerable. 
The manufacture of pharmaceuticals involves two stages: the 
production of the active materials by extraction, synthesis or 
fermentJtion, and the conversion of these substances into dosage forms. 
The first of these steps is normally confined to a few sometimes a 
single 3itE:: in Europe, but the second is often decentralised. A 
common reason is reported to be pressure from host governments, often 
expressed in the course of price negotiations (paragraphs 30-33, 42). 
Multinational companies agree that to meet these demands is often to 
sacrifice economies of production. 
53. The equipment used for the formulation of active ingredients is 
relatively cheap but the building in which it is put, which requires 
elaborate air-conditioning and ultra-clean facilities is not. The 
total cost of a formulation plant depends not so much on the volume 
of output as on the product mix and on the technology used. Over a 
wiae range of output, therefore, it may be taken as fixed. The number 
of such installations within the Community much exceeds need. 
American multinationals report that their European formulation plants 
were often working at between one third and one-half their capacity. 
54. Assuming this to be generally true, then between one-half and 
two-thirds of all formulation plants belonging to the multinational 
companies are surplus to requirements. There are approximately 250 
such plants within the Community. If they are conservatively valued 
at either ECU 10 or 20m each then the extra capital employed is in the 
range ECU 1250-3333m. If they were eliminated then, assuming a 
10-year lifetime for this kind of installation, the annual saving 
would be ECU 125-333m. 
55. If it is further assumed that the extra production could be 
provided by existing plants with no further labour then the reduction 
in employment may be tentatively estimated at a maximum of between 
12,500 and 16,500 persons. Labour costs would drop by ECU 225-295m. 
The tot a 1 saving in production costs \'IOU 1 d then be ECU350-630m, or 
1.0-1.9 per cent of unit costs. If prices remained unchanged this 
would increase the trading profits of the Community industry as a 
whole by 7-14 per cent; alternatively spending on R & D might be 
raised by 8 - 15 per cent. 
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56. It should, however, be emphasised that these gains are markedly 
hypothetical. r~ultinational companies commented that in many cases 
their local activities were beneficial to them. In some countries, 
notably France, they are a condition of receiving an adequate price. 
In Germany, although pressures of this kind were absent, the free 
market permits relatively high prices which are advantageous in those 
export markets in which they are linked to those in the country of 
origin. More generally, firms feel an obligation to behave as 
corporate citizens of their host countries. Their local plants 
already exist, and it would be politically unacceptable and 
commercially damaging to shut them down. 
57. Multinational companies do not think that there are appreciable 
direct costs in running Europe-wide networks of subsidiaries. Most of 
them remarked that the extra staff required to coordinate their 
operations were few. 
58. The unification of the European market would therefore not be 
followed by large changes in the location of facilities. Some degree 
of concentration is seen as desirable but would happen slowly. 
Extensive action would have to await changes in pricing systems. Most 
companies indicated that they would continue to maintain production 
facilities in the five major countries of the Community. 
1.5 The results of unification 
59. The savings which might be expected from unification of the 
Community pharmaceutical market have been estimated in a variety of 
more or less plausible scenarios on an exploration of company 
attitudes. They are shown in table 3. In the first, no concentration 
of facilities takes place but ecoriOmies due to unified a"nd more rapid 
registration are realised (paragraph 22). In the second, 
multinational companies also withdraw all production facilities from 
Greece and Portugal. In the third, they further reduce the number of 
formulation plants which they operate by 50 per cent in France and by 
25 per cent each in Italy and Spain. The production lost by these 
countries is transferred to the FRG and the UK. 
.. 25 -
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TABLE 3 SAVINGS IN DIRECT COSTS OF OPERATION TO COMPANIES AND COUNTRIES THROUGH THE 
UNIFICATION OF THE COMMUNITY MARKET ON A 1984 BASIS 
{For the three scenarios see para 59) 
Origin of firms FRANCE FRG UK USJl. SWITZ OTHER TOTAL 
SCENARIO 1 
Savings to firms 
- m ECU: lO\'/er value 10.7 23.4 17.6 65.6 28.6 14.1 160 
upper value 17.2 37.7 28.3 105.6 46.6 25.3 260 
-
As % unit costs 
lower value 0.19 0.26 0.51 0.91 1.34 0.22 0.48 
upper value 0.30 0.40 0.82 1.47 2.10 0.39 0. 77 
SCENARIO 2 
Absolute saving m ECU 
Low value 18.5 29.6 23.8 84.3 31.7 15.7 204 
High value 28.9 47.0 37.6 133.6 50.7 27.6 325 
Reduction in unit 
Costs % 
Low value 0.32 0.34 0.70 1.17 1.43 0.24 0.61 
High value 0.50 0.53 1.09 1.86 2.15 0.43 0.96 
SCENARIO 3 
Absolute saving m ECU 
Low value 22.8 39.3 34.4 116.4 35.8 19.8 269 
High value 46.2 88.6 61.9 227.7 65.8 42.7 533 
Reduction in unit 
costs % 
Low value 0.40 0.44 1.00 1.62 1.68 0.30 0.79 
High value 0.81 1.00 1.81 3.17 3.08 0.66 1.57 
Source: Authors' estimates 
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60. The savings realised range from a minimum of 0.5-0.8 per cent of 
European unit costs to a maximum of 0.8-1.6 per cent. These savings 
would accrue primarily to companies operating on a multinational basis 
in a large nuw.ber of member nations. They are proportionately 
greatest for US firms follmved by those based in Switzerland and, at 
some distance, by the UK. Because these estimates relate to all 
companies of a particular nationality it shculd be remembered that 
this reduction in unit costs might be considerably higher or lower for 
individual firms, depending on their circumstances. 
61. The funds so liberated might be used to increase investment in R & 
D, with a positive effect on competitive strength. For the Community 
as a who 1 e research budgets cou 1 d rise by between five and 18 per 
cent. However, as noted above, the rna in benefits wou 1 d be felt by 
companies based outside the Community. 
62. The effects of moves towards common pricing have been exp 1 ored. 
Countries in which this entailed general increases in the price of 
pharmaceuticals would have to spend more on consumption but would 
simultaneously become more attractive as centres for production, since 
local production is always a major source of supply for the local 
market in the larger member countries of the Community. Countries in 
which prices fell would experience the reverse. Harmonisation on a 
basis which maintained total Community expenditure would benefit 
French and Italian firms and would have adverse effects on those of 
the FRG. UK, US and Swiss firms would break even. Harmonisation on a 
basis which reduced expenditure would be unambiguously unfavourable 
for all. 
63. In the longer term the effect of unifying the European market will 
be to make the strong stronger and the weak weaker. Firms which have 
. 
depended on the favour of their governments will suffer, while those 
who are already highly competitive will flourish even more. The 
elimination of marginal companies should concentrate resources on the 
more efficient and enable them to exploit the opportunities of the 
future the more profitably. Accelerated progress towards a two-tier 
pharmaceutical industry, in which companies are either very large or 
relatively small, seems probable. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1. In 1984 pharmaceutical sales within the Community, including Spain 
and Portugal, were approximately ECU25,750m at manufacturers' prices 
(Table 1), forming 9.5 per cent of health care costs and 0.79 per cent 
of combined gross domestic product (GOP). Of this total, 88 per cent 
of sales by value were obtained through a doctor's prescription, 14 
per cent being consumed in hospitals and 74 per cent being dispensed 
through retail pharmacies. Only 12 per cent were bought over the 
counter, 
2. There are large variations in the consumption of pharmaceuticals 
between the member states in the Community. Differences in income are 
only partly responsible. Equally important are differences in 
attitudes to drugs and in traditions of medical practice. These 
variations affect both the levels of consumption and the types of 
product consumed. There are strong similarities between Belgium, 
France, Italy and Spain, on the one hand, and Denmark, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and the UK on the other. The FRG has elements in common 
with both. 
3. The supply of pharmaceuticals within the ~ommunity is highly 
internationalised. Taking the Community as a whole, 43 per cent of 
sales are by indigenous companies to their own national market. In 
every country the locally owned industry has a disproportionately 
large share of the local market. Only in France and the FRG, however, 
does it amount to more than 50 per cent. Supplies from companies based 
in other Community countries make up a further 23 per cent of the 
total, while 34 per cent come from firms based outside the Community, 
primarily in the USA and Switzerland. 
4. Foreign companies supply drugs either through trade or by local 
production. In the Community the latter is the more important, 
amounting to about 40 per cent of all pharmaceuticals supplied. US and 
Swiss firms depend overwhelmingly on local production to supply their 
markets, while British and German companies also have substantial 
foreign facilities. Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands are the only 
Community countries which are supplied mainly by imports from abroad. 
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TABLE 1 PHARMACEUTICAL CONSUMPTION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1984 
Country Total Per As % 
sales capita GOP 
ECU ECU 
(1) 
BELGIUM 880 90 0.81 
DENMARK 370 74 0.50 
FRANCE 5600 102 0.81 
FRG 7660 125 0.89 
GREECE 449 45 0.95 
IRELAND 160 46 0.67 
ITALY 4440 78 0.91 
NETHER- 660 46 0.38 
LANDS 
PORTUGAL 350 35 1.08 
SPAIN 1830 48 0.81 
UK 3510 62 0.59 
TOTAL 25750 0.78 
(1) at manufacturers' prices 
(2) 1983 
(3) including dispensing doctors 
As % By type and outlet (%) 
health 
care OTC Ethical 
costs ' 
(2) through through 
retail hospitals 
pharmacies 
(3) 
8.6 12 76 12 
7.0 15 70 15 
8.8 9 78 13 
11.0 16 66 18 
20.2 83 17 
8.8 5 80 15 
12.4 8 79 13 
4.1 n/a 
18.9 93 7 
12.1 88 12 
9.6 20 67 13 
9.5 12 74 14 
(4) using the 1983 indices of the EC statistical office 
{5) per capita spending/average price. 
Average 
price 
(UK=100) 
(4) 
103 
154 
76 
164 
73 
115 
57 
145 
low 
low 
100 
91 
RelativE 
volume 
Per 
capita 
(UK=100 
(5) 
140 
77 
216 
122 
99 
65 
221 
51 
n/a 
n/a 
100 
152 
Source: Authors estimates based on IMF and IMS data and OECD: Measuring Health Care 
1960-1983 
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5. Production of pharmaceuticals within the European Community amounted in 
1984 to ECU39,300m (Table 2). The sector is dominated by large companies 
with the resources to develop new active substances (NAS). The cost of 
doing so is currently at least ECU75m per NAS to reach the market, and 
requires annual sales of ECU150m or more. There are 60 such firms operating 
in the Community, of which 33 are based there. Of the remainder, 20 are 
American, four are Swiss and three Swedish. 
6. These companies have a strong international orientation and operate 
on a world-wide basis. They are generally organised on multinational 
lines. Within the Community, marketing is always organised on a 
country-by-country basis. The manufacture of active ingredients is 
confined to a limited number of sites, but conversion into dosage 
forms is extensively decentralised. Basic and commercially sensitive 
research is highly centralised most commonly in the country of origin. 
Clinical and formulation development work, however, is often 
dispersed. 
7. Many smaller companies operate in the Community. Most of them 
concentrate on generics or OTC products or exploit local markets with 
well established remedies. Their innovative capacity is limited, and 
their focus national rather than international. Firms of this kind 
have 20-30 per cent of the market in France, the FRG, Italy and Spain, 
although they have largely disappeared in the UK. 
8. On the basis of shares of the world market and of success in 
innovation, the pharmaceutical industry of the USA leads. That of 
Switzerland, although much smaller, is also in the first class. Among 
the companies based within the European member nations those of the 
FRG and the UK are very strong. French firms are less well placed, 
being excessively dependent on sales in the home market and in the 
franc zone, and the same is true, mutatis mutandis, of those of Italy. 
The research-based companies of Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark 
have elements of competitive strength but are handicapped by their 
moderate size. The indigenous companies of the other Community nations 
are uniformly weak. 
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TABLE 2 PHARMACEUTICAL OUTPUT IN EUROPEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1984 
COUNTRY PHARMA 
COMPANIES 
NUMBER 
(1) 
BELGIUM 80 
DENMARK 39 
FRANCE 331 
FRG 308 
GREECE 90 
IRELAND 153 
ITALY 365 
NETHER- 47 
LANDS 
PORTUGAL 96 
SPAIN 370 
UK 333 
TOTAL 2212 
(1) Manufacturers only 
( 2) 1983 
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTION 
TOTAL VALUE TAADING AS % 
ECUm ADDED PROFIT CHEMICAL 
% AS % SALES 
(2) SALES ( 2) 
(3) 
1290 49 20 9.4 
870 44 19 36.4 
8530 30 5 19.6 
10140 46 12 12.4 
405 20 
1040 69 52.4 
6300 41 11 21.0 
1050 
410 
2570 42 14 19.3 
6700 52 30 16.8 
34300 43 14 16.8 
(3) Authors• estimates based on 1983 Eurostat data. 
Source: IMS, Eurostat, national sources 
R&D 
EXPENDITURE 
TOTAL AS % 
$m PHARMA 
SALES 
125 10 
65 7 
1090 13 
1430 14 
<1 
15 5 
380 6 
llO ll 
<1 
40 2 
910 14 
4165 ll 
EMPLOYMEN" 
(000) 
10 
8 
66 
87 
3 
4 
64 
10 
3 
32 
66 
353 
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9. The pharmaceutical industry is subject to a very large degree of 
government regulation. The admission of new products to national 
markets is strictly controlled. Proof of safety, efficacy and quality 
is universally required. Regulation of this type is carried out on a 
national basis, although a considerable degree of uniformity within 
the Community has been attained through the various directives issued 
by the Commission since 1965. 
10. Pricing policies designed to limit pharmaceutical expenditure are 
also normal in the member countries. They result from the heavy 
involvement of European governments and national agencies in the 
provision of health care. Only in the FRG and the Netherlands are 
prices largely uncontrolled. Elsewhere, they are fixed by various 
forms of official action (paragraphs 27-32). Positive lists, which 
limit reimbursement to specified products, and negative lists, which 
exclude certain drugs or therapeutic categories, are widely used. 
Average price levels vary very considerably within the Community. 
Differences of this kind have existed for many years. Prices are set 
on a national basis and little progress towards harmonisation has been 
made. 
11. Other barriers towards the unification of the European market and 
industry are relatively unimportant. Tariffs and direct import 
restrictions have been eliminated, except in the cases of Portugal and 
Spain, where they are being phased out. Patent protection has been 
unified. Direct assistance to the local pharmaceutical industry in the 
form of subsidies and tax concessions is only significant in the case 
of Ireland. The discriminatory use of registration procedures and 
price controls is considered below. 
12. Government regulation of the industry means that it forms apart of 
the political agenda. National administrations have divided aims. They 
wish to limit health care spending, of which pharmaceuticals form a 
minor but readily controlled part; at the same time they want to 
promote high-technology industries, of which the pharmaceutical sector 
is a successful example. There is therefore an inherent conflict of 
objectives. 
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13. In practice, Greece, Portugal and Spain, without a research-based 
industry, favour the interests of consumers unambiguously. Belgium and 
the Netherlands are inclined in the same direction; although they have 
such a sector, they appear to attach only a secondary importance to 
it. The FRG values its major companies, but is committed to a detached 
attitude to all types of industry. Denmark and the UK have a generally 
/ 
supportive attitude towards their own firms, which, however, make most 
of their sa 1 es abroad. The governments of France, and, to a 1 esser 
extent Italy, attach an equally strong importance to the interests of 
both consumers and producers, which have proved difficult to 
reconcile. 
14. The object of registration is to make sure that a drug is safe, 
effective and of adequate quality before it is put on sale. The onus 
is on the applicant to satisfy the authority; the role of the latter 
is to evaluate the evidence put before it. 
15. During the past 20 years the requirements of national regulatory 
authorities have converged as a result of action by the European 
Commission. There are now few differences in technical standards 
between them. All Community countries accept evidence obtained abroad 
and follow common guidelines. All provide abbreviated forms of 
registration for projects based on known ingredients. A uniform 
120-day decision period has been agreed, to which 90 days are added if 
the product is referred to an advisory committee. 
16. In practice, however, there are substantial differences between 
one country and another. Methods of evaluation vary, as do perceptions 
of the weight to be put on particular kinds of evidence. A large 
element of judgement is involved, which must be influenced by the 
local traditions of medical practice. Local clinical trials may not be 
officially required, but are often advisable to familiarise local 
opinion leaders with a new product. 
17. There are also considerable delays in processing applications. 
Currently only France approaches the 120-day 1 imi t on occasion. The 
FRG and the UK take about two years, and Italy and Spain three or 
more. The Community average is currently 18-24 months. Such delays 
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have tended to increase in recent years. They are attributed in the 
main to a lack of resources on the part of national registration 
authorities, aggravated in several nations by a large increase in the 
number of applications for generic products. 
18. The large research-based companies respond to this situation by 
preparing the necessary dossier centrally, usually with the US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), the most demanding of authorities, in 
mind. The experimental work is organised so as to satisfy all 
requirements; thus, if local clinical testing is needed, it will be 
included in the overall programme. The dossier is then modified to 
suit the needs of each authority. They consider this to be a 
satisfactory if not ideal way to work. 
19. The direct costs of multiple registration within the Community are 
limited. Based on the extra staff employed by the major firms, a 
figure of ECU40-55m seems reasonable. Extra clinical testing is not 
considered to be serious burden; as already noted, the results 
contribute to the central dossier, while the testing itself may help 
towards a favourable decision by the licensing authority and towards a 
better reception when the product reaches the market. 
20. More important are the effects of delays .in the registration 
process. Since it takes 9-12 years to develop an NAS, the opportunity 
costs of the money tied up in the process are considerable. A further 
delay increases the penalty correspondingly. Estimates based on data 
supplied by the FDA suggest that in 1984/5 the total costs imposed by 
the general failure to observe the 120-day limit were in the range of 
ECU30-200m, depending on the discount rate chosen, with a most 
probable range of ECU57-82m, corresponding to rates of eight and ten 
per cent respectively. 
21. Another serious problem arising from delays in approval is the 
loss of revenue while the product is in patent. As yet there is no 
general patent term restoration in the Community, and effective patent 
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lives, weighted by national sales, average nine years. Estimates 
derived from average sales of new active substances during the years 
following their introduction suggest that the failure to meet the 
120-day limit caused gross losses of ECU360-640m to their originators. 
The net losses are smaller, in part because costs of production must 
be deducted, and in part because of the continued sales of products 
which would otherwise be made obsolete. 
22. The penalties due to the differences between member nations are 
less serious. As has been noted, with the partial exception of France, 
all greatly exceed the 120-day limit. If the minimum practicable time 
for the approval of an NAS under current conditions is taken to be 
one year, then the opportunity costs of de 1 ay drop to ECU20-28m and 
the net loss of sales to ECU100-175m. As far as registration is 
concerned, the total cost of the non-Europe is therefore ECU160-260m 
or 0.5-0.6 per cent of industry costs within the Community (table 3). 
Effective unification of the market would most benefit US companies 
since they introduce the largest number of new active substances. 
23. Approaches to a more unified system of registration have focussed 
on two major alternatives - mutual recognition between states and 
pan-European registration agency. Research-based companies see 
considerable problems with both these approaches. There are doubts 
about the equality of the countries involved. There is some feeling 
that north European agencies carry more weight than south European 
ones. The differences of medical culture were thought to raise 
difficulties of mutual acceptability. Registration is not, however, 
thought to be used in a deliberately discriminatory way. 
24. A single European agency would have the advantages of impartiality 
and uniformity of approach. In principle it could provide rapid 
decisions. It might, however, be excessively rigid and bureaucratic; 
the precedent of the FDA, EAG found, was not thought to be 
encouraging. There was some anxiety about the standards to be used; 
these would have to be high, but many feared a combination of the most 
severe elements of all national agencies. There was also concern about 
the political acceptability to the individual nations of a central 
authority. 
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25. It does not appear that a central registration authority would be 
much cheaper to run than the present system. The national agencies 
employ the equivalent about 1500 staff at a cost of ECU55-70m to which 
accommodation and related overheads should be added. Allowing for the 
higher salaries prevailing in the USA, this sum is comparable with the 
cost of the drugs and biologics division of the FDA. The European 
national registration agencies are generally under-staffed and savings 
through the creation of a single authority would therefore be limited. 
26. From the standpoint of the pharmaceutical industry the key issue 
is the speed of the registration process. Any change which lengthened 
it would be opposed. Consumers would also benefit from the more rapid 
approval of new substances provided that safety standards were not 
lowered. 
27. The CPMP procedure in force between 1978 and 1985 was not widely 
used because of doubts among large innovative companies about its 
advantages. The current procedure has a~ised considerably more 
enthusiasm, especially as it is thought to be potentially faster than 
the normal route. 
28. As already noted, policies intended to control pharmaceutical 
expenditure are found in all member states of the Community. The 
methods used vary very widely as do average price levels. The only 
common factors are that all systems incorporate an element of patient 
copayment and the over-the-counter (OTC) produ.cts are exempt from 
regulation. 
29. At one extreme, the FRG leaves pharmaceutical firms free to set 
prices as they wish. Total expenditure is limited by strong pressure 
on companies to limit price increases and on doctors to economise and 
by a negative list which excludes certain categories of comfort drugs 
from the reimbursement system. The situation in the Netherlands is 
very similar. Prices are high in both countries. 
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30. In the UK the profitability of pharmaceutical companies is 
controlled. A target level is set for the sector as a whole; the 
target for each firm depends on its research effort and on its 
contribution to the British economy. Subject to these constraints 
companies are allowed to set the prices at which their products are 
introduced. Irish prices are in pra£tice tied to those in the UK. In 
both countries they are in the middle range. 
31. In principle firms may set their own prices in France, but in 
practice admission to the national reimbursement system is strictly 
controlled. Products are dealt with on an individual basis. The price 
agreed between the manufacturer and the reimbursement authority 
depends on those of competitive products and on the company • s 1 oca 1 
activities in France. Belgium has a similar system. Prices are low in 
both countries, and especially in France. 
32. Denmark, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain control the prices of 
individual drugs by the use of cost-plus methods, and maintain 
positive lists. Prices are high in Denmark, below average in Italy and 
very low in the other three countries. 
33. In every CoiTUilunity country except the FRG, the price at which a 
product is introduced cannot subsequently be changed without official 
permission. Such permission is often delayed, refused or made 
contingent on the company expanding its local activities. 
34. As far as the adequacy of price levels is concerned, the attitude 
of the research-based companies is that sales in the Community market 
should ideally make a substantial contribution to world overhead 
costs, and in particular to the cost of innovation, and to profits. 
Prices in Denmark, the FRG and the Nether 1 ands are considered to be 
'satisfactory' form this point of view and those in the UK and Ireland 
'adequate'. 
35. Prices elsewhere are considered to be less than adequate. Those 
prevailing in France are thought to be strikingly low as were those in 
Italy until recently. Prices in Portugal and Spain are even lower. 
Nevertheless, the major firms continue to sell their products in these 
countries. The reason for this behaviour is that production costs are 
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relatively low, especially at the margin, while most other costs are 
fixed in the short run. It is therefore worth selling in any market in 
which direct costs are covered and some contribution is made to 
overheads. 
36. Official data suggests strongly that total costs vary considerably 
between member countries. In Italy, Portugal and Spain, low prices are 
offset to some extent by low costs and in the FRG high prices are 
accompanied by high cost. The UK is unusual in combining above average 
prices with below-average costs, while the reverse is true of France. 
All measures suggest that prices in France are uncomfortably low from 
the standpoint of the French-based industry, which depends heavily on 
its local market. In contrast the UK industry is markedly profitable. 
37. Consumer advocates claim, in opposition to the standpoint of the 
industry, that pharmaceutical prices are generally excessive and that 
the industry is inefficient in its use of resources. Central costs are 
inflated and conceal unnecessary activity, especially in marketing and 
administration. Prices would be more firmly controlled; alternatively, 
competition should be stimulated. 
38. In relation to national income, total expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals is relatively low in Denmark and the Netherlands, and, 
to a lesser extent, in Ireland and the UK. It is high in France, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. These variations result primarily 
from different attitudes to drugs rather than from differences in 
prices. For historical and cultural reasons the propensity to consume 
medicines is unusually high in southern Europe and low in northern 
Europe (paragraph 2). Such attitudes are difficult to change and must 
therefore influence national policies concerning the control of 
pharmaceutical expenditure. 
39. In relation to national price levels, pharmaceutical products are 
unusually cheap in France, and were so, until recently, in Italy. This 
is not the case in Greece, Portugal and Spain. It is arguable that in 
the former countries prices are strictly controlled in order to limit 
total expenditure because it is impossible to reduce the volume of 
consumption. In the latter nations, how~ver, low prices cor~espond to 
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low incomes. Prices in Denmark, the FRG and the Netherlands are high 
compared to other prices, perhaps because of the combination of free 
pricing, comprehensive health care services and a restrained attitude 
to medicines (table 1 and paragraph 38). 
40. In so far as comparison with otAer parts of the chemical industry 
is possible, the pharmaceutical industry of the Community appears to 
use its resources with equal efficiency. In most member countries, 
however - France is the principal exception - it appears to be 
appreciably more profitable. 
41. This is probably due to the ways in which price competition is 
limited by the arrangements for getting drugs to those who need them. 
Most products are available only on prescription (paragraph 1) and 
doctors see their prime duty as well-being of the patient rather than 
economy. The majority of the bill is paid by the state or the 
insurance agency. In most countries the distribution system 
incorporates definite monopoly elements. There is therefore scope for 
higher than normal profits. 
42. To this extent consumer organisations have grounds for their 
criticisms. As presently constituted, the arrangements for 
discovering, making and distributing drugs are as a whole rather more 
expensive than is strictly necessary. The extra profits realised by 
the industry, however, do not appear large while the future benefits 
to be derived from its continued activities are very considerable. It 
is also arguable {paragraph 46) that price competition is increasing 
in certain significant parts of the pharmaceutical market. Moreover, 
it is obvious that radical alterations to the system would require a 
major political effort. 
43. There is clear evidence that pr1c1ng systems may operate in a 
discriminatory way. As already mentioned (paragraphs 30-33}, 
individual prices and profit margins depend in several member 
countries on the scale and nature of a company's local activities. 
This obviously discriminates in favour of indigenous firms; it also 
promotes the unnecessary decentralisation of particular functions, 
with potential losses in economies of production {paragraphs 53-54). 
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44. Market distortions arise from the sharp differences in price 
level. The most obvious sign is parallel importing from low-price to 
high-price areas. It is seen in Denmark, the FRG, the Netherlands and 
the UK, the main sources of supply being France and Italy. The scale 
of this practice is quite small, however - it accounts for no more 
than 0. 5 per cent of tota 1 Conmuni ty sa 1 es - and has not increased 
recently. It is seen by the industry as an irritant rather than as a 
major threat. 
45. Although prices do not play a major role in the competition 
between pharmaceutical products (paragraph 41), they nevertheless have 
an appreciable if subordinate part. In countries which permit free 
pricing, in-patent products are introduced at prices explicitly 
related to those charged by their competitors. Therapeutic advantages 
justify a premium price of up to 25 per cent over other medicines in 
the same therapeutic class. 
46. A vigorous market in out-of-patent genric products has recently 
developed in those member countries where prices are high. Prices have 
been forced down and reductions in expenditure realised. Such products 
account for eight per cent by value of the UK market and ten per cent 
of that of the FRG and the Netherlands. It may be noted, however, that 
the market is highly imperfect and the originator is normally able to 
retain much of his sales even when charging a premium price. Official 
action to encourage generic products has been a sine qua non for the 
development of a successful generic sector. 
47. The industry welcomes the transparency directive which it sees as 
a step to reduce and perhaps eliminate discriminatory practices and, 
in particular, pressures to enlarge local activities beyond what is 
commercially desirable. Progress towards convergence of national price 
levels within the Community is widely anticipated. There is some 
anxiety about the basis on which this might take place. The directive 
has been less enthusiastically received by consumer advocates, who 
consider that it will do little to limit the profits of the industry. 
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48. The major pharmaceutical companies operating in Europe are 
organised on a multinational basis (paragraph 4). This could be 
sub-optimal from an economic standpoint. The need to carry out 
operations in many locations could give rise to losses in economies of 
scale. The coordination of such an organisation could prove 
excessively expensive. 
49. The research-oriented companies say that there would be no 
worthwhile economies of scale in research from the unification of the 
Community market. There are indeed such economies in serious 
innovative research but they have already been realised. Such 
activity is normally concentrated in the firm's country of origin. 
Where a company has major research centres abroad, they have been 
placed there in order to exploit local expertise. Within the 
Community such centres ar~ placed in the UK or, less frequently, in 
France. In a unified market there would be no immediate change in 
this policy. 
50. Local development work is more decentralised. It does not appear, 
however, that this activity would be much affected by unification. 
Formulation research for specific markets is best carried out on the 
spot, where local advice and information is most effective and tests 
may be most readily arranged. As has already been seen (paragraphs 
16, 18), local clinical research has 
functions as well as sci enti fie 
indispensable in practice. 
promotion a 1 and even po 1 it i ca 1 
ones, and may therefore be 
51. The scope for economies in marketing are also very 1 imited. 
Traditions of medical practice and patterns of consumptions vary 
markedly between member countries (paragraphs 1, 2) and different 
approaches are necessary for each market. Even more to the point, the 
key person in rna rket i ng is the sa 1 esman who ca 11 s on doctors to 
promote his company's products. If he is suitably persuasive, he must 
by definition be a native of the country in which he works. In 
practice marketing is always organised on a national basis, and no 
firm interviewed could see any alternative. 
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52. The possibility of economies in production are more considerable. 
The manufacture of pharmaceuticals involves two stages: the 
production of the active materials by extraction, synthesis or 
fermentation, and the conversion of these substances into dosage forms. 
The first of these steps is normally confined to a few sometimes a 
single-site in Europe, but the second is often decentralised. A 
common reason is reported to be pressure from host governments, often 
expressed in the course of price negotiations (paragraphs 30-33, 42). 
Multinational companies agree that to meet these demands is often to 
sacrifice economies of production. 
53. The equipment used for the formulation of active ingredients is 
relatively cheap but the building in which it is put, which requires 
elaborate air-conditioning and ultra-clean facilities is not. The 
total cost of a formulation plant depends not so much on the volume 
of output as on the product mix and on the technology used. Over a 
wide range of output, therefore, it may be taken as fixed. The number 
of such installations within the Community much exceeds need. 
American multinationals report that their European formulation plants 
were often working at between one third and one-half their capacity. 
54. Assuming this to be generally true, then between one-ha 1 f and 
two-thirds of all formulation plants belonging .to the multinational 
companies are surplus to requirements. There are approximately 250 
such plants within the Community. If they are conservatively valued 
at either ECU 10 or 20m each then the extra capital employed is in the 
range ECU 1250-3333m. If they were eliminated then, assuming a 
10-year lifetime for this kind of installation, the annual saving 
would be ECU 125-333m. 
55. If it is further assumed that the extra production could be 
provided by existing plants with no further labour then the reduction 
in employment may be tentatively estimated at a maximum of between 
12,500 and 16,500 persons. Labour costs would drop by ECU 225-295m. 
The total saving in production costs would then be ECU350-630m, or 
1.0-1.9 per cent of unit costs. If prices remained unchanged this 
would increase the trading profits of the Community industry as a 
whole by 7-14 per cent; alternatively spending on R & D might be 
raised by 8 - 15 per cent. 
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56. It should, however, be emphasised that these gains are markedly 
hypothetical. Multinational companies commented that in many cases 
their local activities were beneficial to them. In some countries, 
notably France, they are a condition of receiving an adequate price. 
In Germany, although pressures of this kind were absent, the free 
market permits relatively high pri~es which are advantageous in those 
export rna rkets in which they are 1 inked to those in the country of 
origin. More generally, firms feel an obligation to behave as 
corporate citizens of their host countries. Their local plants 
already exist, and it would be politically unacceptable and 
commercially damaging to shut them down. 
57. Multinational companies do not think that there are appreciable 
direct costs in running Europe-wide networks of subsidiaries. Most of 
them remarked that the extra staff required to coordinate their 
operations were few. 
58. The unification of the European market would therefore not be 
followed by large changes in the location of facilities. Some degree 
of concentration is seen as desirable but would happen slowly. 
Extensive action would have to await changes in pricing systems. Most 
companies indicated that they would continue to maintain production 
facilities in the five major countries of the Community. 
59. The savings which might be expected from unification of the 
Community pharmaceutical market have been estimated in a variety of 
more or less plausible scenarios on an exploration of company 
a~titudes. They are shown in table 3. In the first, no concentration 
of facilities takes place but economies due to unified and more rapid 
registration are realised (paragraph 22). In the second, 
multinational companies also withdraw all production facilities from 
Greece and Portugal. In the third, they further reduce the number of 
formulation plants which they operate by 50 per cent in France and by 
25 per cent each in Italy and Spain. The production lost by these 
countries is transferred to the FRG and the UK. 
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TABLE 3 SAVINGS IN DIRECT COSTS OF OPERATION TO COMPANIES AND COUNTRIES THROUGH 
THE UNIFICATION OF THE COMMUNITY MARKET ON A 1984 BASIS 
(For the three scenarios see para 59) 
Origin of firms FRANCE FRG UK USA SWITZ OTHER TOTAL 
SCENARIO 1 
Savings to firms 
- m ECU: lower value 10.7 23.4 17.6 65.6 28.6 14.1 160 
upper value 17.2 37.7 28.3 105.6 46.6 25.3 260 
-
As % unit costs 
lower value 0.19 0.26 0.51 0.91 1.34 0.22 0.48 
upper value 0.30 0.40 0.82 1.47 2.10 0.39 0. 77 
SCENARIO 2 
Absolute saving m ECU 
Low value 18.5 29.6 23.8 84.3 _31. 7 15.7 204 
High value 28.9 47.0 37.6 133.6 50.7 27.6 325 
Reduction in unit 
Costs % 
Low value 0.32 0.34 0.70 1.17 1.43 0.24 0.61 
High value 0.50 0.53 1.09 1.a6 2.15 0.43 0.96 
SCENARIO 3 
Absolute saving m ECU 
Low value 22.8 39.3 34.4 116.4 35.8 19.8 269 
High value 46.2 88.6 61.9 227.7 65.8 42.7 533 
Reduction in unit 
costs % 
Low value 0.40 0.44 1.00 1.62 1.68 0.30 0.79 
• 
High value 0.81 1.00 1.81 3.17 3.08 0.66 1.57 
Source: Author•s estimates 
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60. The savings realised range from a minimum of 0.5-0.8 per cent of 
European unit costs to a maximum of 0.8-1.6 per cent. These savings 
would accrue primarily to companies operating on a multinational basis 
in a large number of member nations. They are proportionately 
greatest for US firms followed by those based in Switzerland and, at 
some distance, by the UK. Becauss these estimates relate to all 
companies of a particular nationality it should be remembered that 
this reduction in unit costs might be considerably higher or lower for 
individual firms, depending on their circumstances. 
61. The funds so liberated might be used to increase investment in R & 
D, with a positive effect on competitive strength. For the Community 
as a whole research budgets could rise by between five and 18 per 
cent. However, as noted above, the rna in benefits wou 1 d be fe 1 t by 
companies based outside the Community. 
62. The effects of moves towards common pricing have been explored. 
Countries in which this enta i1 ed genera 1 increases in the price of 
pharmaceuticals would have to spend more on consumption but would 
simultaneously become more attractive as centres for production, since 
local production is always a major source of supply for the local 
market in the larger member countries of the Community. Countries in 
which prices fell would experience the reverse. Harmonisation on a 
basis which maintained total Community expenditure would benefit 
French and Ita 1 ian firms and wou 1 d have adverse effects on those of 
the FRG. UK, US and Swiss firms would break even. Harmonisation on a 
basis which reduced expenditure would be unambiguously unfavourable 
for all. 
63. In the longer term the effect of unifying the European market will 
be to make the strong stronger and the weak weaker. Firms which have 
depended on the favour of their governments will suffer, while those 
who are already highly competitive will flourish even more. The 
elimination of marginal companies should concentrate resources on the 
more efficient and enable them to exploit the opportunities of the 
future the more profitably. Accelerated progress towards a two-tier 
pharmaceutical industry, in which companies are either very large or 
relatively small, seems probable. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Terms of reference 
This study was commissioned by DGIII of the European Community in a 
contract with Economists Advisory Group Ltd (EAG) dated 24 August 
1987. The terms of reference are those set out in EAG's submission to 
DGIII dated 26 June 1987 and are given below: 
to review the present structure and organisation of the 
pharmaceutical industry within the European Community; 
to analyse of the costs and benefits of present institutional 
arrangements; 
to estimate the consequences in the short and longer term of the 
unification of the Community pharmaceutical market. 
1.2 Method 
The report is based on a review of the extensive 1 iterature of the 
world pharmaceutical industry which already exists including that 
commissioned by DGIII in 1983; on data collected from a large number 
of authoritative sources, notably the World Drug Marketing Manual 1986 
and from industry federations in Europe and the and the USA; and an 
extensive interview programme with appropriate ministries, government 
agencies, industry federations and pharmaceutical companies both 
within and without the Community. 
In all we interviewed in depth senior executives· from 12 large 
international pharmaceutical companies with major European operations. 
We also interviewed five industry associations, including EFPIA 
(European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries Associations). These 
interviews were semi-structured in nature and designed to elicit 
mainly qualitative information about attitudes and possible responses 
to official action. 
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We would like to thank all concerned who contributed the data, 
information and opinions on which this report is based. Naturally, 
responsibility for the report itself lies with the author. 
1.3 Timing 
The desk research was carried out between July and November 1987 and 
the interviews in August and September 1987. Our draft report was 
submitted 23 November 1987 and the final report in February 1988. 
1.4 Currency conversion 
The US dollar is commonly used as the standard yardstick for 
pharmaceutical sales, costs and expenditure. The bulk of the data used 
in this report refers to 1984, when the dollar had greatly appreciated 
against the ECU. All dollar figures have been converted to ECU at the 
value given by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as prevailing at 
the end of 1984, ie 1ECU=0.71 US$. 
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2 THE PHARMACEUTICAL SITUATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
The aim of this chapter is to review the pharmaceutical market and 
industry of the European Community as it was in the mid-80s. In so 
doing, particular attention is given to the extent to which they are 
divided along national or regional limes and to the factors which 
account for this state of affairs. Certain of these factors are 
analysed in greater detail at later points in the report; here the 
object is to identify and to describe. 
2.1 Patterns of demand 
In 1984 the consumption of pharmaceuticals within the 12 member 
countries of the Community was approximately ECU26,000m. (cf. table 
2.1). This was 21 per cent of the world total of ECU123,750m and made 
the Community market the second largest in the world, behind the USA, 
with nearly 28 per cent, but in front of Ja:pan, with 15 per cent. 
Within the Community five large countries - France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom- accounted 
for 89 per cent of pharmaceutical sales (1). 
In economic terms, the role of pharmaceuticals in health care is 
significant but not dominant. In 1983 pharmaceutical consumption 
formed between eight and 12 per cent of the health care budget in the 
member countries of the Community or rather less than one per cent of 
gross domestic product (GOP). Only in Portugal and Greece was this 
proportion much exceeded. Growth in the consumption of drugs has been 
moderate in recent years: in real terms the annual rate of increase 
from 1977 to 1984 was 2.6 per cent, which is less than that of health 
care spending in general and close to that of GOP (2). 
The large majority of pharmaceuticals are available only on 
prescription. Over-the-counter ( OTC) products generally account for 
ten per cent or less of total sales; only in the FRG, the Netherlands 
and the UK are they more significant. They consist of established 
remedies for minor illnesses. Their share of the market is static. 
Between 12 and 20 per cent of prescription drugs are used in 
hospitals; the remainder are prescribed by medical personnel working 
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TABLE 2.1 PHARMACEUTICAL CONSUMPTION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1984 
Country Total Per As % As % By type and outlet (%) Average Relative 
sales capita GOP health price 
ECU ECU care OTC Ethical (UK=lOO) 
(1) 
Belgium 880 90 0.81 
Denmark 370 74 0.50 
France 5600 102 0.81 
FRG 7660 125 0.89 
Greece 449 45 0.95 
Ireland 16G 46 0.67 
Italy 4440 78 0.91 
Nether- 660 46 0.38 
lands 
Portugal 350 35 1.08 
Spain 1830 48 0.81 
UK 3510 62 0.59 
Total 25910 82 0.78 
(1) at manufacturers• prices 
(2) 1983 
(3) including dispensing doctors 
costs 
(2) 
8.6 12 
7.0 15 
8.8 9 
11.0 16 
20.2 
8.8 5 
12.4 8 
4.1 
18.9 
12.1 
9.6 20 
9.5 12 
83 
93 
88 
through through 
retail hospi ta 1 s 
pharmacies 
(3) 
76 12 
70 15 
78 13 
66 18 
17 
80 15 
79 13 
n/a 
7 
12 
67 13 
74 14 
(4) using the 1983 indices of the EC statistical office 
(5) per capita spending/average price. 
(4) 
103 
154 
76 
164 
73 
115 
57 
145 
1 ow 
low 
100 
91 
volume 
Per 
capita 
(UK=100) 
( 5) 
140 
77 
216 
122 
99 
65 
221 
51 
n/a 
n/a 
100 
152 
Source: Author•s estimates based on IMF and IMS data and OECD: Measuring Health Care 
1960-1983 
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outside hospitals. Thus, the role of the physician, and especially the 
physician practising outside hospitals, has a powerful influence on 
the scale and nature of pharmaceutical consumption. 
There are considerable variations in the demand for drugs between the 
various member countries of the CommuDity. Table 2.2 presents relevant 
data. It is clear that these differences cannot readily be explained 
in economic or demographic terms. Age structures and major causes of 
death are similar everywhere. National consumption is sensitive to 
differences in per capita income and in average price levels, but 
these factors account for less than half the total variance. In terms 
of volume, demand is unusually high in France, Greece and Italy, and 
unusually low in the UK and and, especially, in Denmark and the 
Netherlands (3). 
More fruitful explanations lie in the variations in attitudes tow~rds 
medicines and in the institutional arrangements by which they are 
delivered to patients. As has already been seen, most drugs are 
obtained on prescription and it may be significant that countries in 
which doctors are paid on a capitation basis consume less than those 
in which they are paid for each consultation. A possible reason is 
that in the former, unlike the latter, the physician has no incentive 
to see his or her patients more than is absolutely necessary and 
opportunities to prescribe are thereby reduced (4). 
Attitudes also differ. A belief in the prophylactic benefits of taking 
medicines is more common in France or Italy than in, say, the UK or 
the USA. This may affect both the tendency to offer drugs and the 
tendency to accept them. British patients are markedly less likely to 
receive prescriptions than their French, Italian or Spanish 
counterparts. As table 2.3 shows, there are also considerable national 
variations in patterns of diagnosis and treatment. Menta 1 disorders 
are strikingly more common in Britain and France than in Italy or 
Spain. Conversely, the incidence of diseases of the digestive system 
is much higher in Italy than elsewhere. 
The types of complaint with which patients present themselves are in 
part social constructions resulting from the underlying assumptions 
about health and sickness of professional and ~atient alike. Many 
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TABLE 2.2 ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC AND MEDICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY IN 1984 
Country GOP Birth Death 
per rate rate 
capita /1000 /1000 
ECU 
Belgium 11090 11.7 11.1 
Denmark 14926 10.1 11.2 
France 12560 13.8 9.9 
FRG 14119 9.5 11.3 
Greece 4760 12.7 8.9 
Ireland 7042 18.2 9.1 
Italy 8611 10.3 9.3 
Nether- 12018 12.1 8.3 
lands 
Portugal 2911 14.2 9.6 
Spain 5926 12.5 7.7 
UK 10598 12.9 11.4 
Total 10366 11.9 10.0 
(1) 1980-85 
% Population 
aged aged 
0-14 65+ 
18.8 13.7 
18.6 14.9 
21.6 12.9 
15.5 14.7 
21.5 13.3 
29.6 10.6 
20.2 12.8 
20.9 11.9 
24.8 10.5 
24.7 11.8 
19.6 14.8 
20.4 13.4 
Expectation % Deaths from 
of life at Cardia- Neoplasms 
birth (yrs.) vascular 
Men Women disease 
(1) 
70.0 76.8 38.0 23.3 
71.6 77.5 44.2 24.4 
71.2 79.4 36.0 23.1 
70.8 77.5 50.6 22.8 
72.1 76.4 45.9 19.4 
70.1 75.6 50.5 19.6 
71.0 77.8 47.3 22.7 
73.0 79.5 44.5 27.4 
68.9 75.8 44.2 16.1 
72.6 78.6 45.8 20.1 
71.8 77.6 49.1 22.8 
<---n/a---> 47.2 22.9 
Source: Eurostat Demographic Yearbook 1987, national sources. 
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TABLE 2.3 LEADING DIAGNOSES BY ICD CHAPTER HEADINGS IN FIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
IN 1982 
% of all top 20 diagnoses 
Chapter heading France FRG Italy Spain UK 
Infective, parasitic diseases 2.7 4.4 4.4 
Endocrine, nutritional and 4.2 3.4 5.6 5.5 2.3 
metabolic diseases 
Mental disorders 16.4 10.5 7.4 4.6 16.5 
Diseases of the nervous system 2.7 2.7 2.3 
and sense organs 
Circulatory diseases 31.0 26.0 23.6 18.4 16.7 
Respiratory diseases 21.4 23.9 25.6 41.9 20.0 
Diseases of the digestive 3.6 7.4 17.1 3.5 2.5 
system 
Diseases of the skin etc. 3.4 6.0 4.1 3.0 3.9 
Musculoskeletal diseases 3.8 8.0 12.2 7.0 9.0 
Symptoms and ill-defined 10.8 11.6 9.0 22.8 
conditions 
Leading twenty diagnoses 36.5 46.5 42.2 36.5 46.6 
as %all diagnoses 
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TABLE 2.3 continued 
LEADING TWENTY DRUG SUB-GROUPS BY ANATOMICAL GROUP 
% of all top 20 drug sub-groups 
Group France FRG Italy Spain UK 
Alimentary tract and metabolism 6.2 3.7 19.4 13.2 6.5 
Blood and blood-forming organs 2.9 
Cardiovascular system 26.5 29.2 25.5 16.2 16.3 
Dermatological 3.6 
Genito-urinary/sex hormones 2.6 3.2 3.3 
Systematic anti-infectives 6.6 7.0 13.6 15.4 
Musculoskeletal system 12.0 12.0 13.4 14.4 5.2 
Central nervous system 25.9 20.4 13.6 14.4 28.9 
Respiratory system 22.8 26.5 17.9 28.2 14.6 
Leading twenty drug sub-groups 51.3 53.3 47.0 50.6 61.5 
as %all prescriptions 
Source: o•Brien, 1984 tables 10 and 13 
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consultations and much treatment concerns minor illnesses, often vague 
in nature, and social factors play an important part in determining 
the outcome. This is reflected in the types of drugs consumed. There 
is a much higher degree of international consensus where serious 
illness is concerned. Even here, however, there are significant 
national variations in the preferred forms of pharmaceutical 
treatment, as table 2.4 indicates for the case of essential benign 
hypertension, one of the most common diagnoses in all European 
countries. 
In fact there appear to be three broad traditions of medical practice 
within the Community. The first is common to Denmark, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and the UK. In these countries the propensity to take 
drugs is low. Products acting on the central nervous system are 
unusually important. Beta-blockers are widely used to treat 
cardiovascular conditions. The second is common to the Mediterranean 
member countries, and, to a considerable extent, to Belgium and 
France. Here the propensity to consume pharmaceuticals is high. 
Treatment of the alimentary tract is emphasised. Peripheral 
vasodilators are the most important class of cardiovascular drug. The 
use of pharmaceuticals in the FRG shows elements of both these 
traditions, but also peculiarities of its own (5). 
This is an important conclusion. The European pharmaceutical market is 
not only divided by wide variations in national wealth but also by 
attitudes to the use of medicines. These attitudes are embodied in the 
training and behaviour of doctors and the expectations of patients. 
The product of fundamental social and psychological factors, they are 
slow to change and difficult to manipulate. Divisions of this kind are 
therefore likely to remain for many years to come, with consequences 
that are explored later. 
2.2 Patterns of supply 
The supply of pharmaceuticals to the member nations of the Community 
is highly internationalised. Table 2.5 shows the breakdown of 1984 
sales through retail pharmacies by the nationality of the company 
concerned. Although an approximate measure - only 74 per cent of the 
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TABLE 2.4 THE DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF ESSENTIAL BENIGN HYPERTENSION IN FIVE 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN 1982 
France FRG Italy Spain UK 
Number of diagnoses (000) 21651 22260 24780 9157 18622 
Number receiving drug treatment (000) 20059 n/a 24373 8593 15641 
Total no. of prescriptions (000) 37254 25568 33421 10754 22335 
Diagnoses/1000 population 401 360 433 244 333 
Drug treatment/diagnosis 0.93 n/a 0.98 0.94 0.84 
Prescriptions/drug treatment 1.85 n/a 1.37 1.22 1.43 
Five leading prescriptions as % total prescriptions in each country 
Beta-blockers 12.7 13.6 10.9 7.2 26.1 
Beta-blocker + combinations 9.7 8.1 
Synthetic hypotensives 19.8 9.9 20.2 11.3 18.8 
Hypotensives + diuretics 37.9 21.5 38.3 
Thiazide combinations 17.4 8.3 11.3 8.0 31.1 
Other diuretics 11.0 14.5 18.6 7.8 
Peripheral vasodilators 8.6 
Source: O'Brien, 1984 
jj 
I 
I 
I 
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TABLE 2.5 SALES OF DRUGS THROUGH RETAIL PHARMACIES BY COMPANIES OF VARIOUS 
NATIONALITIES IN 1984 
ECUm (1) 
Origin of 
company -->Bel Den Fra FRG Gre Irl Ita Net Por Spa UK USA Swi Swe Total 
SALES IN 
Belgium 58 7 65 59 10 17 72 237 73 10 608 
Denmark 11 169 20 45 4 7 30 7 28 20 349 
France 113 24 2500 346 15 79 220 1023 342 4662 
FRG 99 26 248 2730 45 97 241 962 534 82 5064 
Greece 4 6 13 44 42 4 34 70 52 269 
Ireland 1 4 4 7 1 31 42 11 2 103 
Italy 13 15 176 520 1494 39 23 311 720 393 38 3742 
Netherlands 11 14 35 56 4 56 107 163 66 23 535 
Portugal 6 10 28 4 44 18 86 46 242 
Spain 20 13 68 227 44 8 508 120 248 196 1452 
UK 28 46 85 232 8 20 723 865 187 39 2233 
Total 364 324 3224 4294 42 1 1628 327 67 508 1915 4423 1925 214 19259 
% Of European 
market 
held 1.8 1.7 16.8 22.4 <1 <1 8.5 1.7 <1 2.6 10.0 23.0 10.0 1.1 100.0 
% Local 
market 
held 10 48 54 63 16 1 40 17 18 35 32 
Home sale 
as % 
European 
sales 16 45 78 63 100 1 92 17 66 100 38 
(1) At manufacturers' prices 
Source : Author's estimates based on IMS data - see text. 
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total market is covered - it indicates the general pattern clearly 
enough (6). 
Taking the Community as a whole, 43 per cent of sales are by 
indigenous companies to their own national market. In every member 
country the locally-owned industry has a disproportionately large 
share of the local market, although only in France and FRG does this 
amount to more than 50 per cent. In the case of the smaller member 
nations the proportion is usually much lower; in Belgium, Ireland and 
the Netherlands it is ten per cent or less. 
Supplies from companies based in other Community countries make up a 
further 23 per cent of the total. German, British and French firms, in 
that order, are most important sources, although the very strong 
international orientation of Belgian, Danish and Dutch companies is 
apparent. Geography and national attitudes to medicine play an obvious 
part in determining the strength or otherwise of particular suppliers 
in particular countries. 
Approximately 34 per cent comes from firms based outside the 
Community. US companies account for 23 per cent; they are especially 
strong in the UK and in the smaller Community nations. Swiss firms 
have ten per cent of the total market, showing strength in every 
country. Of the remainder, only Sweden is a significant source of 
drugs for the Community. Japanese and third world companies are as yet 
conspicuous by their absence. 
This situation has not greatly changed since 1980, although British 
firms appear to be gaining ground in Europe and French and Italian 
ones losing it. This reflects the stability of the industry as a whole 
in recent years, and the measured pace at which the international 
distribution of strengths and weaknesses changes. This latter area is 
explored in section 2.5 below (7). 
Companies can supply foreign markets by trade or through local 
manufacture. In the case of pharmaceuticals the latter is the more 
important. Community trade in finished drugs in 1984 is shown in table 
2.6. Total imports from outside the Community amounted to ECU1,176m or 
about four per cent of total sales. A comparison of individual 
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TABLE 2.6 TRADE IN FINISHED DRUGS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN 1984 
ECUm 
From: Bel Den Fra FRG Gre Irl Ita Net Spa UK USA Swi Swe Oth Total 
To: 
Belgium 13 100 145 1 3 20 59 7 41 23 65 18 8 503 
Denmark 14 17 21 14 3 13 1 37 4 23 23 11 181 
France 44 1 21 7 24 31 1 77 23 30 8 13 280 
FRG 128 34 182 1 11 69 59 24 96 55 182 58 82 981 
Greece 8 6 11 24 1 4 3 13 6 17 1 1 95 
Ireland 4 3 4 10 1 8 4 120 4 4 1 4 167 
Italy 25 10 41 128 13 1 75 35 108 4 30 474 
Nether- 131 24 72 75 7 13 4 75 3 68 11 8 491 
lands 
Portugal 7 4 4 24 1 4 1 20 7 30 1 1 103 
Spain 1 14 1 4 1 8 13 4 4 4 54 
UK 54 51 86 189 4 39 27 59 3 58 54 42 27 693 
Total 416 164 518 641 6 82 163 249 46 562 231 585 171 189 4022 
Source OECD: Trade by Commodities, Imports, category 5417, 1984 
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trade figures with the market shares held by companies of particular 
nationality (table 2.5} suggests that production in the Community by 
US firms amounted to about ECU4,200 and by Swiss firms to about 
ECU1,450m. 
It is more difficult to decide how much foreign production there is 
within the Community by firms based there. Trade returns do not 
differentiate between companies according to their ownership. A figure 
of ECU2,500m seems probable, which would give a grand total of about 
ECU8,000m or about 40 per cent of all sales through retail pharmacies. 
If this proportion were to apply to all pharmaceutical sales, then the 
foreign production within the Community might be as high as 
ECUll,OOOm (8}. 
Estimates of the distribution of this capacity, based on a variety of 
sources, are given in table 2.7. Local production by the affiliates of 
foreign multinationals is most common in large countries, especially 
where restrictive attitudes towards imports formerly existed. France, 
Italy and Spain fall into this category. The UK is popular with US 
firms for cultural reasons and Germany because prices are high and the 
industrial milieu attractive. 
Among the smaller countries, Greece and Portugal have encouraged the 
development of local production facilities by a variety of means. 
Although their local markets are dominated by foreign companies, most 
of the products consumed are made locally. Denmark, Ireland and the 
Netherlands, however, are supplied largely by imports, even though 
Ireland is a favourite site for the manufacture and export of active 
ingredients. 
Once again, this situation has 
Multinational operation within 
1950-1975 as a response to then 
changed little in recent years. 
Europe developed in the period 
prevelant non-tariff barriers. As 
these have been reduced, the drive to penetrate local markets through 
local production has abated somewhat, although other arguments 
favouring such activities have taken its place. Much recent expansion 
has involved the purchase of existing companies by foreign interests 
( 9). 
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TABLE 2.7 SUPPLIES OF FINISHED DRUGS THROUGH RETAIL PHARMACIES BY LOCAL 
AFFILIATES OF FOREIGN COMPANIES IN EUROPE 
ECUm (1) 
Origin of 
company--> France 
Host 
country 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Italy 
Nether-
lands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
Total 
110 
140 
70 
30 
350 
FRG 
350 
30 
420 
15 
210 
110 
1135 
(1) At manufacturers' prices 
Sources: Author's estimates 
UK USA Switzerland Other 
30 210 
170 1000 320 40 
170 920 400 30 
30 70 40 
250 700 300 70 
110 
80 30 
110 240 210 70 
850 140 
760 4180 1440 210' 
Total 
240 
1880 
1630 
170 
1880 
110 
125 
910 
1130 
8075 
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Other aspects of multinational operation are discussed in later parts 
of this report. It is clear that a large minority of the drugs 
consumed within the Community are made outside the country of origin 
of the companies selling them. US and Swiss firms are overwhelmingly 
dependent on local production of this kind, while British and German 
firms also have substantial foreign facilities. French and, still more 
Italian firms are more centralised. 
2.3 The structure of the European pharmaceutical industry 
In 1984 pharmaceutical production within the European Community 
amounted to ECU39,300 (table 2.8). The largest national producer was 
the FRG, followed by France, the UK, Italy and Spain in that order 
{10). 
Size by itself, however, means little. A nation•s drug industry may 
very largely consist of foreign-owned firms; equally it may be limited 
to turning active ingredients into dosage forms. At the present time, 
competition between companies is primarily through the introduction of 
new and better products. The capacity for product innovation is 
therefore critical, and this capacity is very largely embodied in a 
limited number of large firms with the necessary resources, which now 
require minimum annual sales of ECU150m. It is companies of this kind 
which dominate the world production of and the world trade in 
pharmaceuticals (11). 
In 1985/6 there were approximately 100 such firms in the world, of 
which 60 were operating in the European Community. They are identified 
in table 2.9. They include all but a handful of the companies with a 
serious research capability; conversely, all of them but a handful are 
research-oriented firms. Of this total, 20 were American in origin, 10 
German, eight British, five French, four Swiss, four Italian, three 
Swedish, and two each Belgian, Danish and Dutch. No Greek, Portugese 
or Spanish company had sales of as much as ECU75m. The predominance of 
the USA was even more marked in the select group of firms with annual 
sales of more than ECU750m. 
These companies have a strong international orientation. Their 
products are developed for world-wide markets; the costs of innovation 
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TABLE 2.8 PHARMACEUTICAL OUTPUT IN EUROPEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1984 
COUNTRY PHARMA 
COMPANIES 
NUMBER 
(1) 
Belgium 80 
Denmark 39 
France· 331 
FRG 308 
Greece 90 
Ireland 153 
Italy 365 
Nether- 47 
lands 
Portugal 96 
Spain 370 
UK 333 
Total 2212 
(1) Manufacturers only 
(2) 1983 
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTION 
TOTAL VALUE TRADING AS % 
ECUm ADDED PROFIT CHEMICAL 
% AS % SALES 
(2) SALES ( 2) 
(3) 
1290 49 17 9.4 
870 44 19 36.4 
8530 30 5 19.6 
10140 46 11 12.4 
405 20 
1040 69 52.4 
6300 41 10 21.0 
1050 
410 
2570 42 12 19.3 
6700 52 29 16.8 
39300 43 13 16.8 
(3) Author's estimates based on 1983 Eurostat data. 
Source: IMS, Eurostat, National sources 
R&D 
EXPENDITURE 
TOTAL AS % 
$m PHARfv'IA 
SALES 
125 10 
65 7 
1090 13 
1430 14 
<1 
15 5 
380 6 
110 11 
<1 
40 2 
910 14 
4165 11 
EMPLOYMEN" 
(000) 
10 
8 
66 
87 
3 
4 
64 
10 
3 
32 
66 
353 
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TABLE 2.9 PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES SELLING MORE THAN ECU150M IN 
1985/6 AND ACTIVE IN THE EEC MARKET 
Company 
SOLVAY 
UCB 
BENZON 
NOVO 
RHONE-POULENC 
ROUSSEL 
SANOFI 
SERVIER 
SYNTHELABO 
ALTANA 
BASF 
BAYER 
Nationality Pharma 
Belgian 
Belgian 
Danish 
Danish 
French 
French 
French 
French 
French 
German 
German 
German 
sales 
ECUm (1) 
428 
152 
207 
322 
1178 
887 
707 
282 
300 
413 
459 
3193 
Main therapeutic 
areas 
Antispasmodics, vaccines 
. CNS 
Antidiabetic 
Cardiovascular, antibiotic 
Cardiovascular, CNS, NSAI 
Varied 
Cardiovascular, CNS, other 
Cardiovascular, digestive 
Antiasthmatic, other 
Cardiovascular, other 
Cardiovascular, CNS, other 
Other interests 
Chemicals 
Chemicals 
Chemicals 
( 1) 
Chemicals 
Chemicals 
BOEHRINGER- German 1843 Antiasthmatic, cardiovascular 
INGELHEIM CNS 
BOEHRINGER- German n/a Antidiabetic, cardiovascular Diagnostics 
MANNHEIM 
DEGUSSA German 
E MERCK German 600 Varied 
NATTERMAN German 183 OTC, generic 
SCHERING German 1018 Sex hormones, digestive Agrochemicals 
SCHWARZ German 150 Cardiovascular 
ERBAMONT Italian 606 Antibiotics, anti-cancer Chemicals, fibres 
MENARINI Italian 362 Anti-ulcer, other 
SERONO I tal ian 175 Immunological, hormones 
SIGMA TAU Italian 170 Cardiovascular, other 
AKZO Netherlands 907 Sex hormones, CNS, other Chemicals, fibres 
GISTBROCADES Netherlands 207 Antibiotics, cardiovascular Chemicals 
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TABLE 2.9 Continued 
BEECHAM British 1290 Antibiotics, cardiovascular Consumer products 
BOOTS British 360 Anti-rheumatic Consumer products 
FISONS British 403 Anti-a 11 ergy Scientific 
equipment 
GLAXO British 2408 Anti-ulcer, anti-asthmatic, 
dermatological, other 
ICI British 1707 Cardiovascular, anti-cancer Chemicals 
RECKITT & British 218 Analgesic, OTC Consumer products 
COLEMAN 
SMITH & British 342 OTC 
NEPHEW 
WELL COME British 1316 Anti-gout, anti-infective, 
other 
CIBA-GEIGY Swiss 3208 Anti-reumatic, cardiovascular Chemicals 
other 
HOFFMANN- Swiss 2179 CNS, vitamins Fine chemicals 
LAROCHE 
SANDOZ Swiss 2242 Cardiovascular, analgestic, Chemicals 
other 
NESTLE Swiss 480 Opthalmological, special foods Food 
ASTRA Swedish 727 Cardiovascular, anti-asthmatic 
PHARMACIA Swedish 383 Digestive 
KABIVITRIUM Swedish 201 Urological 
ABBOTT us 2628 Antibiotics, cardiovascular Hospital supplies 
AMERICAN us 1646 Antibiotics, anti rheumatics Chemicals 
CYANAMID 
AMERICAN HOME us 3570 CNS, hormones, OTC Consumer products 
PRODUCTS 
BRISTOL-MEYERS us 2469 Antibiotics, anti-cancer, other Toiletries 
DOW us 1068 Various Chemicals 
JOHNSON & us 1606 Antifungal, CNS, digestive Consumer products 
JOHNSON Hospital supplies 
ELI LILLY us 2515 Antibiotics, other Agrochemicals 
MERCK & CO us 3977 Cardiovascular, antirheumatics, 
opthalmological 
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TABLE 2.9 Continued 
MONSANTO us 369 Cardiovascular Chemicals 
PFIZER us 3762 Antibiotics, antirheumatics, Agrochemicals 
cardiovascular 
PROCTER & us 413 Cardiovascular, urological Consumer products 
GAMBLE 
ROBINS us 521 Anti-rheumatics, OTC 
RORER us 476 Digestive, OTC 
SCHERING- us 1580 Dermatological, hormones Consumer products 
PLOUGH 
SMITHKLINE us 2330 Anti-ulcer, cardiovascular Scientific 
BECKMANN equipment 
SQUIBB us 1686 Cardiovascular, antibiotics, Consumer products 
Anti-rheumatics 
STERLING us 814 Analgesics, OTC Consumer products 
SYNTEX us 1131 Anti-rheumatics, hormones 
UP JOHN us 2243 Antibiotics, anti-cancer, CNS Agrochemicals 
WARNER-LAMBERT us 2637 Cardiovascular, dermatological, Toiletries, foods 
OTC 
{1) World wide sales 
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are too high to permit any other strategy. They are usually organised 
on multinational lines. The extent to which operations are 
decentralised depends on the function in question. Marketing is always 
organised on a nation-by-nation basis. The formulation of active 
ingredients into bulk drugs and their conversation into dosage forms 
may be carried out in many countries, but the manufacture of the 
active ingredients themselves is usually confined to limited number of 
sites. Clinical and other development work is often dispersed, but 
basic and commercially sensitive research tends to be centralised 
(12). 
As would be expected from section 2.2 above, the multinational form of 
organisation is especially favoured by the largest companies and by 
those of American and Swiss origin. British and German firms also 
decentralise their operations but the French and Italians do so to a 
much more limited extent. Britain is a particularly popular site for 
fundamental research and Ireland for the manufacture of active 
materials. Downstream manufacturing is widely dispersed, especially 
among the member nations of Southern Europe (13). 
These major research-oriented companies form, as it were, the first 
division within the industry. Below them are a much larger number of 
independent firms of more limited capacity. Some are on the fringes of 
the research-oriented group, although their continued ability to stay 
there must be increasingly in question. Others specialise in 
particular areas, such as diagnostic aids. Yet others concentrate on 
generics and OTC products, or exploit local markets with 
well-established remedies. Their focus is national rather than 
international, and their strategies opportunistic rather than 
dynamic ( 14) . 
Companies of this type with annual sales of ECU5-7Sm, are important in 
most European countries. Among the larger Community nations they 
retain 20-30 per cent of the retail market in France, Germany, Italy 
and Spain. Only in the UK have they largely disappeared. Their 
continued importance is an important element in the fragmentation of 
the European pharmaceutical market. International firms have 
international attitudes to medicine; national ones have national 
attitudes (15). 
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2.4 National strengths and weaknesses 
There is no one yardstick of national competitive strength in 
pharmaceuticals. The number of new active materials developed in a 
country is a measure of innovative activity but not all new compounds 
are successful. Trade balances lose some of their meaning in an 
industry which is organised on multinational lines. World sales are a 
better measure, but may reflect the successes of the recent past 
rather than the present. In any case, some markets are more 
attractive than others from a commercial standpoint. 
In practice, however, most indicators point in the same direction. A 
number are listed in table 2.10. Most of them are self-explanatory~ 
but several call for explanation. Estimates of sales in the various 
national and regional markets and in total are based on a mixture of 
market and company data which are not entirely comparable. Innovative 
strength is particularly difficult to measure, and several different 
scales are therefore presented (16). 
The USA industry is clearly hors concours. With more than one-third of 
world sales outside the command economies it is everywhere strong, 
continuing to dominate its own exceptionally competitive domestic 
market. It remains the major source of new products and, in 
particular, of those which attain world-wide sales. The Swiss 
industry, although much smaller, is also in the first rank. As has 
already been seen, both hold substantial proportions of the Community 
market, and have extensive manufacturing and research facilities 
there. 
The position of the European member countries is more complex. The 
research-oriented German companies are clearly competitive at the 
world level; the German industry also contains, however, a 
considerable number of smaller firms whose viability is less certain. 
The UK-owned pharmaceutical companies hold only a minor part of their 
home market, but they are both large and have excellent records of 
research and a markedly international outlook. The appreciable share 
of sales in the USA and the rest of the EEC held by UK firms is highly 
significant. 
TABLE 2.10 MEASURES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH AMONG NATIONS 
Country 
Belgium 
France 
FRG 
Italy 
UK 
Other EEC 
Switzerland 
USA 
Japan 
Other 
Measures of innovative capacity 
% of new chemical No of top 100 
entities introduced 
(1) 
1971-80 1981-5 
2.1 5.0 
15.0 6.5 
13.5 14.0 
10.8 5.5 
4.4 8.0 
0.5 0.5 
6.7 6.0 
22.9 13.0 
11.7 26.0 
12.4 14.5 
products in 
1980 (2) 
2 
3 
14 
2 
14 
1 
12 
35 
8 
9 
Share of 1984 markets (%) 
EEC USA Japan World 
(3) <-------(4)------> 
4 <1 <1 2 
17 <1 <1 7 
22 4 4 11 
8 <1 <1 3 
10 5 2 6 
5 <1 <1 2 
10 8 3 9 
23 80 10 35 
<1 <1 80 19 
1 <1 <1 6 
(1) 1971-80, Reis-Arndt: Die Pharmazeutische Industrie, 1982, 44, 415, 1981-5: Scrip, various issues 
(2) EFPIA, 1984 
(3) Table 2.5 above 
(4) Author's estimates based on IMS data 
Overall ranking 
Medium 
See text 
I 
High ~ 
Medium 
High 
Generally low 
High 
High 
Medium 
Generally low 
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France is less well placed. The French industry is still heavily 
dependent on sales within France and to the Franc zone. French 
companies have made little impact in the USA or Japan, and only a 
relatively modest one in the European Community. The sector still 
contains a 1 arge number of sma 11 firms with 1 imi ted resources. The 
situation in Italy is broadly similar. The Italian industry is 
excessively fragmented and bears the marks of the long period during 
which patent protection for pharmaceuticals was not permitted. 
The industries of Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands show elements 
of competitive strength. They are strongly export-oriented, but suffer 
from their moderate size. With one exception, their major companies 
lack a fully developed international structure. Ireland is in a 
curious position: supplied almost entirely by imports, it is a centre 
for the manufacture of active ingredients by foreign, especially 
American firms, for reasons which are discussed in section 2.5 below. 
A notable Irish-owned research-only firm has recently emerged (17). 
The indigenous pharmaceutical industries of Greece, Portugal and Spain 
are weak. Their main activity is the conversion of active ingredients 
into dosage forms; they are still heavily dependent on imports of the 
former. Research is limited. The local companies are small by 
international standards and concentrate on the local markets, which 
are dominated by foreign multinationals. 
2.5 The role of governments 
The pharmaceutical industry is subject to a very considerable degree 
of government regulation. The ways in which certain of these 
regulations work, and their role in dividing the European market is 
the subject of later chapters in this report; at this point our aim is 
to identify the activities controlled and to examine the explicit and 
latent objectives of official direction. 
The main areas of regulation are shown in table 2.11. A major 
objective is to make sure that pharmaceutical are effective and safe 
to use (cf chapter 3 below). The admission of new products to national 
markets is strictly c:ontrolled. Proof of safety, efficacy and quality 
is universally required. This process of registration applies not only 
TABLE 2.11 GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND OTHER SPECIFICATION INVOLVING THE COMMUNITY PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
Price of Tariff and 
Admission of individual Other measures Subsidies and non-tariff National Qualification 
new products drugs to limit pharma tax concessions barriers to pharma of patent 
Country controlled controlled expenditure trade company protection 
Belgium Yes I i t Denmark Yes No No 
France Yes No ~ ~ ,eo. U\1 FRG No + Greece Yes Yes Yes limited No Yes Yes 
I 
• I Ireland No Yes . f ~ Italy Yes limited No Netherlands No + 
Portugal Yes No Being phased out No 
I 
Spain Yes ~ Being phased out ~ UK No No 
Source: EAG 
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to genuinely novel products but also to those based on existing 
ingredients, althou,gh the requirements are generally less stringent 
for the latter. The packages, labels and patient information leaflets 
to be used must be approved. Post marketing surveillance is now 
standard in all member countries. Manufacturing requires a licence and 
the periodic inspection of production facilities is normal. The 
methods used to market drugs are also regulated to a greater or lesser 
extent. 
A second important aim is to limit pharmaceutical expenditure. In all 
member nations the state is heavily committed to the provision of 
health care, whether directly or through national insurance agencies. 
Expenditure for this purpose has greatly increased during the past 25 
years and economy measures have become necessary. Controls over 
pharmaceutical expenditure are therefore normal (cf chapter 4 below). 
Most member countries prefer to fix the prices of individual drugs, 
usually on a cost-p'lus. The UK limits the profitability of companies. 
The FRG, unusually, has no formal price controls but strongly 
encourages generic competition. Positive lists, which confine 
reimbursement to approved products, and negative lists, which exclude 
certain drugs or categories of drugs, are common. As a result of these 
measures, there are large variations in pharmaceutical prices between 
one European country and another, even when they have many economic 
and demographic characteristics in common (cf. table 2.1)(18). 
A third objective is to encourage the development of the local 
pharmaceutical industry for strategic reasons, as a source of income 
and employment, or in order to economise on foreign exchange. Measures 
to this end may be positive or negative. In the former category are 
subsidies and tax concessions. They have been used successfully in 
Ireland to build up a substantial capacity for the production of 
active ingredients, almost all of which is owned by foreign companies. 
Elsewhere they have been little employed. Negative measures include 
tariffs and restrictions on imports. Important in the past, they have 
largely disappeared except in Spain and Portugal, which are phasing 
them out. The abrogation of patent rights in the interests of 1 oca 1 
producers is likewise of significance only in these countries, which, 
once again, are in a transitional stage following their adherence to 
the Treaty of Rome (19). 
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In practice most regulation is carried out at the national level. 
Progress towards a fully unified European system has been considerable 
but is not yet complete. Obvious barriers to trade, such as tariffs, 
quotas and speci fie restrictions on pharmaceuti ca 1 imports have been 
eliminated. A European Patent Convention has been in operation since 
1978. The registration of new products, however, remains a national 
responsibility, as do price controls. To a substantiai extent, the 
criteria of safety, quality and efficiency employed within the 
Community have been harmonised, as have certain of the procedures for 
marketing authorisation and for manufacture. An agreed method for 
multistate applications has existed since 1977 and was revised in 
1985. In practice, however, there are still substantial differences in 
the decisions made by the various national authorities. Little 
progress has been made in the harmonisation of pricing systems (20). 
A further point may be made. Regulations can be used for more than one 
purpose. The registration of new products may be delayed in order to 
control pharmaceuti ca 1 expenditure. Negotiations about price may be 
the occasion to press a foreign company to expand its local 
activities. National controls may be used to discriminate in favour of 
the national industry. There is much anecdotal evidence, some of which 
was collected in the course of the enquiry, to suggest that such 
practices are common (chapter 4.4 below). 
2.6 The place of the pharmaceutical industry in national politics 
Government regulation of the pharmaceutical industry means that 
official policies are a permanent if minor part of the political 
agenda. Every administration faces the same dilemma. 
As we have seen, hea 1 th care expenditure has grown rapidly in the 
recent past. There is now a general, if unspoken consensus that it 
should not increase at more than the growth of national income. At 
the same time, high-technology medicine and aging populations put 
intense pressures on existing budgets. Economies are unavoidable and 
spending on drugs is an obvious target. Labour may be 70 per cent of 
health care costs but medical and paramedical personnel are well 
organised and enjoy high standing. On the whole, pharmaceutical 
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companies do not. Drug prices should therefore be kept low, limited 
lists imposed and generics encouraged. Patent protection should be 
reduced on the Canadian model. 
The research-based pharmaceutical sector, however, is a model of the 
commercially successful high-technology industry. For some countries 
it is a significant part of the national economy. It should therefore 
be supported. Prices should be kept sufficiently high to maintain or 
increase current levels of R&D spending. Patent protection should be 
improved. There is therefore a clash between the interests of 
consumers and producers. The outcome must depend on official 
perceptions of the strength or weakness of the local industry. Four 
questions may be posed: 
do we have an innovative local industry ? 
is it an important national asset ? 
does it need official support ? 
is our local market vital to it ? 
If the answer to th~:! first question is •no•, then absolute priority 
may be given to the interests of consumers. If the answers to the 
second, third or fo1rth questions are •no•, then the interests of 
consumers may be we·ighted more heavily than would otherwise be the 
case. 
The answers implied by the behaviour of European governments are 
indicated in table ~~.12. Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain may be e>tpected to favour consumers unambiguously. They 
either do not have a research-based industry, or where they do, attach 
only secondary importance to it. The FRG values its major companies 
but is strongly conrnitted to a hands-off attitude to all types of 
industry. Denmark and the UK have a supportive attitude towards their 
own firms, which, however, make most of their sales abroad. The 
governments of France and Spain might experience a severe conflict of 
aims. 
00 
...... 
TABLE 2.12 GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES TO THEIR INDIGENOUS RESEARCH-BASED PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
Do we have Is it an 
an indigenous important Does it need Is our national 
research-based national official market vital 
Countr~ industr~? asset? su~~ort? to it? Outcome 
Belgium Yes Perhaps No No Consumers prevail ~ 
Denmark Yes Yes Yes No Balance of interests 
....., 
sought, 
France Yes Yes Yes Yes Conflict of interest 
FRG Yes Yes No Yes Market prevails 
Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes Conflict of interests 
Netherlands Yes No No No Consumers prevail 
Spain No ~ some official concern .... Consumers prevail 
UK Yes Yes Yes No Balance of interests sought 
Source: EAG 
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Once again, this is a conclusion of considerable importance. The 
interests of the various nations of the Community are not identical. 
Any course of action to unify the market will therefore produce gains 
and losses which w1i 11 be different for each country and wi 11 be 
received accordingly. 
2.7 Conclusions 
Both the European pharmaceutical market and the European 
pharmaceutical industry are extensively fragmented. There are widely 
differing traditions of medical practice and corresponding variations 
in diagnosis and prescription. Levels of consumption differ markedly 
between one country and another. The industry is also fragmented. A 
high proportion of the products consumed are made by the local 
affiliates of foreign companies. In addition to the large 
research-based international firms there are may locally-oriented 
small and medium-sizt~d companies in most countries. US and Swiss firms 
are prominent in the European industry. 
Despite progress towards the harmonisation of government regulations, 
there remain conside1~able differences in the operation of registration 
procedures and, especially, in pricing systems. National capabilities 
for pharmaceuticals vary greatly. National objectives for the industry 
differ. 
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NOTES 
1 Throughout this report the European Community is taken to include 
Portugal and Spain, even when, as here, the time to which 
reference is made is before 1986. 
2 See also Burstall and Senior: The Community's Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 1985, Brussels: Commission of the European Community, 
table 4.1, p.30. 
3 For the nine member countries in 1983, the relationship between 
per capita income, relative drug prices, using the EEC estimates, 
and per capita pharmaceutical consumption was Consumption = 0.3 
(income(exp 0.83)(price(exp - 0.48)) with r = 0.69. 
4 See Able-Smith and Grandjeat, Pharmaceutical Consumption in the 
Community,1978, EEC, p26. The number of diagnoses per capita is 
usually low in the UK by the standards of the other major 
European countries (O'Brien: Patterns of European Diagnosis and 
Prescription, 1984, London: Office of Health Economics, table 4, 
p. 25). 
5 O'Brien, op, cit, tables 5-9, 14-18. IMS data concerning the 
national sales of particular products strongly supports this 
conclusion. The FRG is unusual inter alia in its high consumption 
of antidiabetic drugs and its preference for sulphonamides over 
antibiotics. 
6 Based on IMS retail pharmacy audits, except for Denmark, for 
which national sources have been used. The coverage is only 93 
per cent complete since company sales below a minimum level are 
not reported. The use of sales through pharmacies discriminates 
against Italy in that a high proportion of the sales of Erbamont, 
its largest firm, are cytostatic drugs used mainly in hospitals. 
7 For the situation in 1982 see Burstall and Senior, op. cit., 
table 9.1, p. 108. 
- 84 -
- 50 -
8 The figure of ECU8,075 was derived by reducing the 1984 import 
figures for each country in proportion to the ratio of sales 
through retail pharmacies (table 2.6) to total sales (table 2.1). 
If the import figures are taken at face value, the estimate is 
reduced to Ecu;r,ooom. There are, unfortunately, no figures for 
sales to hospitals comparable to those for retail sales, and 
there is reason to suppose that the patterns of consumption are 
markedly different. 
9 Thus, for example, Zambeletti (Italy) was taken over by Beecham 
(UK), Abello (Spain) by Merck and Co. (USA) and Almirall (Spain) 
by Erbamont ( It,:ily). 
10 These figures comprise all pharmaceutical production within 
national borders. The manufacture of active ingredients is 
usually included; since some of these will later be used to make 
finished medicines, there is an obvious element of double 
counting. 
11 For a discussion of this point, see Burstall and Senior, op. cit, 
pp. 105-6. Finns with annual sales of more than ECU750m accounted 
for 58 per cent of world sales excluding the command economies; 
those with sales of more than ECU150m for 80 per cent. 
12 Burstall, Dunning and Lake: Governments, Technology and 
Multinational Enterprises - The Pharmaceutical Industry, 1981, 
Paris: Organiscttion for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
chapter 3, pp. 
13 Estimates of R&D spending within the European Community in 1982 
by firms of various nationality are presented by Burstall and 
Dunning: IntE!rnational Investment in Innovation, in 
Pharmaceuticals among the Sunrise Industries, edited by N. Wells, 
1985, London: Croom Helm, pp.185-198. At that time total spending 
was about ECU3,:350m, of which ECU2,450m was spent by companies in 
their country of origin. The main recipients of foreign money 
were the UK, \'dth ECU270m and France, with ECU240m. The main 
donor was the USA with ECU270m, of which ECU170m was spent in the 
UK. 
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14 This genera 1 i sat ion does not, of course, apply . to the 
research-only companies which are developing rapidly, but rather 
to those firms which are engaged in manufacturing and marketing 
their own products. 
15 Independent companies with annual sales of less than ECU75m have 
19 per cent of the French retai 1 market, 23 per cent of the 
German, 28 per cent of the Italian and 35 per cent of the Spanish 
(authors• estimates based on IMS data). In the UK firms of this 
size are usually the local affiliates of foreign multinationals, 
although a few are generic or other specialists. 
16 For more extended discussions of the problems of assessing 
competitive strength, see Burstall and Senior, op. cit., pp. 
105-127, and Burstall, Dunning and Lake, op. cit., pp. 
17 Two American multinationals have major research centres in 
Belgium and a third has one in Italy. 
18 Thus, for example, between France and the FRG. 
19 In both Portugal and Spain, only process patents were available 
before 1986 and enforcement was difficult. Both countries have 
been given a transitional period lasting until 1992 to bring 
their patent and other institutions into line with those 
prevailing in the Community. 
20 The transparency directive is discussed in chapter 4.6 below. 
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3 REGISTRATION AND ITS PROBLEMS 
If a pharmaceutical product is to be admitted to a particular national 
market it must first be approved by the national registration 
authority (cf chapter 2.5 above). In principle that body is 
autonomous: it is free to make its own decision and is not obliged 
to consider what has happened elsewhere. Registration is therefore a 
potential barrier to the unification of the Community pharmaceutical 
rna rket. The object of this chapter is to describe the process of 
registration, to estimate the extra costs due to registration being on 
a national rather than a pan-European basis, and to review the 
advantages and disadvantages of alternative arrangements. 
3.1 The process of registration 
The purpose of registration is to make sure that a drug is safe, 
effective and of adequate quality before it is put on sale. The onus 
is on the applicant to satisfy the authority; the role of the latter 
is to evaluate the evidence produced by the former and come to a 
decision. It is not to carry out experimental work itself. It is 
judge, not advocate. Alternatives to this system have been suggested 
but nowhere have they been put into effect. 
Registration authorities have always provided guidance about the 
evidence that they need. During the past 20 years these requirements 
have gradually converged as a result of directives by the European 
Commission and a high degree of uniformity within the Community is now 
apparent. Common standards concerning pharmacological and 
toxicological tests in animals and the conduct of clinical trials 
have been adopted, as have common forms of documentation. All 
Community countries accept evidence obtained abroad. All now provide 
abbreviated forms of registration for products based on known 
ingredients. The formal differences between the requirements of one 
Community nation and another are now small. Equally, the stated 
grounds on which a product may be rejected, other than safety, 
efficacy and quality, show only minor variations. A uniform 120-day 
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decision period - plus 90 days if the medicine is referred to an 
advisory committee - has been agreed. The current position is 
summarised in table :3.1 (1). 
In practice registration procedures are less harmonised than this 
account might suggest. Interviews undertaken in the course of this 
enquiry show that there are substantial differences between one 
country and another. To some extent this reflects different 
administrative arran,gements. The UK carries out all its evaluations 
in-house, as does the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), whereas 
Belgium, Denmark, France and Italy rely very largely on outside 
experts directed by small official organisations. Germany and the 
Netherlands use mixed systems. To rely entirely on in-house expertise 
is clearly to favour a more formal and standardised approach. The 
major problem, however, is the element of judgment that is involved in 
making the decision to approve or to reject an application. This 
cannot but involve the local traditions of medical practice already 
discussed in chapter 2.1 and the local perceptions of what sorts of 
evidence carries the most weight. 
Thus, in one country the emphasis may be on the pharmacology of a new 
substance, whereas in another the main stress is on the controlled 
large-scale clinical trial. Significantly, the FDA looks with 
particular favour on British and Scandinavian data. This reflects 
both the general perception that these countries have rigorous 
standards, and also the fact that they share a medical culture common 
with that of the USA.. Similarly, local clinical trials, although not 
required in theory, are often advisable in practice. Carried out by 
well-known local experts, they are the more acceptable to the 
registration agency for that reason. Differences of opinion between 
one European authority and another rarely occur over major 
discoveries, about which a high degree of consensus usually exists. 
They are more common in the case of products which represent a modest 
improvement or are 'intended for the treatment of minor illnesses, 
where, inevitably, differences of opinion play a greater part (2). 
Delays in processing applications are common. At the present time 
no country can meet the official 120-day limit, although France has 
approached it on occasion. Some estimates from various points in the 
TABLE 3.1 REGISTRATION PROCEDURES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS IN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1985-86 
Country Evaluation system Special local requirements 
Belgium Outside experts Analytical data 
Denmark do Extra clinical data may be 
required 
France do local eli tal trials advisable 
FRG Mainly in-house 
Greece Outside experts None 
Ireland In-house + Italy Outside experts Mutagenicity tests; clinical 
trial certificates required. 
local clinical trials advisable 
Netherlands Mainly in-house None 
Portugal Outside experts Currently in transition 
Spain do do 
UK In-house None 
Source: IMS, national sources, interviews 
Grounds for rejection 
(1) 
None 
Poor safety/efficacy balance 
Combinations must be justified 
None 
None 
None 
Poor safety/efficacy balance 
do 
Price, no therapeutic advantage 
Comparative safety 
Abbreviated procedure 
for copy products 
Yes 
1.11 
-'=" 
I 
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recent past are shown in table 3.2. At the present moment, the 
European average appears to be 18-24 months, with France and Belgium 
rather quicker and Italy, Spain and Portugal substantially slower. 
The FDA takes 30-36 months to deal with a New Drug Application. Delays 
have tended to increase in recent years. One major reason is 
under-staffing, coupled with a rise in the work-load in certain 
countries due to the growth of applications for generic products. 
Registration procedures do not appear to be used in a discriminatory 
manner. In report·ing variations in the ways in which particular 
countries dealt with particular products, the companies interviewed 
explained them in terms of the differing national attitudes to 
medicine mentioned previously. They did not consider that local firms 
were at an advanta9e except in so far as they might be especially 
attuned to the preferences of the local market. 
3.2 The response of companies 
Given that there exist both the need to apply for marketing 
authorisation in a number of countries and substantial variations in 
the approaches of registration authorities, how do the large 
research-oriented multinational companies cope? 
The development of a new chemical entity (NCE) is a prolonged and 
expensive process. Much of the time and money is occupied in 
establishing that the product is both safe and efficacious. After 
preclinical studies in rodents and in larger manmals come tests in 
healthy human volunteers. If the compound maintains its promise it is 
then used in steadily larger numbers of patients suffering from the 
condition which it is intended to remedy. These are referred to as 
phase 1, 2 and 3 clinical trials. Meanwhile, work on animals 
continues in order to detect possible carcinogenic and other long-term 
effects. The doss·ier presented to a registration authority will 
typically contain r~esults from up to 3-4,000 patients together with 
exhaustive pharmacological and toxicological data. Even after a 
product is marketed studies will normally continue in order to develop 
new uses for it and additional line extensions. 
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TABLE 3.2 ESTIMATES OF THE TIME TAKEN TO OBTAIN MARKETING 
AUTHORISATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
FRG 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
Average (1) 
IMS 
1984/5 
12 
12 
4 
6-10 
12-24 
<12 
24-36 
9-24 
6-24 
12-48 
10-12 
15,3 
(1) Weighted for sales 
Source and dates of estimates 
FDA 
1985 
19 
12-18 
12 
12-15 
18 
12-18 
16 
18-24 
24-30 
24-30 
12-18 
14,4 
Present study 
1987 
12 
6-12 
18-24 
11 lengthy 11 
24-36 
36-
18-24 
18-24 
months 
Source: Information obtained from IMS, the FDA and major multinational 
companies interviewed during this study 
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Much animal testing ·is sub-contracted to outside specialists as is all 
clinical testing. In the latter case the company selects an 
established clinical investigator working in the appropriate area with 
whom to cooperate. A protocol for the study is developed jointly, 
after which the investigator carries it out with the company providing 
the resources. Since so many patients must be studied, the dossier 
will contain the results from a number of such trials, which may well 
have been conducted in several countries. Within broad limits, 
therefore, the compa1ny has a considerable element of discretion as to 
where and with whom it carries out its clinical work. The UK and 
Scandinavia are favoured on technical grounds but other factors, 
discussed below, entt~r into the equation (3). 
Research-oriented companies work to high standards. Many of them 
explicitly follow FDA procedures. The USA is the largest single 
national market, and a potential world-class product must be able to 
sell there. Moreover, given the severity of American regulations, a 
drug that can satisfy the FDA has an excellent chance of satisfying 
other regulatory authoHties. A dossier prepared with the FDA in mind 
is therefore often used as the basis for all applications. If it is 
thought necessary or desirable to include local clinical testing, then 
this is done as part of the total programme on which the dossier is 
based. As far as possible other special requirements are dealt with 
in the same day. This central document is then translated, rearranged 
and modified to suit the needs of each regulatory authority. In this 
way the work associated with multiple applications is minimised. 
Meeting local requirE~ments could be more of a burden for a small firm, 
but small firms rarely develop new chemical entities. They are more 
interested in new products based on known ingredients, for which, 
however, abbreviated applications are normally sufficient. The latter 
are much more sterotyped in nature and vary little from one country to 
another. Clinical studies are not required and evidence of purity and 
adequate bioavailability is enough. 
3.3 The costs of multiple registration 
The direct costs of multiple registration are limited. 
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A study of the costs of the UK regulatory system carried out in 1980 
estimated that pharmaceutical firms operating in the UK, British and 
foreign, employed an extra 350 people in meeting the requirements of 
overseas regulation. Extending these figures to the rest of the 
Community would suggest a total of about 2000 extra staff. However, 
this figure is probably high, as it included those dealing with 
countries outside Europe and, of course, somewhat predates the 
systematic approach to registration described in the previous section. 
Interviews conducted in the course of this study revealed that a large 
research-oriented company typically employs 3-5 people in each major 
European country to deal with local registration and related problems. 
For the 50 such companies operating in the Community this gives a 
total of 750-1250 people, and, assuming an average annual salary of 
ECU40,000m an extra expenditure of ECU30-50m per year. 
To this figure should be added the cost of those extra operations, 
such as translation, which are carried out centrally and that of total 
requirements such as clinical trials. Both of these appear to be 
quite small. A figure of ECU10-15m seems reasonable for the former 
item. As regards the latter, it has already been seen that local 
testing usually forms part of the overall clinical programme, and so 
the extra costs are negligible. It might also be noted that such 
testing is designed in part to familiarise local opinion leaders with 
the product and its advantages. To this extent it has a positive 
function and should be seen as a form of marketing. Taking these 
findings into consideration, and allowing for the fact that many of 
the staff identi·fied have more than one duty, the extra costs of 
multiple registration are most probably about ECU40-55m per year (4}. 
The potential cost of delays in approval is higher. During the 1970s 
expenditure per NCE introduced, inclusive of failures but exclusive of 
interest foregone, was around ECU85-100m, spread over 8-10 years. 
Patent protection is normally obtained at the beginning of - or even 
before - the main testing programme, which now lasts between eight and 
ten years. The effective life of the patent, which only starts when 
the product reaches the market, is correspondingly reduced, and is now 
no more than 8-12 years, depending on country in question. Thus, to 
delay approval is to impose a double burden on the discoverer. The 
money already committed to the development of the new product is tied 
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up for a further period, while the sales within the period of patent 
protection are lost (5}. 
The development of a new pharmaceutical product immobilises funds 
which might otherwise be invested in interest-producing ventures. The 
sums involved are large because lead times are long. FDA estimates 
based on data from the 1970s show that the direct cost of developing a 
single NCE up to the point of marketing, inclusive of the failures, 
was approximately EC:U96m in 1987 dollars. When the opportunity costs 
were charged, this sum becomes between ECU130 and 250m, depending on 
the discount rate used. The cost of a year's delay in approval may 
then be readily calculated, since it is the income that might have 
been earned by invt~sting the money used in the development for a 
further year. It lies in the range ECU6.5-37.7m. These figures, 
however refer to the world as a whole; since the EEC market is 24 per 
cent of the market economy total, the pro-rata sums are between ECU1.6 
and 9.0m, per NCE per year (6}. 
In 1986 24 NCEs werE~ 1 aunched by European or North American companies 
in Europe or elsewhere. It may be assumed that they will all 
eventually be marketed within the Community. Taking the FDA estimate 
that the average time taken to approve an NCE in the Community was 15 
months in 1985 (cf, table 3.2}, then the opportunity cost due to the 
failure to observe the 120 day limit was between ECU34 and 199m, the 
most probable range being ECU58-83m, which correspond to discount 
rates of eight and ten per cent respectively. The opportunity costs 
due to the fact that the market is not unified and approval times 
differ must obviously be less. Assuming that the minimum time required 
for approval is one year, then taking each country in turn and 
weighting its contribution by its total sales a figure of between 
ECU20 and 28m, is obtained (7}. 
These sums are trivia 1. Much more important is the 1 oss of revenue 
during the period of patent protection due to delays in approval. As 
yet, there is no patent restoration within the Community, and 
effective patent lives, weighted by sales, average nine years. The 
average sales per NCE per year in the Community market may be 
estimated in several approximate ways: 
- 95 -
~ 60 -
1 If the average cost of developing an NCE is ECU96m, and R & D is 
between 10 and 15 per cent of sales for a research-oriented 
company (cf table 2), then during its lifetime it should realise 
between ECU630 and 960m. Assuming that this lifetime ends with 
patent protection, then the average revenue per year is between 
ECU70 and 105m, and the proportion to be assigned to the European 
Community pro rata between ECU17 and 25m. 
2 Estimates of sales by age structure in six Community countries in 
1982 showed that the 208 NCEs introduced in Europe and North 
America between 1976 and 1980 had by then attained average 
Community sales of between ECU18 and 24m {8). 
3 An extrapolation of FDA data suggests that the 135 NCEs 
introduced into the US market between 1980 and 1985 accounted for 
between 134 and 175m US prescriptions in the latter year. 
Estimates of the cost per prescription on various assumptions 
yield total sales of between ECU4590 and 5210m, or sales per NCE 
of between ECU34 and 38m. Since the US market is approximately 
30 per cent larger than that of the Community, the corresponding 
figure for the latter would be between ECU25 and 30m (9). 
These figures are surprisingly comparable, especially when it is 
remembered that US prices are on the whole higher than the European 
average. 
It is now possible to determine, at least approximately, the loss of 
sales due to delays in registration. Failure to observe the 120 day 
limit means that there was a delay of approximately eleven months and 
a loss of sales to the innovators of ECU370-650m, in 1985. The costs 
due to the market not being unified may be estimated in the same way 
as between ECU100m and 175m. From a practical standpoint, however, 
these figures should be qualified in one important particular. There 
is no such thing as an average NCE, and the distribution of penalties 
is therefore very uneven. A major discovery might sell ECU150m or 
more per year within the Community, and the loss of sales could be 
correspondingly more serious for its inventor (10). 
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Who suffers from tlhe 1 oss of sa 1 es? The research-based companies 
clearly do. The average value added in the European pharmaceutical 
industry is approximately 40 per cent of revenue; for an NCE it is 
certainly higher. Where a new and clearly superior product is 
involved, the losses may be serious, as has already been noted. 
However, important as this is for the innovator, it must be offset for 
the industry as a whole by the continued sales of product which would 
otherwise be made obsolete. This effect is difficult to quantify. 
Given, though, that new products corrmand higher prices and are more 
attractive to doctors (chapter 4.5), it appears certain that the 
overall income of the sector is appreciably reduced by delays in 
registration (11). 
There is also a definite loss in consumer welfare, in that the patient 
is denied the new medicine. Here again, much turns on its therapeutic 
advantages: a 11 breakthrough 11 product is in a different category to a 
11 me-too 11 one. It is however, often difficult to decide a priori which 
is which in particular cases; reduced side-effects or improved 
convenience of administration may not greatly affect the outcome but 
can make the process of recovery much more agreeab 1 e. Once again, 
therefore, the losses are real, although exceedingly difficult to 
estimate in monetary terms (12). 
Thus, as far as reg·istration is concerned, the costs of 11 Non-Europe 11 
to the pharmaceutical industry are between ECU160m and 260m, about 25 
per cent of which is represented by direct costs and the bulk of the 
remainder by loss of sales due to differential delays in approval. 
Given that only a part of the latter falls on the industry, these 
figures must be tak~~n as an upper bound. Probably more serious are 
the pen a 1 ties impose!d by the genera 1 fa i 1 ure to observe the 120 day 
decision period, which cause losses of sales amounting to ECU360-650m. 
These sums are respectively 0.5-0.8 per cent and 1.1-1.9 per cent of 
total industry cost incurred within the Community (13). 
3.4 Alternatives to present institutional arrangements 
The possibility of replacing the present methods of national 
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registration by some more convenient system have been repeatedly 
discussed in recent years. Two main alternatives have emerged; 
mutual recognition of registrations by all member countries and a 
pan-European registration agency. 
The companies interviewed saw considerable difficulties with both of 
these proposals. There are doubts about the equality of the countries 
involved. Some respondents felt that the approval of north European 
agencies carries more weight than that of south European ones, even 
though it was generally agreed that technical standards had been 
harmonised upwards to a very considerable extent during the past 
decade. The differences in medical culture and therefore in the 
subjective elements of assessment were thought to present serious 
problems. Several companies commented that mutual recognition would 
imply both the mutual acceptance and the mutual rejection of 
products, which would have negative as well as positive effects. They 
did not consider that their registration policies would be affected by 
a policy of mutual recognition, since they followed a world-wide 
strategy in any case. 
There would also be problems \'lith a single European registration 
agency. Technically possible, it was thought that it could offer real 
gains in principle to both producers and consumers. It would be 
impartial and it could be rapid. There was much anxiety, however, 
about the procedures that might be used. Several respondents 
commented that the most likely outcome was a combination of the most 
severe elements of each national agency. There would also be 
political difficulties. How could it be staffed and to whom would it 
be responsible? A rigid, elaborate and bureaucratic system would be 
unwelcome but was perhaps unavoidable. The precedent of the FDA was 
not felt to be encouraging. Doubts were also expressed as to whether 
such an organisation could entirely replace national agencies, which 
currently deal with many minor as well as major issues. 
The costs of operating the present registration agencies are not 
large. They are difficult to compute with accuracy since much of the 
work is carried out by outside personnel (cf chapter 3.1 above). If, 
however, the manning levels of the Medicines Division of the UK 
Department of Health and Social Security, which carries out all its 
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evaluations in-house, are typical, then the equivalent of 1500 staff 
are employed. At an ,average annual salary of ECU40,000 this suggests a 
tot a 1 budget of ECL160m to which the expenses of accommodation and 
other overheads should be added. The Drugs and Biologics Division of 
the FDA employs 1500 staff at its centre in Maryland, about one third 
of them qualified at the PhD level, at a total cost of ECU150m. They 
also have about 900 personnel in the field, which adds a further 
ECU60m. Allowing for the higher rates of pay in the USA, these 
figures are not ver·y different. Both the FDA and the majority of 
European registration agencies are understaffed for their work-load. 
Possible economies resulting from either mutual recognition or a 
pan-European agency would seem to be limited. 
From the standpoint of the large research-oriented company the key 
issue is the speed of registration. Any change which shortened the 
time required would be welcomed, any change which increased it would 
be opposed. The welfare of the consumer would also benefit from more 
rapid registration provided that this did not result in a reduction in 
standards of safety. As we have seen, the average time taken is more 
important than the differences between nations. The direct costs of 
multiple registration are not negligible but they are of relatively 
minor importance. Enforcement of the 120-day decision period might 
well represent a larger gain than the further integration of the 
national registration procedures. 
3.5 The impact of EEC initiatives 
The companies interviewed considered that the measures already taken 
to harmonise data requirements had been helpful and had had a 
consideraol~ effect in raising as well as standardising national 
requirements. 
The original multistate application procedure, which operated from 
1978 until the end of 1985, was used for 41 applications. Few of them 
involved products or companies of the first importance. The procedure 
was known to all respondents, whose general attitude was cautious. In 
their opinion the resources committed to the development of an NCE 
were so large that a new registration procedure would have 
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to have very striking advantages over those already established before 
they would consider it seriously. The revised multistate procedure, 
however, aroused considerably more enthusiasm, as did that for 
high-technology and biotechnology products. By the middle of 1987 14 
applications under the former had already been made. 
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NOTES 
1 The relevant directives of the Commission are 65/65, 75/318, 
83/570 and 87/19. To the 120-day limit, 90 days are to be added 
if the application is referred by the licensing authority to an 
advisory committee. 
2 The comments in the last two paragraphs are drawn from interviews 
with large multinational companies and national registration 
authorities. 
3 This account is based on discussions with the clinical testing 
manager of a major firm. 
4 This estimate is confirmed by the qualitative comments of 
executives int~~rviewed in the course of this study, who 
considered the direct costs of multiple registration to be minor. 
5 J Thesing: Industrielle Arzneimittelforschung Heute, 1983, 
Mainz: Mediziniisch Pharmazeutische Studiengesellschaft, pp 24-9, 
gives an estimatte of 155m OM per NCE introduced by the seven 
research-orientE!d German firms between 1972 and 1981. The period 
currently requir·ed for testing in the USA is given as 10 years by 
the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of the USA (Facts at 
a Glance, 1987, p 21) ; this was confirmed by the FDA. For the 
UK, see NEDO: !'harmaceuticals: Focus on research, 1987, London; 
HMSO, pp15-16, 1r1hich suggests a time of eight years. Estimated 
of effective p.atent lives in 1983 are given by R Chew , G 
Teeling-Smith and N Wells: Pharmaceuticals in seven nations, 
1985, London; Office of Health Economics, p 39. They suggest 13 
years for FrancE!, 6,5 for the FRG, 8-10 for Italy and 8,7 for the 
UK. 
6 Data supp 1 i ed 
Pharmaceutical 
by the FDA, based on R W 
Development Process-Estimation 
Hansen: The 
of Current 
Development Costs and Times, 1977, Rochester; University 
Graduate School of Management, up-dated and expressed in 1987 US 
dollars. 
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Scrip, 1986, 1176/8, 8. NCEs developed by Japanese companies 
were excluded because of uncertainties about the extent to which 
they would be marketed outside Japan. During the period 
1960-1985 Japanese NCEs were not widely introduced into the 
Community market. 
8 The number of NCEs introduced between 1976 and 1980 was 208, 
excluding those introduced in the Co11111and Economies, in Japan 
(see note 8 above) and in unspecified countries (Reis-Arndt, 
quoted in Pharma Data 83, 1984, Frankfurt/Main: Bundesverband 
der Pharmazeutische Industrie, p23. Sales of these products in 
1982 were estimated from the age-distributions given in 
Indicatori Pharmaceutici 1984, 1984, Table 27, p50. The lower 
figure for annual sales per NCE is calculated on the basis of 
sales through retail pharmacies and the higher on the basis of 
total sales, since it is not clear which applies. 
9 FDA: Drug Utilisation in the US-1985, .Seventh Annual Review, 
1986, Washington DC, gives numbers of NCEs introduced 1980-85 and 
cumulative and 1985 prescription figures for the first 52 of 
these. By the use of the Pareto distribution (H A Wittcoff and B 
G Reuben: The Pharmaceuti ca 1 Industry-Chemistry and Concepts, 
1987, Washington: American Chemical Society) it was possible to 
estimate the total number of prescriptions of these compounds 
graphically. The average price per prescription, weighted by 
sales, was calculated from the histogram of wholesale prices as 
given by the 1987 Red Book (Dradel, NJ: Medical Economics Press) 
and adjusted to manufacturers' prices. 
10 In 1982 there were three products selling $100m or more, 16 
se 11 i ng between $50 and 100 m, and 36 se 11 i ng between $25 and 
50m, in the Community of the time. Not all of these were in 
patent (M L Burs tall and I S Senior: The Conmunity' s 
Pharmaceutical Industry - Evolution of Concentration, Competition 
and Competitivity, 1985, Brussels: European Commission, Table 
7.4' p83). 
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11 At the European average level, the loss in value added would be 
ECU147-259m; as noted in the text a higher figure is probable. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the introduction of a new 
product is not a zero-sum game; the total market often expands, 
as appears to be the case with H2-antagonist anti-ulcer drugs 
(comment of sevE!ra 1 industria 1 respondents). 
12 A study of several therapeutic markets suggests strongly that 
advantages that are minor in medical terms may be critical in 
commercial terms. This point was made strongly by the FDA, who 
remarked that their own classification of drugs was entirely 
medical in its basis. The importance of convenience and low 
side-effects may be expected to increase as incomes rise, in line 
with Maslow's concept of the hierarchy of needs. 
13 For the estimation of industry costs see appendix B. 
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4 PRICING SYSTEMS, PRICES AND PRICE COMPETITION 
National controls over pharmaceutical expenditure also serve to divide 
the European pharmaceutical market. As has already been seen (chapter 
2.5 above), all member nations take steps to limit the health care 
budget, of which drugs form a minor but significant part. Each has 
its own objectives for the pharmaceutical industry (chapter 2.6) and 
its own views about the best way to attain them. In consequence there 
are large differences between countries, both in average price levels 
and in the prices of individual products. These are increased by 
~iations in the incidence of VAT and of the margins permitted to 
pharmaceutical wholesalers and retailers. 
4.1 Price control systems 
The methods employed to control pharmaceutical expenditure in the 
member nations of the Community are shown in table 4.1. They vary 
greatly, the only common features being an element of patient 
copayment and the exemption of OTC products from any form of price 
regulation. 
At one extreme, the FRG does not control prices at all. Total 
pharmaceutical expenditure, however, is regulated by a variety of 
means. A negative list excludes all products in four therapeutic 
categories from reimbursement. Since 1981 the members of the national 
pharmaceutical manufacturers association {the BPI) have operated a 
voluntary price restraint scheme. The health insurance agencies exert 
pressure on physicians to economise in prescribing. These measures 
have had considerable success. Prices are also uncontrolled in the 
Netherlands, where the situation is broadly similar to that in the 
FRG. The government is, however, currently examining a markedly more 
restrictive system based on fixed reimbursement for identical or 
equivalent products (1). 
The UK controls pharmaceutical expenditure through limits on 
profitability based on sales to the National Health Service. An 
overall ·rate of return on capital for the industry is fixed; that 
TABLE 4.1 METHODS USED BY EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO CONTROL PHARMACEUTICALS COSTS, 1984/5 
Country 
Roln;um IW'- I ::f I Ullll 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
Drug expenditure 
directly controlled? 
V--·~;) 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Source: National and IMS information 
Individual drug 
prices controlled 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Basis for allowed price 
Noveity, therapeutic value, local 
activities 
Costs, "reasonable" profit 
Therapeutic value, cost, local 
activities 
Not applicable 
Costs 
Tied to UK prices 
Costs 
Not applicable 
Costs, comparative prices-
Costs 
Control of global profits 
Positive or 
negative list 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Negative 
Positive 
Neither 
Positive 
Negative 
Positive 
Positive 
Negative 
0. 
'() 
lABEL 4.1 (contd) METHODS USED BY EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO CONTROL PHARMACEUTICALS, 1984 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
FRG 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Nehterlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
Manufacturers' 
price level 
low 
High 
low 
High 
low 
Medium 
low 
High 
low 
low 
Medium 
Wholesalers' 
average price 
(3) 
113 
109 
110 
112 - 121 
111 
115 
112 
120 
111 
119 
114 
1 For out-of-hospital prescriptions 
2 Author's estimates 
3 Manufacturers' price = 100 
Source: IMS, national sources 
Retailers' 
average price 
(3) 
131 
182 
175 
130 - 168 
148 
173 
149 
192 
139 
167 
152 
VAT 
% 
6 
22 
7 
14 
Up to 23 
8.25 
5 
6 
15 
Patient 
copayment 
scheme1 
25, 50 or 100% of price 
25, 50 or 100% of price 
0, 30, 60, or 100% of price 
Flat fee 
10-20% of costs 
Depends on income 
Flat fee & 15% of cost 
Flat fee 
Flat fee & 35-40% of price 
40% of price 
Flat fee 
% prescription 
drug bill met 
by patients2 
50 
40 
30 
10 
15 
20 
20 
30 
30 
108 
-> 
0 
V1 
I 
...... 
0 
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permitted to individual companies varies according to their 
activities, and in particular to their innovative efforts. Allowance 
is made for expendli ture on research and deve 1 opment and for the 
promotion of new chemical entities. Within these limits companies are 
free to set the prices of individual new products. A negative list 
excludes all but the generic forms of certain specified drugs from 
reimbursement; unlike the FRG, however, the UK does not ban entire 
therapeutic classes. Prices in the Republic of Ireland are tied to 
those prevailing in the UK {2). 
Seven member states - Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain ·- control the prices of individual products, but 
use widely differing methods to do so. Denmark, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain use plus-cost systems of one kind or another, 
accompanied with positive lists which confine reimbursement to 
~pecified products. In France, companies are in principle free to set 
their own prices but admission to the reimbursement system is strictly 
controlled. An acceptable price, based on the therapeutic advantages 
of the product and on cost data must be negotiated. Since four 
ministries are involved, prolonged delays are common. In Belgium a 
maximum selling pric:e is fixed at registration by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, taking both economic and therapeutic considerations 
into account. The health insurance agency (INAMI} then sets a 
reimbursement price (3}. 
A further point dese·rves emphasis. In every member nation except the 
FRG the price of drug is in effect fixed at the time when it first 
enters the national market. This is as true of such countries as the 
Netherlands or the UK in which it is set by the company as in 
countries such as It.aly or Spain where it is set by negotiation with 
an offici a 1 body. J'ny increase in price necessary to offset, say, 
inflation or rises in the cost of raw materials, requires permission, 
which may or may not be forthcoming. Since a product may be marketed 
for many years, pric:e increases for existing products are often as 
important to pharmac4~utical firms as the prices that they obtain for 
new ones. In consequence, it is open to a government to use pricing 
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as a means to more than one end. Admission to a reimbursement list, a 
better price for a new product or more frequent and extensive price 
increases for an existing one, may all depend on the behaviour of the 
company in question. Information obtained in the course of this 
enquiry leaves no doubt that this is a fact of life on most member 
countries. The ways in which these opportunities are exploited and 
the consequences for the Community are discussed in chapters 4.4 and 
5.4 below. 
4.2 Price levels within the Community: the industry's standpoint 
Price levels differ greatly between member countries. 
The comparison of average pharmaceutical prices is not easy. Not only 
do exchange rates vary but much turns on the basket of drugs common to 
all national markets which must be used for this purpose. Some recent 
estimates, adjusted to 1985 exchange rates, are presented in table 
4.2. It is clear that by all measures prices are high in Denmark, the 
FRG and the UK occupying an intermediate position. The state of 
affairs in Belgium appears less certain but the consensus view is that 
prices there are comparatively depressed. Those prevailing in 
Portugal and Spain are very low; a recent estimate suggests that they 
are only 60 per cent of the European average (4). 
The evolution of prices has been a complex process. The relative 
positions of particular nations have changed considerably over the 
past decade. In pharmaceutical terms, Belgium was an expensive 
country in 1974 and Britain a cheap one, whereas most estimates 
suggest that the reverse is now true. It is also obvious that, 
relative to the UK, German prices have dropped considerably, although 
they remain high by European standards. The decisive effect of 
official action on average price levels is clear. In most member 
countries of the Community, however, pharmaceutical prices remained 
constant in real terms between 1980 and 1984 (table 4.3), the main 
exceptions being Belgium and France, where they fell. 
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TABLE 4.2 PHAR~~CE:UTICAL PRICE COMPARISO~S IN COMMUNITY NATIONS 1974 
- 1985 
UK = 100 
COUNTRY RELATIVE PRICES (1) 
COOPER PROGNOS HEALTH EEC DUKES EFPIA 
ECON 
DATE 1974 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Belgium 143 73 66 103 69 70 
Denmark 143 154 99 
France 80 69 57 76 52 77 
FRG 288 128 159 164 124 120 
Greece 73 
Italy 85 65 62 57 58 73 
Netherlands 140 145 114 113 
UK <-------------------100----------------------------> 
(1) Adjusted to 1985 exchange rates. 
Source: see note ( 4). 
TABLE 4.3 REAL PHARM,ACEUTICAL PRICES IN EEC COUNTRIES 1980-1984 
1980 = 100 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Belgium 100 93 87 78 79 
Denmark 100 102 105 103 104 
France 100 98 93 87 84 
FRG 100 100 97 99 99 
Netherlands 100 96 96 97 101 
Spain 100 100 100 99 97 
UK 100 100 100 99 97 
Source: IMS, based on national data. 
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How reasonable are European prices? The opinions of producers and 
consumers naturally differ. The view of the research-oriented 
pharmaceutical sector is clear: prices in Denmark, the FRG and the 
Netherlands are 11 Satisfactory 11 ; those in Ireland and the UK are 
11 adequate 11 ; but those in the other nations of the Community are 
11 Unsati sfactory 11 • These judgments are based on the view that each 
market should make a proportionate contribution to overhead costs and 
in particular to the cost of innovation. At the same time, however, 
it is significant that international firms rarely withdraw from or 
even run down their operations in a low-price country. Within the 
Community, only Greece has suffered from such action, and other 
factors besides price were involved. 
The key to such behaviour lies in the cost structure of the 
research-based industry. Manufacturing costs, inclusive of raw 
materials, are normally considerably less than half the selling price 
(cf table 4.4). At the margin total variable costs may be as low as 
one-third of the whole or even less. A high proportion of the balance 
is fixed in the short run. In such circumstances, it is rational for 
an international company to sell in any market in which the prices 
available cover direct costs and make some contribution to overheads. 
This appears to be the case in a 11 the member countries of the 
Community. That this contribution is always adequate from the 
standpoint of the firm is less certain (5). 
It is not easy to relate the pharmaceutical prices prevailing within a 
nation to the costs incurred by the national pharmaceutical industry. 
Most significant companies operate on a world-wide basis. Within 
Europe national markets are supplied not only from the production of 
indigenous firms but also from abroad and from the output of the local 
affiliates of foreign companies (chapter 2.2 and tables 2.5-2. 7). 
Production may include active materials that are subsequently 
converted into dosage forms. The position in 1984 is shown in table 
4.5, from which H is apparent that among the larger countries the 
national market absorbs a minimum of between 40 and 70 per cent of 
local production. The balance is exported or consumed in the later 
stages of production. 
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4.4 COST STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN 1983 
ECUm 
Bel~1ium Denmark France FRG Italy Spain UK Total 
Employees (000) 10.0 7.7 64.8 86.9 64.0 32.1 66.6 332.1 
Turnover 1~~05 740 7290 8205 6578 2380 5377 31775 
Production value (1) 1015 752 7042 7433 5865 1965 5163 29235 
Raw materials etc ~148 273 2998 2098 2297 1866 
Services 181 136 2363 1739 1179 636 
Value added (2) fi02 330 2111 3448 2388 819 2660 12258 
Salaries and wages 184 154 1061 1816 1064 345 925 5549 
Total labour costs ~~62 167 1539 2313 1511 459 933 7184 
Gross margin {3) ~~40 163 572 1135 877 360 1727 5074 
Capital employed {4) 1050 700 6100 6870 5520 2050 4550 26500 
Depreciation {5) 40 25 245 275 220 80 180 1065 
Trading profit {6) ~~00 140 330 860 660 280 1550 4020 
Investment 70 59 164 360 250 398 
R&D expenditure ].09 55 943 1233 326 36 786 3488 
Value added as % 
value of production 49.4 44.0 30.0 46.4 40.7 41.7 51.5 41.9 
Value of production 
per capita (000 ECU) 101.6 97.5 108.7 85.5 91.7 61.2 77,5 88.0 
Value added )er 
capita {000 ECU 50.2 43.0 32.6 39.7 37.4 25.4 39.9 36.9 
Salaries and wages 
per capita (000 ECU) 18.4 20.1 16.3 20.9 16.7 10.8 13.9 16.7 
Labour costs per 
capita {000 ECU) 2Ei.2 21.6 23.7 26.6 23.6 14.3 14.0 21.6 
Labour costs as % 
value added 5~~ .2 50.5 72.9 67.1 63.3 56.1 35.0 58.6 
Gross margin as % 
production value 2~1.6 21.7 8.1 15.3 14.9 18.3 33.5 17.4 
Gross margin as % 
value added 4j' .8 49.5 27.1 32.9 36.7 43.0 65.0 41.4 
Profit margin (7) Hi.6 18.9 4.5 10.5 10.0 11.8 28.8 12.7 
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TABLE 4.4 (contd) COST STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN 1983 
ECUm 
Profitability (8) 
(1) Excluding VAT 
(2) At factor cost 
Belgium Denmark France 
19.0 20.0 5.4 
(3) Value added less labour costs 
FRG Italy Spain UK Total 
12.6 12.0 13.7 34.4 15.1 
(4) Calculated from the equation (capital employed) = 0.828 (turnover) + 76 and rounded up 
to three significant figures; see Appendix B. 
(5) Taken as 1/30 of turnover; see Appendix B. 
(6) Gross margin less depreciation 
(7) Trading profit/turnover 
(8) Trading profit/capital employed. 
Source: Eurostat: Structure and Activity of Industry 1982/3, 1987; author's estimates 
based on national sources. 
TABLE 4.5 DEPENDENCE OF NATIONAL INDUSTRIES ON NATIONAL MARKETS IN 1984. 
ECUm 
Belgium Denmark France FRG Greece Ireland 
Total pharmaceutical 
sales 890 379 5634 7705 448 166 
Imports of finished 
pharmaceuticals (1) 503 180 280 980 96 166 
Sales supplied from 
local production 387 199 5354 6724 352 
Total pharmaceutical 
production 1296 873 8577 10197 408 1042 
Local sales as % 
production 38 22 62 66 86 <1 
(1) SITC 5417 
Source: Table 2.1, 2.5, 2.8 
Italy Netherl Portugal 
4465 665 353 
475 490 105 
3990 175 248 
6338 1056 415 
63 17 70 
Spain UK 
1845 3535 
56 691 
1789 2843 
2585 6648 
69 42 
__. 
__. 
N 
·Total 
26090 
4022 
22068 
39435 
56 
I 
.... 
.... 
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A conflation of the data in tables 4.4 and 4.5 leads, however, to 
certain definite if tentative conclusions. Comparing those countries 
for which the local market forms the major outlet for the local 
industry - France, the FRG, Italy and Spain - it seems very probable 
that high prices are offset to some extent by high costs in the FRG 
and low prices by low costs in Italy and Spain. The UK industry is in 
the fortunate position of having low costs and selling its products 
at generous prices. France suffers from a combination of high costs, 
especially for non-industrial services, and low prices within France. 
This is aggravated by the fact that French exports of pharmaceuticals 
are mainly to low-price countries. Value added is therefore unusually 
low in relation to sales; to bring it up to the European average 
would require an increase in the prices received of about 16 per cent 
(6). 
The financial experience of the research-oriented companies of France 
tend to support this finding. Of these firms, Rhone-Poulenc, with a 
profit margin of 18 per cent and a return on capital of 16 per cent in 
: 
1985, showed profits comparable with those of British and American 
firms. It is, of course, the French company that most closely 
approximates to the world-wide type. The other French firms had 
profit margins below 10 per cent and generally below five per cent. 
This state of affairs has prevailed for a number of years. 
Significantly, a recent estimate of the profitability of national 
pharmaceutical industries suggested a pre-tax figure of 4.0 per cent 
for France in 1982, compared with 8.7 per cent for the FRG, 13.6 for 
the UK and 18.8 per cent for the USA (7). 
The evidence therefore confirms the view, genera 1 in the industry, 
that French prices are uncomfortably low. The same is true of those 
in Greece. The position in the other low-price countries is much less 
certain; as a proportion of sales value added is only marginally 
below the European average in both Italy and Spain. The same is true 
of the gross margin. It is also clear that the high prices that 
prevail in the FRG might be seen as a necessity imposed by high costs 
rather than an opportunity to reap large profits. These conclusions 
refer, of course, to national industries as a whole, and do not 
necessarily apply to individual companies. They are nevertheless 
suggestive. 
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4.3 Prices within the Conmunity: the consumer•s standpoint 
Spokesmen for the consumer start from a different position. When the 
major pharmaceutical firms argue that the fixed costs incurred in 
their world-wide operations are unavoidable if the industry is to 
continue as at present, consumer advocates deny that premise. In 
their view central costs are inflated and conceal much unnecessary 
activity, especially in marketing and administration. Innovation is 
desirable but too much R & D is directed towards the development of 
••me-too 11 products. Because entry barriers are high, the industry 
tends towards monopoly. Price controls should be maintained and 
extended. Alternatively, freer competition would reduce prices, force 
costs down and improve efficiency. 
Some of these arguments presuppose an extensive restructuring of the 
industry and, indeE~d, of national social security and health care 
systems. Scenarios of this kind are discussed in chapter 6. At this 
point we are concerned to explore the present situation, and, in 
particular, to examine current price levels from the consumers• point 
of view. The consumers• interest is both to have ready access to 
effective chemotherapy now and to have continued access to it in years 
to come. In a sector characterised by continuous innovation, this 
would imply that thE! consumer should be willing to pay a premium over 
the minimum price for current products in order that the products of 
the future should actually be developed. 
Reasonable as this statement may be, it raises a number of questions. 
How large should this premium be? Is it not already adequate for the 
purposes of innovation, if not, as some might say, too large? 
Moreover, there are problems of equity: should consumers in countries 
where prices are high subsidise those in which they are low? 
Alternatively, shoulld not those better able to pay carry a heavier 
burden than others? To an extent such questions are too simple: as 
has just been seen, low prices do not necessarily mean low margins, 
nor high prices high margins. Some further light is thrown on them by 
an examination of two specific issues. 
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The first concerns the impact of current pharmaceutical expenditure on 
consumers in member countries of the Community. Some relevant 
information is summarised in table 4.6. It is clear that in relation 
to per capita income, pharmaceutical spending is high - between 0.8 
and 1.1 per cent - in France, the FRG, Greece, Italy, Portuga 1 and 
Spain. Apart from the FRG, these countries share a common medical 
culture, which emphasises the benefits of pharmaceuticals, both in 
curing illness and in maintaining health (chapter 2.1). However, it 
is also that, compared to prices in general, drugs are very cheap in 
France and Italy but by no means so in the other mediterranean 
countries. 
At the other extreme, it is notable that expenditure is low by all 
measures in Denmark and the Netherlands. Once again, this appears to 
be due to social factors rather than to the relatively high prices 
which prevail: patients in these countries see their doctors 
relatively infrequently, and when they do, are less likely to receive 
a prescription than their counterparts in the mediterranean nations. 
Prices can then be high without an intolerable burden being imposed on 
the patient or on the insurance system. The same is true, though to a 
lesser extent, in Britain and Ireland. In the FRG, consumption is 
moderate in terms of volume but, because prices-like costs-are high, 
spending is substantial (8). 
It appears, therefore, that, in terms of volume, pharmaceutical 
expenditure is determined in the main by the attitudes of doctors and 
of patients. In the mediterranean medical culture, the consumption of 
pharmaceuticals is seen as an unequivocal benefit; in that of 
northern Europe as a sometimes avoidable necessity. Attitudes in the 
FRG are intermediate. Economic factors are of lesser significance, 
the more so in that the direct charge to the patient is limited: it 
may indeed be suspected that prices are kept low in France and Italy 
because consumption is high rather than the latter resulting from the 
former. The use of economic measures to control the burden of 
expenditure must depend on the elasticity of demand with price. This 
is discussed in chapter 4.5 below. 
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TABLE 4.6 PHARMACEUTICAL CONSUMPTION, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES AND THE ABILITY TO PAY, 1984 
BEL DEN FRA FRG GRE IRL ITA NET POR SPA UK 
GOP per capita {ECU) 11040 14927 12561 14120 4761 7042 8611 12018 2911 5927 10599 
Pharmaceutical 
consumption per capita 
-
ECU 
-
AS % GOP 
-
relative volume {1) 
Relative prices (1) 
- pharmaceuticals 
- consumer prices 
- ratio 
{1) UK = 100 
90 
0.81 
140 
103 
97 
106 
74 
0.50 
77 
154 
122 
126 
102 125 45 46 78 46 35 48 62 
0.81 0.89 0.95 0.67 0.91 0.38 1.08 0.81 0.59 
216 122 99 65 221 51 103 129 100 
76 164 73 115 57 145 60 65 100 
105 115 79 101 86 103 63 75 100 
72 143 92 114 66 141 95 87 100 
Source: Tables 2.1, 2.2; Soc:ial Trends 17, 1987, London: HMSO, Table 6.6, pl04. 
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The second point concerns the efficiency or otherwise of the national 
pharmaceutical industries. Some relevant evidence is presented in 
table 4.7. There are obvious difficulties in comparing one industry 
with another and the pharmaceutical sector may fairly be described as 
sui generis in certain aspects. Production value per employee is 
1 ower than the average for the chemica 1 industry, though generally 
higher than that for manufacturing as a whole. This reflects the 
nature of the pharmaceutical sector, in which the use of large-stream 
plants with their attendant economies in the use of labour is 
generally not feasible. Value added per employee, however, is close 
to the average for the chemical industry. 
More significantly, labour costs per employee are very similar to 
those prevailing in other parts of the chemical industry, except in 
the UK, where they are strikingly lower. Thus, it does not appear 
that manpower is used in an inefficient way or that it is rewarded in 
a disproportionately generous manner. Comparisons of the efficiency 
with which capital is used is not feasible, since different sectors 
differ very markedly in their technologies and therefore in their need 
for capital. It is, however, probable that the pharmaceutical 
industry is in general rather less capital-intensive than most parts 
of the chemical industry, although it has become more so during the 
past decade. 
A reasonable conclusion would seem to be that, in so far as comparison 
is possible, the pharmaceutical sector is as efficient as other parts 
of the chemical industry in it use of resources, but that it is 
distinctly more profitable than the latter in most member countries. 
The gross margin is generally higher than elsewhere, especially in the 
UK. The main exception is France. Some implications of this finding 
are discussed later (cf chapter 6.3). 
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TABLE 4.7 COMPARISON OF PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR WITH OTHER PARTS OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
1983 
Belgium France FRG Italy 
Value of production per employee 000 ECU 
Pharmaceuticals (1) 101.6 108.7 85.5 91.7 
Chemical industry (2) 139.3 125.4 104.7 102.2 
Manufacturing industry 84.7 81.6 76.3 65.8 
v,a 1 ue added per emp 1 oyee 000 ECU 
Pharmaceuticals 50 •. 2 32.6 39.7 37.4 
Chemical industry 44.0 33.7 36.9 26.4 
Manufacturing industry 25.:8 24.7 27.0 20.0 
Labour costs per employee 000 ECU 
Pharmaceuticals 26.:2 23.7 26.6 23.6 
Chemical industry 24.J 23.9 26.8 21.3 
Manufacturing industry 18.!5 19.3 21.4 14.3 
Gross margin (3) per employee 000 ECU 
Pharmaceuticals 24.0 8.9 13.1 13.8 
Chemical industry 19. ~J 9.8 10.1 5.1 
Manufacturing industry 7.3 5.4 5.6 5.7 
Investment per employee 000 ECU 
Pharmaceuticals 6.8 3.5 4.1 5.0 
Chemical industry 5.8 3.7 4.7 4.4 
Manufacturing industry 4. 'J' 3.4 4.2 3.7 
(1) NACE 258 
(2) NACE 25 
(3) Value added less labour costs 
Source: Eurostat: Structure and Activity of Industry 1982-3, 1984; 
Author's estimates based on national sources 
Spain UK 
61.2 77.5 
90.7 106.5 
65.9 
25.4 39.9 
29.7 38.5 
23.5 
14.3 14.0 
13.9 21.3 
14.0 
11.1 25.9 
15.8 17.2 
9.5 
6.0 
8.7 
3.3 
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4.4 Distortions of the Community market due to the regulation of 
prices 
Price controls and the variations in national price levels which they 
cause give rise to appreciable distortions in the Community 
pharmaceutical market and industry. 
The most obvious symptom is parallel importing, in which products 
exported from a country where prices are high are bought in a country 
in which they are low and re-exported to their nation of origin. A 
series of cases heard before the European Court of Justice in the 
1970s established that this practice is legal even when the 
differences in price arise from official regulation. The main sources 
of parallel-imported products are currently France and Italy and the 
main destinations the FRG, the Netherlands and the UK (9). 
In practice parallel imports have not developed to the extent that was 
originally expected. In 1985, they amounted to about ECU150m in value 
or about 0.5 per cent of European sales. They are most prominent in 
the FRG and the UK but even there do not have more than two per cent 
of the market. Information gathered in the course of this study shows 
that since 1983 they have receded as a cause for alarm among the 
research-based pharmaceutical industry. 
There are several reasons for this situation. The countries in which 
parallel imports are significant have taken steps to control their 
admission to their national markets; although requiring a minimum of 
formalities, such regulations may act as a disincentive to the 
importer. The companies who make the products have also defensive 
measures. Since it is commonly believed that a margin of 20-25 per 
cent in price is required to make parallel importing worthwhile, and 
any steps which add significantly to costs will therefore have a 
discouraging effect. 
Both public and private attitudes have hardened in other ways. There 
are increased doubts about the benefits of parallel imports to those 
who pay the bills. At first, the gain went entirely to the 
pharmacist, who bought at a reduced price but who was reimbursed by 
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the state or the insurance agency at the standard rate. This practice 
has now been brought under control but at the expense of reducing the 
incentive to the re,tailer. Enthusiasm for parallel imports among 
consumer spokesmen hats waned. 
A more serious problE!m is the use of pricing regulations to influence 
decisions about the location of industry facilities. As has been 
pointed out already (chapter 4.1 above) to control prices is to create 
opportunities for official pressure to be brought to bear on 
international companies. In exchange for admission to a reimbursement 
list, a better pric:e for a new product or permission to raise 
an existing one, a firm may be expected to create or expand local 
facilities. Such opportunities are frequently exploited. 
Interviews carried out in the present study suggest that pressures of 
this kind are most c:ommon in Belgium, France, Italy and Spain. In 
Belgium they are embodied in the Oleffe law, introduced in 1975 and 
extended for a further five years in 1983. This permits discretionary 
price increases in return for company commitments on local investment, 
R & D and exports. The French system of contracts, introduced in 
1983, works in the same way, and is reported to be applied vigorously. 
Italy follows a less formal, but broadly similar policy of favours for 
favours. 
Elsewhere the use of price controls to promote the local industry is 
less common. Under the system used in the UK up to 1986, the 
profitability permitt1ed to individual companies depended on the scale 
and nature of their British activities, but this element has been 
somewhat diluted in the new regulations. There are no direct controls 
over prices in the FRG and the Netherlands and so they cannot be used 
as instruments of pressure. Denmark has never attempted to do so. In 
Ireland, the government has actively fostered a local industry 
exclusively oriented to the export of active materials. The chosen 
instruments, however, have been tax concessions and subsidies, and 
differential pricing has played no part. 
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The use of price controls to build up local pharmaceutical capacity 
has two effects. The first is to force international companies to 
expand their facilities beyond what they would otherwise choose. This 
increases their costs, in that economies of scale cannot be realised. 
Estimates of these additional costs are presented in chapter 5 below. 
The second is to favour indigenous firms, since all pharmaceutical 
companies carry out a large proportion of their manufacturing and 
research in their country of origin. This is especially important in 
France and Italy, where the national firms are heavily dependent on 
their national markets. 
From the standpoint of a unified market both these outcomes are 
undesirable. They increase costs and limit competition. In terms of 
national objectives for the pharmaceutical industry, however, they can 
make sense (chapter 2.6). A conflict of aims is therefore 
unavoidable. 
4.5 The role of prices in the pharmaceutical market 
The unified market is expected to reduce costs, increase competition, 
and lower prices. This implies that demand is sensitive to price. To 
what extent is this true of the pharmaceutical sector? 
The traditional answer is that prices play a very limited part there. 
Within a therapeutic sub-market, demand is determined by the incidence 
of the particular disease. Most drugs are available only on 
prescription and doctors are therefore the customers. Their training 
emphasises the well-being of the individual patient and medicines are 
chosen on that basis. Price is at most secondary consideration. 
Moreover, in every member country state or the insurance agency meets 
all or most of the cost and so neither the doctor nor the patient has 
a direct interest in economising. There is much truth in this view. 
The importance of social attitudes and medical traditions have already 
been emphasised. At the same time, there is evidence to suggest that 
prices have a significant and increasing role in the pharmaceutical 
market. 
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It is generally agrt~ed within the industry that the price set for a 
new medicine must take into consideration those of competitive 
products. This is true of countries where the prices of individual 
drugs are not controlled. A premium may be charged if it has 
substantial therapeutic advantages but this cannot be very large. 
Several respondents mentioned a maximum of 25 per cent for a 
"breakthrough" product and smaller figures for those showing lesser 
gains over existing medicines. Within these limits arguments which 
justify a relatively high price on medical grounds were often accepted 
by regulatory autho1rities. The importance of economic as well as 
therapeutic considE!rations in pricing new pharmaceuticals is 
considered to be on the increase everywhere. 
Price competition is considerably more vigorous in the out-of-patent 
sector, which now m,akes up more than 50 per cent of the Community 
market by value. A substantial generic sector has emerged in those 
member countries in ~~hich average prices are relatively high. In 1984 
generic products had approximately three per cent by value of the 
entire European market, four per cent of that in the FRG, six per 
cent in the UK and ten per cent in the Netherlands. Since they have 
made further advances, especially in the FRG where, by some estimates, 
they have more than ten per cent of the national market. As yet they 
have had little impac:t in France or the mediterranean countries. 
This market is, however, by no means perfect. The generic companies 
have only achieved their share of the market by severe price 
reductions, sometimes amounting to 50 per cent or more of that charged 
by the originator. •~oreover, it is normal for the latter to retain a 
substantial proportic>n of the total sales despite charging a premium 
price. The advantages of size and reputation are sufficient in the 
eyes of many doctors to justify a conservative attitude towards new 
suppliers. Signific,antly, most generic companies in the FRG' have 
found it necessary to promote their products directly to the medica 1 
profession rather tha.n relying on price alone. 
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The role of official agencies has also been crucial. Within the 
Community, a generic sector has developed only where they are 
commercially attractive and where there has been action, direct or 
indirect, from governments or insurance organisations to encourage 
their use. Thus in the FRG, the combination of high prices and 
vigorous action by the Krankenkassen to control pharmaceutical 
spending has favoured generics. In all member nations they are used 
extensively in hospitals, which, as readily identified cost centres 
are under constant pressure to economise. The development of the 
European generic market is a result of paymaster-led demand rather 
than customer-led demand, and, given the constraints imposed by 
current social security systems, this seems likely to be the case in 
the foreseeable future (10). 
More general evidence from several countries confirms that there is an 
element of price sensitivity in demand. When in 1983 the FRG excluded 
products for certain minor illnesses from reimbursement, their sales 
fell substantially and had not fully recovered by 1986. The UK 
negative list had a similar impact on the demand for branded 
tranquillisers and minor analgesics. More recently, increases in the 
levels of patient copayment in France and Italy are reported to have 
reduced pharmaceutical consumption appreciably. The overall picture 
is one of a market characterised by a low - probably below unity - but 
not zero elasticity of demand with price (11). 
At present, then, price has an appreciable but not critical role in 
the competition between in-patent products. Therapeutic advantage is 
still the major factor. Among out-of-patent medicines, price could in 
principle be much more significant element, but much turns on the 
willingness or otherwise of official bodies to emphasise its 
importance. From the standpoint of the unified market, the central 
consideration will be the balance between in-patent and out-of-patent 
products. Unification could reduce costs without leading to a 
reduction in the prices of the former (cf chapter 3.3). As already 
indicated, the prices of out-of-patent drugs are much more likely to 
fall as costs drop and new producers enter the market. 
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4.6 The impact of Community initiatives 
There is a consensus common to both industry and government that the 
harmonisation of p1rices will be a slow process. The political 
difficulties are seen as formidable. In the eyes of many respondents 
a considerable degre1e of harmonisation between social security systems 
would be a necessary prerequisite. There are also problems of equity: 
how could the same price be charged in the FRG and in Portugal, given 
that per capita real incomes differ by a factor of nearly three? 
The industry would 1ideally prefer unrestricted free pricing but sees 
little hope of this happening. Given the political realities, the 
major companies accept, if reluctantly, the existence of national 
price controls with all their disadvantages. Cost-plus methods are 
seen as complex, time-consuming and unrealistic; the British system 
is preferable but might not work outside the UK. As has already been 
seen (cf chapter 4.4) they are not especi"ally worried by parallel 
imports, which are seen as an irritant rather than a major threat. In 
their foreign operations they resent discrimination in favour of 
indigenous firms, but have bowed, again reluctantly, to pressures to 
expand their local activities, which are seen as the necessary cost of 
a licence to operate in many countries (cf chapter 5.4). Price 
freezes are particularly disliked because of their unpredictability 
and their long-term E~ffects. 
As far as prices are concerned the industry view of the Commission is 
a broadly favourable one. There is appreciation of what is has done 
on occasion to bring about price increases, notably in Italy, and to 
limit blatantly disc1riminatory practices. Such approval is, however, 
tempered by a feeling, particularly common among Swiss and American 
firms, that more might have been done. The proposed transparency 
directive is generally welcome. If the 120-day limit for decision 
were to be generally observed there would be a saving in time; as was 
shown in chapter 3.3 this would be economically significant. 
Discrimination betw~:!en companies would be, as one industrial 
respondent put it, "s.moked out" and thereby made more difficult. It is 
a 1 so hoped that pressures to expand 1 oca 1 faci 1 i ties unnecessarily 
would be abated. 
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On the general issue of the unification of the market the attitude of 
the major firms is more reserved. Fear was expressed that it would 
lead in the longer run to generally lower prices. Pressures to 
harmonise prices downwards would become irresistible. Consumer groups 
and at least some governments, of course, tend to fear the reverse. 
At the same time, some degree of harmonisation of prices was seen as 
part of an irreversible trend. Some scenarios which involve a degree 
of price convergence are explored in chapter 6.3 below. 
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NOTES 
1 The categories excluded are products for coughs and colds, those 
for mouth and throat infections, laxatives and medicines for 
motion sickness. Very recently it has been proposed to restore 
cough and cold remedies to the reimbursement list but to exclude 
tranquillisers. 
2 The British PPRS was extensively modified in 1986. Until then 
the permitted r-ate of return was explicitly based on value added, 
investment, exports and R & D expenditure in the UK. 
3 The French authorities have now (October 1987) set up an economic 
commission with which companies will now negotiate. At the time 
that this step was announced it was admitted that under the 
previous system it took an average on one year to agree a price 
(Scrip, 1987, ]247, 1). The Belgian pricing mechanisms are also 
under review, following pressure from the European Commission 
(Ibid, 1987, 1249, 2-3). 
4 Data from the following sources: 1974, M H Cooper: European 
Pharmaceutical Prices, 1975, London; Croom Helm; 1981: Prognos, 
quoted in R Cht~w, G Teeling-Smith and N Wells: Pharmaceuticals 
in Seven Nation~, 1985, London: Office of Health Economics, 47; 
1982, Health E~conomics, private communication; EEC 1983 and 
EFPIA 1985, Eu1ropean Commission, COM (86) 765 final, table 1, 
p18; 1983, M N Dukes: Drugs and Money, 1985, Copenhagen: WHO, 
table 2, p8, Price levels in Portugal and Spain were estimated by 
an industrial !iource to be 40 per cent of those of the FRG in 
1987. Those in Italy, previously low, have risen sharply during 
the past two yeiilrS. 
5 Eurostat: Structure and Activity of Industry 1982/3, 1987. 
Information from the Association of the British Pharmaceutical 
Industry indicated that in 1982 manufacturing costs amounted to 
46% of total costs; the Bundesverband der Pharmazeutische 
Industrie gave a 1984 figure of 43% for the FRG. Senior 
executives of 'large research-oriented companies interviewed in 
the course of the study suggested a marginal cost of 30-35%. 
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In 1984 French exports of pharmaceuticals (SITC 541) to the 
developed world outside the European Community were ECU256m 
compared to exports of ECU1000m to the developing world. 
Burstall and Senior: The Community's pharmaceutical Industry, 
1985, Brussels: European Commission, table 9.4, p115, estimated 
that French-based companies made only 3.5 per cent of their 1982 
sales to the USA and Japan; the corresponding figures for the 
FRG and the UK were 15.5 and 24.0 per cent respectively. The 
pas it ion of the UK 1 n these rna rkets has improved considerably 
since that date. 
7 Profit margins calculated from Scrip's Pharmaceutical League 
Tables 1985/6, 1987 Richmond: PJB Publications, Profitabilities 
are from Teeling-Smith and Wells: Pharmaceuticals in Seven 
Nations, 1985, London: Office of Health Economics, table 11, 
p17. 
8 Based on B O'Brien: Patterns of European Diagnoses and 
Prescribing, 1984, London: Office of Health Economics, Table 4 
p25. According to the Dutch pharmaceutical industry organisation 
NEFARMA, no drugs are prescribed in 44 per cent of consultations 
in the Netherlands; the corresponding figures for other 
countries are USA 37, UK 26, France 22, Spain 16, and Italy and 
Belgium 8 per cent each (Scrip, 1986, 1107, 3) 
9 See Burstall and Senior, op cit, chapter 8.3, pp98-101. 
10 This discussion is based on M L Burstall: Generic 
Pharmaceuticals in Europe - Blessing or Threat?, 1986, London: 
Economists Advisory Group, Especially chapter 4, pp 47-70. 
11 Explicit calculations of the elasticity of pharmaceutical demand 
with price are rare, in part because the product mix is 
constantly changing, in part because a variety of factors enter 
into the equation, and in part because prices in most member 
nations of the Community are set by administrative action. A 
simple model relating per capita consumption to price and real 
per capita income in the USA, where prices are not centro 11 ed, 
suggested an elasticity of 0.67 with price and one of 1.25 with 
income for the period 1960-1984. 
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5 THE MULTINATIONAL SYSTEM AND ITS COSTS 
5.1 The origins of the system 
To a large extent the Community pharmaceutical industry is organised 
on multinational lines (chapter 2.2, 2.3}. Companies make and sell 
drugs and carry out research in a number of countries. In principle 
this must add to operating costs in that economies of scale cannot be 
fully realised, and that extra capital and labour are required. 
The multinational system predates the second world war. German, Swiss 
and American pharmaceutical firms began to create networks of local 
subsidiaries in European countries from the turn of the century 
onwards. Until the 1950s, however, most of these affiliates were 
purely marketing organisations. Local manufacturing became widespread 
in the aftermath of the war, mainly in response to restrictions on 
imports imposed by governments anxious to economise on foreign 
currency and to encourage the indigenous pharmaceutical sector. Thus, 
the majority of US companies began to make drugs in the UK at the time 
of the dollar shortage of the immediate postwar era, later expanding 
their operations to other member countries (1}. 
Such considerations have remained important. As tables 2.5-2.6 
indicate, imports of finished drugs are still remarkably small in 
France and Italy, although foreign firms have a large .share of the 
market in both countries. Until Spain acceded to the Treaty of Rome, 
the official policy was to exclude such products altogether as far as 
this was possible. The process of integration within the Community has 
removed many of the obvious barriers to freer trade, but, as has been 
shown in chapter 4.4, others still remain. In any case the past cannot 
be repealed. Institutional inertia means that local facilities, once 
created, acquire a life of their own. Good reasons appear why they 
should expand rather than contract. Public relations may make it 
awkward to withdraw; political factors may make it impossible. 
The multinational system has therefore continued to develop within the 
Community. As already noted, the American and Swiss firms supply the 
large majority of their European markets by local production. This 
form of operation is also important for British and German companies, 
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though less so for those of France and Italy. These local affiliates 
often export a substantial proportion of their output. R&D is also 
carried out by forE!ign firms, sometimes on a considerable scale; in 
this field the favourite host is the UK and guest the US. Local sales 
organisations of almost every significant company are to be found in 
almost every member country (2). 
5.2 Where do pote·ntial economies exist? 
In a truly unified pharmaceutical market there would be less need for 
local production. Nations could be supplied from fewer, perhaps even a 
single source, which might be outside the Community. There are few 
technical difficulties: pharmaceuticals are small in volume and cheap 
to transport. 
Costs could therefore be reduced. In part the savings would arise from 
economies of scale and in part from a simplified organisational 
structure. The problems of coordinating a complex and geographically 
diffuse empire would be much decreased. The scale and nature of such 
savings, however, is more difficult to predict. Thus, economies of 
scale may exist in s1ome operations and not in others. They may already 
have been realised. There may be diminishing returns to size above a 
certain point. A careful inspection of the evidence is therefore a 
necessary pre-requisite to attempts to calculate the possible 
reductions in operating costs. 
There are substantial economies of scale in basic research. Below a 
certain size - often said to be 2-3000 personnel - it is impossible to 
provide special faci 1 ities such as 1 ibraries, animal testing, 
analytical services etc - on the necessary scale. Moreover, drug 
discovery is a multidisciplinary activity and it h desirable to bring 
together scientists from widely different backgrounds. Research teams 
intera~t in producthe ways. For these reasons, a large centre is more 
productive than a small one. However, there are also limits to the 
size of a research establishment. Above perhaps 1000 personnel - many 
would say well below this number - management problems become 
intractable and output falls. In addition, many companies wish to 'tap 
into another research culture' in order to improve their efficacy. 
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Such factors favour dispersion rather than concentration (3). 
The multinational firms interviewed in the course of this study 
considered that they had, broadly speaking, realised the possible 
economies of scale in this field. All of them had a large research 
centre or centres in their country of origin where they did the bulk 
of their fundamental work. Establishments in other nations were 
relatively few in number, usually, though not always, on a smaller 
scale, and often worked in specialised areas in which there was local 
expertise. The availability of such staff is an important factor. •we 
go for the best people. If they can do the job, we go to them• was a 
typical explanation. Cost was very much a secondary consideration. 
None of these firms thought that their policies concerning the 
location of research would be altered by the emergence of a unified 
market ( 4). 
Similar considerations apply to the later stages of innovation. Apart 
from clinical testing (cf. chapter 3.2) development is concentrated at 
a single or at most a very few centres. Indeed, several respondents 
thought this was more true of such work than of basic research, in 
that it was more suited to systematic organisation. However, the 
adaptation of existing products to local needs is usually carried out 
in a local laboratory. To do so facilitates cooperation between the 
research, manufacturing and marketing divisions of a company. Once 
again, the firms approached were unanimous in thinking that further 
economies of scale were very limited and that their own practices 
would not be changed by unification of the European market. 
Manufacturing is in a different position. There are two basic stages 
in the production of pharmaceuticals - the preparation of the active 
ingredients and their conversion into dosage forms. The first involves 
chemical or microbiological technologies in which there are large 
economies of scale. The square/cube law relating capital costs to 
output applies very generally; labour is also used more efficiently in 
a large plant than in a small one. The only limiting factor is the 
need to preserve flexibility of production. Both Community and 
non-Community multinationals reported that economies of scale at this 
stage were largely realised. They owned a limited number of plants for 
the production of active ingredients - often only one within the 
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Community - which WE!re frequently of a near-optimum size (5). 
The same companies, however, agreed that there were large and 
unrealised economies of scale in the stage at which the active 
ingredients are formulated into dosage forms. Because of pressures of 
various kinds from governments they had been obliged to build local 
plants to turn impo1rted active materials into dosage forms. The main 
cost of such fac:tories is the building, together with the 
air-conditioning and ultra-clean facilities required; the machines 
themselves are relatively cheap and have a very large output (cf. 
chapter 5.3 below}. All firms reported that many of these plants ran 
at well under capacity; several of them suggested that in a unified 
market their number could be reduced by a factor of between one-half 
and two-thirds (6). 
The situation in marketing is different again. Here, it is generally 
agreed, economies of scale exist within a country. A lar.ge company can 
offer a bigger range of products through its sales force and can 
promote its drugs more effectively in other ways. However, it is 
absolutely necessary to organise marketing along national lines. The 
main cost is the sales force, which must be composed of local 
personnel familiar with local traditions of medical practice and, of 
course, speaking the local language. Some respondents thought that it 
was possible that there might be potentia 1 economies in a unified 
market-through, for example, the adoption of co11111on strategies, but 
this was a minori~y view. In any case, such practices do not 
necessarily require a single Community market (7). 
Few firms found it diifficult to coordinate their European activities. 
The numbers of staff involved were modest and largely informal 
procedures were thou!~ht to be adequate. It is clear that the major 
pharmaceutical companies are thoroughly accustomed to the 
multinational form of operation and have adjusted their modes of 
control accordingly. 
Thus, it is clear that in most fie·lds of activity within the industry, 
the economies of scale that might result from a unified market do not 
exist, as in the case of marketing, are relatively trivial, as with 
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coordination, or have already been realised as far as is desirable, as 
in the R&D and probably the production of active materials. The area 
which shows real scope for cost reduction is formulation and it is to 
the scale of these economies that we now turn. 
5.3 How large are the potential economies? 
A reduction in the number of formulation plants would save fixed 
capital and labour costs. 
The first step is to determine the amount of excess capacity. In 1982 
the number of prescriptions written by doctors practising outside 
hospitals in the member countries of the Community was approximately 
three billion (three thousand million). Allowing for in-hospital 
prescription the grand total might be four billion. At an average of 
100 tablets per prescription, consumption would be 400 billion tablets 
(8). 
A medium-sized compression tabletting machine has an output of 250,000 
tab 1 ets per hour, and an annua 1 output of about two billion on a 
three-shift basis. It could be used to make 10-12 products in fairly 
long runs. Thus, the entire European consumption of tablets could be 
made on 200 machines. The output of equipment to make vials or 
capsules is much lower but still very considerable. In practice a 
formulation plant will contain a number of machines in order to ensure 
operating flexibility. As already noted its main cost is the building 
and the specialised facilities required by the product mix. The 
formulation equipment itself is relatively cheap: the tabletting 
machine mentioned previously costs about ECU200,000 (6). 
The Community pharmaceutical market is highly fragmented. No company 
holds as much as five per cent of the total and the typical figure for 
a large multinational is below two per cent. It therefore appears 
that on purely technical grounds no company needs more than a single 
European formulation plant. As table 5.1 shows, however, foreign 
manufacturing facilities within the Community number approximately 
250. If it is assumed that all Community-based companies locate their 
single plant in their country of origin, and that every non-Community 
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TABLE 5.1 FOREIGN COMPANIES WITH PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN EEC COUNTRIES 
Location of Bel Fra FRG Gre Ita Neth Por Spa UK Total 
facility--
Nationality 
of companies 
Belgium 2 1 1 1 1 6 
France 5 4 3 7 2 6 2 29 
FRG 1 5 2 10 1 2 10 5 36 
Italy 1 1 1 4 1 8 
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 8 
Portugal 1 1 
UK 4 6 3 3 5 1 5 27 
USA 9 18 14 7 19 2 5 17 19 110 
Switzerland 4 3 3 2 4 1 4 3 24 
Other 1 1 2 1 5 
Total 25 36 28 18 49 6 10 50 28 254 
Source: see note (9). 
- 135 -
- 99 -
multinational needs a single plant within the Comnunity, then there 
are 225 surplus plants (cf table 2.9). Such a conclusion is 
undoubtedly over-simple. Special factories may be needed for special 
products. To centralise production completely carries obvious risks. 
It does, however, lend force to the comnent of several companies, 
mentioned above, that in a unified market the number of formulation 
plants could be reduced by one-half to two-thirds (9). 
The total cost of a formulation plant depends on the technology 
employed. A state •state of the art• facility containing 10-20 
machines and making 40-50 products would cost ECU35m and employ 
150-200 staff. At the other extreme, a factory making straightforward 
generic or OTC drugs on a large scale would use 3-6 dedicated machines 
and cost perhaps ECU10m. Since there are no data about the age 
distribution of these plants, for the purposes of calculation of 
conservative figures of ECU10 and 20m will be assumed. This suggests 
that the book value of the foreign formulation plants in the Community 
is between ECU2500 and SOOOm. If one half of them are surplus to 
requirements, then the extra capital involved is ECU2500m; if 
two-thirds, the sum is ECU1650-3333m. Assuming a life of 10 years, the 
corresponding annual depreciation payments are in the range 
ECU125-333m (6, 10). 
The magnitude of these figures can be checked to some extent from 
company data. From UK returns the fixed capital required by foreign 
subsidiaries operating in the UK during 1985/86 was equal to 35 per 
cent of their annual sales. Firms described as marketing 
pharmaceuticals rather than making them reported fixed capital 
averaging 12 per cent of their sales. There was no systematic 
variation in these ratios with the size of the company. If total sales 
by the local affiliates of foreign multinationals operating in the 
Community, including exports to destinations outside the Community, 
are taken as ECU12, SOOm, then the fixed capita 1 used by them for 
purpose other than marketing is ECU2875m at book value. This figure 
includes, of course, the value of R&D facilities and of plant for 
making active ingredients. Given ~he uncertainties involved, 
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however, the agreement with the earlier estimate is surprisingly good 
( 11). 
The saving in labour must now be considered. Here much turns on the 
mode of operation: to replace three factories working single shifts 
with one working thrE!e shifts is to reduce total employment but not by 
a factor of two-thirds. A rough estimate, based on the interviews 
undertaken, is that 30 per cent of all personnel or a total of 105,000 
for the whole of the Community (table 2.8) are involved in production. 
Pro rata about 35,000 work for the subsidiaries of foreign companies, 
of whom perhaps 25,000 work in formulation. Assuming once again that 
in a unified market between one-half and two-thirds of the plants 
could be closed down, then the maximum saving in labour would be 
between 12,500 and 15,500 or between 3.5 and 2.5 per cent of the 
total. At European average labour costs (table 4.4) this would 
represent a saving of between ECU270 and 356m. The actual saving is 
likely to be less, however, partly for the reason already mentioned 
and partly because pr·oduction workers receive below-average pay. 
5.4 Why are these economies not realised? 
These calculations ar-e very approximate, but they suggest that savings 
of several hundred millions of ECUs would be possible in a unified 
market. Why, then, has the concentration of production not already 
taken place? 
The main reason is that the prices a company receives for its products 
depends in many countries on the scale and nature of i·ts local 
activities (chapter 4L4). This is especially true of price increases 
for drugs already on the national market. 'If we were to close down 
our plant in ------, we'd never get another price increase there. This 
would outweigh any possible savings• was one entirely typical comment. 
Thus the funds invested in local facilities are in effect the price of 
a licence to operatj~ in the local market. As previously remarked, 
pressures of this kind are most intense in France, Italy and Spain, 
among the larger member nations, and Belgium, Greece and Portugal 
among the sma 11 er onE!S. They are much resented but equally seen as an 
inescapable fact of life. 
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When pressed on possible courses of action if the market were to 
unified in 1982 all respondents took a cautious attitude. Much would 
depend on national pricing systems: if the present situation 
continued, then little change was foreseen. If, however, the 
transparency directive were to inhibit or remove pressures towards 
local investment there would be a greater degree of concentration. 
This would, however, be limited and would take place at a measured 
pace. Most thought that they would retain manufacturing facilities in 
the main European markets, although not necessarily in the smaller 
member nations. The production of individual products might be 
concentrated at a single European centre but radical policies would 
not be pursued. Strategies would rather be of a selective 'horses for 
courses' type. 
Several reasons were offered for this considered approach. Companies 
wish to present a favourable image in the countries in which they 
operate. 'We wish to be good corporate citizens' as several 
respondents commented. There is some feeling that products seen to be 
locally made are preferred to imports in many countries. To close a 
plant invariably create hostility. There are also very practical 
considerations. To have a local plant is to facilitate the process of 
product development for the local market. There is greater flexibility 
and speed of response. Opportunities can be more readily seized and 
problems averted. Financial factors play a part. The FRG is a popular 
host country even though the attitude of the federal government is one 
of strict non-involvement in the industry's affairs. German prices are 
high, though, and in many parts of the world the permitted price is 
tied to that in the country of origin. Accordingly, the FRG is an 
attractive centre from which to export. The same is true of the UK. 
It should also be remembered that for most companies the decision to 
invest in a particular European country was made in the past when 
circumstances were substantially different. The money has been spent; 
it is 'water over the dam'. In many cases the local subsidiary is now 
of appreciable size, and, of course, it will be manned almost entirely 
by local personnel. Such an organisation is both part of the country 
and part of the larger company. To dispose of it would not be easy. 
Most commonly it is not a free-standing entity, capable of carrying 
out all functions, but is relatively specialised in its operations. If 
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so, then it could not readily be sold to local operator, while to shut 
it down may well be politically unacceptable. Therefore it is better 
to treat it as an asset and make the best use of it. 
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NOTES 
1. For a general account, seeM L Burstall, J H Dunning and A Lake: 
Governments, Technology and Multinational Enterprises - the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 1961, Paris: OECD, especially chapters 3 
and 9. 
2. Comparing tables 2.5 and 2.7 local production supplies 95 per 
cent of the Community market for US firms, 75 per cent for those 
of Switzerland, 73 per cent for those of Germany, 64 per cent for 
those of the UK and 49 per cent for those of France. Information 
is lacking for Italian firms but interviews suggest that their 
production outside Italy is limited. Approximately 28 per cent of 
all 1982 R&D spending in the Community was by foreign companies, 
and about 17 per cent by firms from outside it (M L Burstall and 
J H Dunning: International Investment in Innovation in ed N 
Wells: Pharmaceuticals among the Sunrise Industries, 1985, 
London: Croom Helm, pp 185-197). 
3. Burstall, Dunning and Lake, op cit pp 69-72; Burstall and 
Dunning, op cit. 
4. Of the major companies identified in table 2.9 only two have 
their principal basic 
origin, although a 
establishments abroad. 
research centre outside their country of 
much larger number have important 
5. Where companies have several plants for making active materials 
this is often the result of acquiring an existing local company, 
Respondents reported that pressure from governments to set up 
such facilities, although existing, was not as intense as that to 
set up formulation plants. 
6. This statement is based on interviews with the tabletting manager 
of a large multinational and with a leading firm of tablet 
machine manufacturers. 
7. Some examples of the economies of scale possible within a 
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national mark1et are given is Gaps in Technology 
Pharmaceuticals, 1969, Paris: OECD. 
8. Figures of prescriptions from B O'Brien: Patterns of Diagnosis 
and Prescription in Five European Countries, 1984, London: Office 
of Health Economics, table 4, p 25. Doctors practising outside 
hospitals in France, the FRG, Italy, Spain and the UK wrote 2603m 
prescriptions; these countries account for 89 per cent by value 
of all 1984 phclrmaceutical sales within the Community (cf table 
2.1), so a total of 3000m for all member nations seems 
reasonable. 
9. The number of plants was estimated primarily form the World 
Drug Marketing P~anua 1 1986, London: IMS. A 11 branches of firms 
outside their country of origin which were described as 
'manufacturers' rather than 'marketers' were included. The list 
was then revised in the light of information from individual 
companies and national sources. It is in broad agreement with 
information from the major multinationals operating in the 
Community, most of whom had between four and eight formulation 
p 1 ants apiece, but is more 1 ike ly to be an under- rather than 
an-overestimate. 
10. A 10-year lifet1ime is suggested by the depreciation figures given 
for foreign subsidiaries operating in the UK in 1985/6 (Business 
Ratios-Pharmaceuticals, 1987, London: ICC-Business Ratios). This 
figure may be r·ather low, particularly for the simpler type of 
plant. 
11. See Appendix B. Chapter 2.2 suggested that pharmaceuticals made 
by the 1 oca 1 caffi 1 i ates of foreign firms were 42% of sa 1 es 
through retail pharmacies. If this ratio applies to all sales 
then the total made in this way is ECUll,OOOm. To this figure 
must be added exports by such companies. These are considerable 
in some cases, thus, it is known that US companies operating in 
the UK account for 30% of a 11 UK drug exports. A figure of 
ECU1,500-2,000, seems reasonable, suggesting a total output of 
ECU12,500-13,00Cim. 
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6 THE RESULTS OF UNIFICATION 
What will be the outcome of measures to unify the Community market for 
pharmaceuticals? 
In a political industry much will turn on the nature of the political 
actions taken by member countries and by the Commission. Since the 
dynamic part of the sector is organised on a world-wide basis the 
impact of such measures on the international competition and 
competitive strength must also be considered. Finally the distribution 
of benefits resulting from particular strategies should be examined; 
as has already been seen, at a number of points there is a degree of 
conflict between the interests of producers and consumers. These areas 
will be explored in the course of answering the following questions: 
what savings are possible through unification of the market under 
various assumptions? 
how would this affect patterns of competition within and without 
the Community? 
what would be the effects of moves towards common pricing within 
the Community? 
what further steps are needed - if any - to unify the market 
completely? 
6.1 Possible reductions in operating costs 
The main savings in the operation of pharmaceutical companies through 
the unification of the Community market have already been identified 
and their magnitude tentatively estimated (chapters 3 and 5). It 
remains to consider the extent to which the possible savings might be 
realised. Here the critical factor is the effect of the transparency 
directive on the locational policies of multinational firms (chapters 
4.5, 5.4). Three scenarios will be examined: 
the directive has no effect. Prices continue to be linked to 
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local activities in most countries. Cost savings are limited to 
those possible through unified registration procedures. 
the directive is effective. Pressures on companies to maintain or 
increase their local activities ceases. For the reasons outlined 
in chapter 5.4, however, companies withdraw manufacturing 
facilities only from marginal areas. 
the directive iis effective. Companies follow policies of maximum 
practicable concentration. 
In all cases it is assumed that relative prices remain unchanged. 
In the first scenario the annual savings are small. They probably 
amount at the most to ECU160-260m or 0.5-0.8 per cent of total 
industry costs within the Community (chapter 3.3} These savings accrue 
to large innovative multinational companies; if they are divided in 
proportion to their Community sales outside their own country, then US 
firms would benefit the most (table 6.1}, followed by those of 
Switzerland, the FRG and the UK. Changes in employment would be 
negligible and there would be none in patterns of trade. Member 
countries would save a maximum of perhaps ECU5m apiece from a 
pan-European registr·ation agency, although this is doubtful (chapter 
3.4}. (1}. 
In the second scenar·io thes savings would be maintained. To them would 
be added the reduc:tions in cost from a limited concentration of 
production. The most probable targets for economy would be Greece and 
Portugal. In both countries prices are low and the local market small. 
Of the other smaller member nations Belgium is a bad place to sell 
drugs but quite a good place to make them (cf table 4.4}; the 
Netherlands has attracted a relatively small amount of foreign 
investment and Denmctrk hardly any (cf table 2. 7). Both countries have 
high pharmaceutical prices and are therefore potentially attractive 
centres from which to export (2}. 
If it is assumed that international companies withdraw from Greece and 
Portugal and that they supply those countries by exports, then a 
number of consequences may be identified. The international companies 
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would ultimately save the capital-related costs of their operations in 
those countries. On a book-value basis (cf chapter 5.3) these might be 
in the range ECU28-42m per year (table 6.2). Foreign firms would also 
save in labour provided that there was excess capacity elsewhere which 
could be used instead, which seems probable. The reduction in labour 
costs would be 700-1000 in Greece and 400-600 in Portugal and in 
annual labout costs ECU15-25m. The total savings, inclusive of those 
estimated in the first scenario, would therefore rise to ECU204-235m. 
(3). 
Trivial as such decisions might seem from a European or world 
standpoint they are quite serious from those of Greece or Portugal. In 
both countries the industry is small and oriented towards the local 
market (tables 2.1, 2.5, 2.8). If the multinationals were to withdraw, 
employment in the industry would drop by up to one-third and the 
balance of payments on pharmaceuticals, already markedly negative, 
would deteriorate further. The additional loss would be approximately 
ECU170m in the case of Greece and 125m in the case of Portugal. These 
consequences might not be acceptable to the national governments, both 
of whom have followed active policies towards the industry in recent 
years (4). 
The third scenario is much more speculative. It assumes that 
international companies might withdraw, not only from Greece and 
Portugal, but also from one or more major European markets and 
concentrate their facilities in a very small number of member 
countries. Who might be chosen? Both economic and subjective factors 
are likely to enter into the decision. Among the more likely 
candidates are the FRG and the UK. The FRG is viewed with some 
enthusiasm by most foreign companies. Although local costs are high, 
local prices are both high and largely free, and the government allows 
the industry unusual freedom of action. Moreover, the technical and 
educational infrastructure is excellent, and the German official 
culture is felt to be markedly sympathetic. The UK has relatively low 
costs, research personnel of the highest calibre, and a reasonable 
pricing system. Both have strong indigenous pharmacuetical sectors. 
Other large European .countries are less well placed. France couples 
high costs with low prices. Industry-government relations are 
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consistently frigid and foreign finns resent strongly the continuous 
pressure on them tt:> expand their local activities. Italy and Spain 
suffer from the latter problem, but, although their prices are 
generally low - in the case of Spain very markedly so - so are their 
costs. Accordingly, as a proportion of output value added and gross 
margins are close to the European average in these nations (table 
4.4}. It is therefore difficult not to feel that France would suffer 
most in a search for economies on the part of companies based 
e 1 sewhere. The on 1 y counterv a i 1 i ng factor is fee 1 i ng that French 
biomedical science is of good and rising quality. For a variety of 
reasons internationcll finns prefer to combine R&D with production and 
this consideration n1ight act in favour of France as a location. 
For purposes of illlustration, therefore, this scenario assumes a 50 
per cent reduction 'in foreign involvement in France and a 25 per cent 
reduction in both Italy and Spain. The lost production is transferred 
by European firms to their country of origin and by American companies 
in equal amounts to the FRG and the UK. The annual savings in capital 
in these three countries would be in the range ECU38-76m (table 6.3}. 
The savings in labour costs have been estimated using two alternative 
sets of assumptions. In the first, two-thirds of those originally 
employed are replaced in the new sites. In the second, the reserve 
capacity is such thatt no replacements are needed. The savings realised 
in this scenario a1"'e the ECU65-208m, and taking into account those 
estimated for the e·arlier scenarios, ECU269-533m. Unit costs in the 
Community industry would be reduced by 0.8-1.6 per cent. US finns 
would realise the lclrgest savings, followed by those based in the UK, 
Switzerland and the FRG. 
These calculations lire highly approximate and are subject to a large 
margin of error. Nevertheless, they suggest that the potential direct 
savings from the unification of the European market are relatively 
limited. Even the most sweeping reorganisation envisaged by the major 
companies (cf chaptt~r 5.3}, in which between one-half and two-thirds 
of their local pla11ts were shut down, would reduce their European 
costs unit by no more than ECU555-960m or 1.6-2.8 per cent. This is 
not negligible: if prices remained unchanged, the average profit 
margin would be inCI"eased by between 14 and 24 per cent (table 4.4). 
This figure is, however, in the nature of an upper bound, and might 
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not in any case be sufficient reward for what would be a distinctly 
fraught transitional period. Alternatively, if passed on in their 
entirity to the consumer they would reduce pharmaceutical costs by 
between 2.1 and 3.7 per cent. 
The balance of power within the European pharmaceutical sector would 
be changed substantially by such policies of concentration. The 
countries from which the multinational companies withdrew would be 
affected in negative ways. Employment would be lost, though only 
marginally. Perhaps more important, balances of payments in 
pharmaceuticals would drop sharply. In the most extreme case it is 
probable that France would move from a large to a small positive 
balance and that Italy and Spain would be in substantial deficit 
rather than only marginally so as at present. Conversely the position 
of the FRG and the UK, already strong, would be further improved 
(tab 1 e 2. 11 ) • 
6.2 Costs and competition 
If costs fall, will competition increase? if so, what are the possible 
results for the industry and for the consumers? 
As we have just seen, the likely reductions in costs are relatively 
sma 11 • They cou 1 d be used to raise profits apprec i ab 1 y or reduce 
prices marginally. They would accrue to relatively large 
research-based companies operating on a multinational basis. The 
overall elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals, although not zero, 
is unquestionably low, for reasons which are unlikely to change. In 
the in-patent sector there is some trade-off between price and 
therapeutic efficacy. In the out-of-patent sector there is increasing 
price competition between different makes of the same product but the 
market is still highly imperfect {cf chapter 4.5). 
The main barrier to entry in the innovation part of the industry is 
the high cost of product innovation, which consists largely of the 
expenditure needed to establish that the new product is both safe and 
efficacious. Currently the cost per NCE, including failures but 
excluding interest forgone is approximately ECUlOOm, corresponding to 
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TABLE 6.1 SAVINGS IN DIRECT COSTS OF OPERATION TO COMPANIES AND COUNTRIES 
THROUGH THE UNIFICATION OF REGISTRATION PROCEDURES (SCENARIO 1) 
Origin of firms ---> France 
Savings to finns 
- ECUm: 
lower value 
upper value 
- As % unit costs: 
lower value 
upper value 
Savings to countries 
- ECUm: 
10.7 
17.2 
0.19 
0.30 
FRG 
23.4 
37.7 
0.26 
0.40 
UK 
17.6 
28.3 
0.51 
0.82 
USA Switzerland Other 
65.6 
105.6 
0.91 
1.47 
28.6 
46.0 
1.34 
2.10 
14.4 
25.3 
0.22 
0.29 
Total 
160 
260 
0.47 
0. 77 
lower value 
upper value 
<-------------------------0------------------------------> 
<-------------------------5------------------------------> 
Source: see chapter 3.3 and the Appendix B 
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TABLE 6.2 OUTCOME OF LIMITED CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES 
(SCENARIO 2) 
A Annual savings (ECUm) to companies from economies in Greece and Portugal 
France FRG UK 
Capital costs: 
lower value 5.0 4.0 4.0 
upper value 7.5 6.0 6.0 
labour costs: 
lower value 2.8 2.2 2.2 
upper value 4.2 3.3 3.3 
total savings: 
lower value 7.8 6.2 6.2 
upper value 11.7 9.3 9.3 
as % total European 
unit costs: 
lower value 0.14 0.07 0.19 
upper value 0.20 0.10 0.29 
~ savings from 
scenario 1: 
lower value 0.32 0.34 0.70 
upper value 0.50 0.50 1.11 
B Annual losses (ECUm) to Greece and Portugal 
Greece 
Output 170 
as % output 42 
Employment (000) 0.7- 1.0 
as % total 23 - 33 
Balance of payments in finished drugs 
current -31 
after concentration -231 
USA 
12.0 
18.0 
6.7 
10.0 
18.7 
28 
0.26 
0.39 
1.17 
1.86 
Switzer-
land 
2.0 
3.0 
1.1 
1.7 
3.1 
4.7 
0.14 
0.22 
1.43 
2.32 
Portugal 
125 
30 
0.4 - 0.6 
13 - 20 
-62 
-202 
Other 
1.0 
1.5 
0.6 
0.9 
1.6 
2.4 
0.02 
0.03 
0.24 
0.32 
Total 
28 
42 
15.6 
23.4 
44 
65 
0.13 
0.19 
0.61 
0.96 
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TABLE 6.2 (contd) 
C Annual gains (ECUm) to current guest countries 
Output 
as % output 
France 
25 
0.30 
FRG UK Switzer-
land 
100 90 65 
1.08 1.36 n/d 
Other 
15 
4 
Employment <---------------- 0 ----------------> 
Balance of payment in finished drugs 
1984 
after concentration 
Sources: Tables 5.1, 6.1, chapter 6.1. 
1140 
1170 
631 
731 
692 
782 
877 
942 
17 
32 
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TABLE 6.3 OUTCOME OF EXTENSIVE CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES (SCENARIO 3) 
A Annual savings (ECUm) to companies from economies in France, Italy and Spain 
Origin of companies 
--------> France FRG 
In capital costs: low 3 7 
high 6 14 
In labour costs: low 1.3 2.7 
high 11.3 27.6 
Total savings: low 4.3 9.7 
high 17.3 41.6 
As % unit costs: low 0.07 0.11 
high 0.30 0.48 
~ savings from scenarios 1 and 2: 
As % unit costs: low 0.40 0.44 
high 0.81 1.00 
UK USA 
4 18 
8 36 
6.6 14.1 
16.3 58.1 
10.6 32.1 
24.3 94.1 
0.31 0.44 
0. 71 1.30 
1.00 1.62 
1.81 3.17 
Switzer- Other 
land 
3 3 
6 6 
1.1 1.1 
9.1 9.1 
4.1 4.1 
15.1 15.1 
0.20 0.06 
0. 71 0.24 
1.68 0.30 
3.03 0.56 
B Annual losses (mECU) to current host countries 
France Italy Spain 
Output 1250 600 300 
- as % output 14.8 9.6 11.8 
Employment (000} 1.8-2. 7 1.2-1.8 1.2-1.8 
- as % employment 2.8-4.2 1.9-2.8 3.8-5.6 
Balance of payments in 
finished drugs: 1984 1140 39 
-6 
after concentration -110 -560 -300 
Total 
38 
76 
27 
132 
65 
208 
0.19 
0.61 
0.79 
1.57 
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TABLE 6.3 OUTCOME OF El<TENSIVE CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES (SCENARIO £) 
C Annual gains (ECUm) to countries of current guests 
FRG UK 
Output 845 655 
- as % output 8.4 9.9 
Employment (000) 0-1.4 0-1.4 
Balance of payments in finished drugs: 
1984 631 692 
after concentration 1476 1347 
Source: chapter 6.1, tables 5.1, 6.1. 
Switzer-
land 
350 
n/d 
0-0.3 
877 
1227 
Other 
300 
9.4 
0-0.3 
382 
682 
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annual world-wide sales of ECU150m {chapter 3.3). As noted earlier 
{chapter 2.3) the number of companies with such sales is limited. Only 
60 are operating within the Community. This group of major 
research-based firms has remained remarkably stable in composition 
over the years, with few companies entering the circle and few leaving 
{6). 
Cost reductions of the type discussed in chapter 6.1 might be of 
significance here. Supposing prices to be unchanged, they could help 
to support a larger research programme. In 1984 R&D expenditure in 
Europe was approximately ECU4200m {table 2.8). The scale of savings 
envisaged in scenario 3 above could increase this sum by between 6 and 
13 per cent. However, a large part of the savings would be realised by 
US firms and might well not be spent in Europe. Alternatively, firms 
could shade the prices of their less striking new products with 
greater comfort. Both outcomes would serve merely to entrench the 
position of existing companies. 
Seriously to increase competition in the research-based sector of the 
industry would require a drastic reduction in the cost of innovation, 
so permitting the entry of large number of new contenders. To do so 
the time and money needed for safety and efficiacy testing would have 
to be cut. At the present stage of technological development this 
would seem to present insuperable difficulties. There is no 
alternative to the use of long-drawn-out trials in animal and human 
subjects. While this remains the case, however, the possibilities of 
increased competition through purely economic measures seem to 
limited. 
In the out-of-patent sector the prospects for increased competition 
are apparently brighter. The barriers to entry are relatively low. 
Many small generic companies have appeared in recent years. However, a 
note of caution is appropriate. As the number of major products coming 
out of patent rises the generic market may be expected to grow, but it 
is far from clear that it will be supplied by new entrants. When 
margins are low, costs savings are critical, and large firms are in a 
better position to realise economies of scale than small ones. In this 
connection it is significant that the savings due to the unification 
of the Community market already identified in this report all benefit 
the major international firm rather than the small local one. 
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American experience shows that it is quite feasible for a 
research-based company to enter the generic rna rket i tse 1 f. A 1 though 
there are often problems of management style, these can be overcome. 
The American generic: market, which is much larger than that of any 
Community country, is dominated by the generic arms of the major 
American multinationals. The situation in the UK is not dissimilar. 
Generic does not mean small, nor are there any insuperable 
difficulties in running both kinds of operation in tandem. 
A further point has already been made in chapter 4.5. The market for 
copy products of al'J kinds is imperfect. The originator is usually 
able to retain a substantial share of his market after patent 
protection expires, often at a premium price. For a variety of 
reasons, discussed ectrlier, doctors do not necessarily welcome cheaper 
equivalents and official pressure is often needed to encourage their 
use. Even in the USA, where most patients pay for their own drugs, 
administrative action - maximum allowable cost regulations, generic 
substitution - has bt~en required. In Europe, where drugs form part of 
national health care provision, this is even more the case. Measures 
to promote price competition are likely to be necessary; in this 
sector it is unlikely to happen automatically. 
The implications of unifying the market for competition are therefore 
clear. By themselves the measures taken will do little. The potential 
cost savings are too small to encourage new entrants; in any case, 
their benefits are co,ncentrated on large established firms. Thus, they 
are likely, if anything, to reduce rather than to promote competition. 
Further and different measures would have to be taken if this were not 
to happen. 
6.3 Towards common prices within Europe? 
A genuine common market implies a convergence of prices between member 
nations. The · transpcirency directive was thought by a number of 
industrial repondents to be a first step in that direction. The 
political obstacles to complete harmonisation are both well-known and 
formidable (chapter 2.5-6) above). It is nevertheless instructive to 
explore the outcome of moves towards common pricing in order to 
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identify, if only qualitatively, the possible consequences for both 
industry and consumers. 
Table 6.4 shows what might happen if 1984 prices were equalised at the 
Community average as weighted by sales. Spain and Portugal are omitted 
because directly comparable data about the average price levels which 
prevailed in those countries are not available. Much depends on the 
elasticity of demand with price which is assumed. It was suggested in 
chapter 4.5 that this was low - below unity in all probability - but 
not zero; accordingly, the results obtained when e = 0.5 are the most 
likely. To unify prices on this basis would lead to a large increase 
in pharmaceutical expenditure in Italy and a proportionately large 
decrease in the FRG, the Netherlands and Denmark. Elsewhere the 
changes would be small. The overall result would be a drop in 
expenditure of less than two per cent. 
Such an outcome would have considerable disadvantages for consumers in 
Italy and Greece, and almost certainly for those in Portugal and Spain 
as well. Although incomes are relatively low in these countries the 
proportion of national income spent on pharmaceuticals is already high 
(Table 4.6). This state of affairs results from social factors which 
are difficult to change in the short run. To equalise prices 
completely would therefore be to transfer income from the poor to the 
rich. 
Offsetting these losses, however, would be changes in the cost 
structure of the industry, which could affect policies of location. As 
we already seen (chapter 4.2 and table 4.4), high prices in the FRG 
are accompanied by high costs, and low prices in Italy and Spain by 
relatively low costs. To unify prices in the manner indicated would be 
to make the FRG less attractive as a place to make drugs and Italy and 
especially Spain more attractive. A conflation of the data of tables 
4.4 and 6.4 suggests, for example, that in a unified market the German 
pharmaceutical industry would actually lose money unless its costs 
were reduced, whereas that of Italy would become notably more 
profitable than it is at present. France would benefit from such 
changes: the increase in local pharmaceutical expenditure would be 
less than 10 per cent, while the cost structure would be shifted in 
favour of the industry, which is very probably under-funded. The UK 
waul~ experience little change (7). 
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TABLE 6.4 CHANGES IN THE CONSUMPTION OF PHARMACEUTICALS IF ALL PRICES WERE 
EQUALISED AT THE PRESENT AVERAGE LEVEL 
Sales in 1984 (ECUm) 
Country Actual On unified basis % Change over actual 
e = 0 e = 0.5 e = 1.5 e = 0 e = 0.5 e = 1.5 
Belgium 880 790 834 929 -4.0 -5.2 +5.6 
Denmark 370 222 296 463 -40.0 -20.0 +25.1 
France 5600 6815 6178 5076 +21.7 +10.3 -9.4 
FRG 7660 4320 5753 10199 -43.6 -24.9 +33.1 
Greece 450 569 496 400 +26.4 +10.2 -11.1 
Ireland 160 130 143 166 -18.8 -10.6 +3.8 
Italy 4440 7205 5656 3485 +62.3 +27.4 -21.5 
Netherlands 660 421 527 826 -36.2 -20.2 +25.2 
UK 3510 :3247 3376 3650 -7.5 -3.8 +4.0 
Total 23730 23730 23259 25194 0.0 -2.0 +6.2 
Source: table 2.1 and chapter 6.3 
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Thus, to unify prices would be to transfer resources between industry 
and consumer with the outcome varying sharply from one nation to 
another. A more limited equalisation would produce similar but more 
limited changes. Scenarios of this type, however, are largely neutral 
with respect to the Community as a whole: they assume that the average 
European price level is satisfactory from the standpoint of the actors 
involved. This is not necessarily the case. The industry considers, if 
implicitly rather than explicitly, that is too low as a whole and that 
prices are certainly much too low in some countries. Consumer 
representatives take the reverse position. Such conclusions merit a 
closer examination. 
A comparison with other parts of the chemical industry is instructive. 
Both sectors are capital-intensive in nature; both employ a relatively 
low labour force with a bias towards highly trained non-manual grades. 
Much of the chemical market proper,. however, is characeterised by 
multiple suppliers and intense competition. Buyers are relatively few 
in number, highly informed and extremely s~nsitive to prices. In 
these ways it differs from the pharmaceutical market. It has already 
been suggested (chapter 4.3 and table 4.7) that the pharmaceutical 
industry compares quite closely with the chemical industry in the 
efficiency with which it uses its resources. It is, however, notably 
more profitable that the rest of the chemical sector. Arguably, this 
results from features in the arrangements by which drugs reach 
patients, which reduce competition and sensitivity to price and permit 
an element of rent. Suppose, then, that the profit margin obtained 
from sales of pharmaceuticals was no higher than that from other 
chemical products. What would be the effect on pharmaceutical prices 
in Europe? 
Although directly comparable figures for total costs and products are 
not available an approximate calculation is possible. The 1983 gross 
margins-value added less labour costs for pharmaceuticals and for 
other chemicals are shown in table 6.5. They refer to all sales, 
including those of intermediates, by companies of all nationalities 
operating within a given nation, and include receipts from exports as 
well as from sales to local markets. They must therefore be 
interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, it is clear that margins are 
generally higher for pharmaceuticals. They suggest that the element of 
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TABLE 6.5 PHARMACEUTICAL PROFIT MARGINS IN 1983 COMPARED TO THOSE FOR OTHER BRANCHES 01 
THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 
Gross margin {1) as per cent turnover 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
FRG 
Italy 
Spain 
UK 
All 
Pharmaceuticals 
{2) 
19.9 
22.0 
7.8 
13.8 
13.3 
15.1 
32.1 
16.0 
Other chemical 
{3) 
11.1 
10.6 
6.1 
7.7 
6.3 
17.3 
14.7 
9.2 
{1) See table 4.4, note {3) {2) NACE 257 {3) NACE 25 - NACE 257 
Source: Eurostat: Structure and Activity of Industry 1982/3, 1987. 
Difference 
8.8 
11.4 
1.7 
6.1 
7.0 
-2.2 
17.4 
7.8 
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rent identified previously might raise Community prices by an average 
of about eight per cent. Were this fully realised, the saving in 1984 
would have been approximately ECU2000m or one per cent of health care 
expenditure. There are large variations between one member nation and 
another, but the differences in national chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries are so considerable as to make further analysis 
unprofitable (8). 
Such an estimate assumes, of course, that the operations and therefore 
the costs of the pharmaceutical industry would remain essentially 
unchanged under such a price regime. The sector as a whole would 
suffer a reduction in profits but would maintain, for example, its 
European research effort. This might not happen. Lower profits would 
certainly handicap companies in their efforts to profitability. 
Non-European firms might be tempted to run down their activities. More 
severe reductions in price levels have been discussed on many 
occasions. Here much turns on the extent to which substantial 
economies in operation are possible. These may exist - large 
successful firms ususally have room for improvement in this respect -
but to identify them and to estimate their extent is difficult. The 
pharmaceutical industries of all countries are remarkably similar in 
nature. To compare what already exists with radical alternatives which 
do not is no easier than to hear the sound of one hand clapping. 
Thus, it may be concluded that current arrangements for delivering 
drugs to patients may raise prices above what is strictly justifiable 
in a truly competitive market. There might therefore be room for 
limited downward movement in average price levels without greatly 
affecting the operations of the industry. The room for such manoevres, 
however, is small, and they could prove counter-productive. There is 
no prima facie case that the industry is inefficient in its use of 
resources, although alternative systems might be more effective. Only 
a very different - and much severe environment - would test this 
point and it remains to be seen if this is either possible or 
desirable. 
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6.4 Compet;tive !itrength in Europe and in the world 
What will be the effect of unification of the Community market on the 
competHive posHion of Community pharmaceutical industry? 
To answer this question it is necessary to separate the effects on 
companies based within the Community and on individual countries 
within the Community. The two are not identical. For example, if 
unification of the market led to reduced prices in Germany and 
increased prices in Spain (cf chapter 6.3), German companies might 
move their production facilities to the latter country. By doing so 
they would maintain or increase their profits and thereby their 
recources for competition in the future. Spain would gain in terms of 
employment. The FRG would lose one kind of economic activitity but 
would be strengthe·ned in so far as German-owned companies were 
strengthened. German patients would receive cheaper drugs. 
Some possible outcomes are indicated in table 6.6. The harmonisation 
of registration achieved through mutual recognition or a pan-European 
registration agency would primarily benefit the research-oriented 
multinational companies. The reduction in their costs would be small 
but perceptible (chapter 3.3). There might also be a modest saving to 
individual member countries. The transparency directive should reduce 
and possibly eliminate pressures to expand local activities beyond 
what is desirable on commercial grounds. In the longer run poroduction 
facilities would be concentrated. In the absence of changes in 
relative national price levels, this would benefit US comapnies most 
of all, followed by those of Swizerland, the UK and the FRG, but all 
multinationals would gain. In terms of countries France, Greece, 
Italy, Portuga 1 and Spain wou 1 d suffer and the FRG and the UK wou 1 d 
benefit (chapter 6 .. 1). As has a 1 ready been seen (chapter 6. 3) , a 
convergence of price levels would favour the movement of production 
facilities to low-c:ost nations. The FRG and the Netherlands would 
become less attractive as manufacturing sites and Italy, Spain and the 
UK more attractivE!. Since relocation takes time and money to 
accomplish, the muHinationals already strong in low-cost areas -
those based in the FRG, the UK and the USA (table 2.7) - would be the 
first to benefit. 
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TABLE 6.6 OUTCOME OF MOVES TOWARDS UNIFICATION OF THE EUROPEAN MARKET FOR MEMBER 
COUNTRIES AND FOR COMPANIES OF PARTICULAR NATIONALITIES 
Action --> Unified registration procedure 
Belgium 
Demark 
France 
FRG 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherland 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
USA 
Switzerland 
For country 
Small saving in 
expenditure 
Action --> Concentration of facilities 
For country 
Belgium No change 
Denmark No change 
France Output declines 
FRG Output increases 
Greece Output declines sharply 
For company based there 
Small saving in costs 
do 
Saving in costs 
Significant saving in costs 
No saving in costs - no 
research-based industry 
do 
Saving in costs 
do 
No saving in costs - no 
research-based industry 
do 
Signigicant saving in costs 
Substantial saving in costs 
Significant saving in costs 
For company based there 
Limited reduction in costs 
No change 
Reduction in costs 
do 
No change 
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TABLE 6.6 OUTCOME OF MOVES TOWARDS UNIFICATION OF THE EUROPEAN MARKET FOR MEMBER 
COUNTRIES AND FOR COMPANIES OF PARTICULAR NATIONANALITIES (continued) 
Action --> Concentration of facilities 
For country For company based there 
Ireland No cha~nge No change 
Italy Limited decline in output Limited reduction in costs 
Netherlands Increase in output do 
Portugal Sharp decline in output No change 
Spain Limited decline in output No change 
UK Output increases Signigicant reduction in cost 
USA No change Substantial saving in costs 
Switzerland Output increases Significant saving in costs 
Action--> Equalisation of prices on a 'neutral' basis 
For country For company based there 
Belgium Drug bii 11 cut No change 
Denmark Drug bii 11 sharply cut do 
France Drug bill raised Increase in profits 
FRG Drug bill sharply cut Sharp reduction in profits 
Greece Drug bill raised No change 
Ireland Drug bill cut No change 
Italy Drug bill sharply raised Sharp increase in profits 
Netherlands Drug bill sharply cut No change 
Portugal Drug bill raised No change 
Spain do Increase in profits 
UK Drug bill cut somewhat No change 
USA Not relevant No change 
Switzerland do No change 
Source: see text 
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Thus, the results of unification are complex in nature. The outcome 
for firms is indeed not the same as that for nations. Much depends on 
the particular measures taken. Certain points may nevertheless be 
made. Among the member nations, the UK is in a favourable position. It 
is a low-cost country, but has a highly developed technical 
infrastructure, and a scientific community of high quality. For many 
years it has been favoured by foreign - and particularly American -
investors. It is therefore likely to benefit under alsmost all 
circumstances. France is in the opposite position. A nation which 
combines high pharmaceutical costs with low prices, it is viewed 
coolly by most foreign companies. The considerable investment which it 
has attracted has largely been the result of continued official 
pressure, which is much resented. It is a prime target for economies 
if they become possible (chapter 6.1). The position of the other major 
member countries in their role as producers is less clear-cut. 
From the standpoint of the research-oriented companies the changes 
from unification are unequivocally favourable as far as registration 
and the concentration of production are concerned. Their costs would 
be reduced and their resources for the future thereby increased 
(chapter 6.2). The effects of common price levels within the Community 
are more difficult to predict. A conflation of the data presented in 
tables 2.5 and 6.4 suggests that on the 'neutral' basis discussed in 
chapter 6. 3 there wou 1 d be a sma 11 gain in income for the French 
companies and larger loss for those of the FRG. UK, US and Swiss firms 
would break even. A reduction in average prices would be unambigiously 
unfavourable. The effect would be especially severe for 
Conmuni ty-based companies; in 1982 sa 1 es within the Conmuni ty were 
estimated to be more than 80 per cent of those of Italian firms, more 
than 70 per cent of French, more than 50 per cent of Dutch and 
German, and nearly 40 per cent of those of British companies. In 
contrast the Community represented only 30 per cent of Swiss sales and 
18 per cent of those based in the USA (9). 
In the longer run, the effect of unifying the European market will be 
to make the strong stronger and the weak weaker. The steps so far will 
benefit all firms but, as has been seen, those of the UK, the US and 
Switzerland will benefit the most. The industry itself is in a period 
of rapid technical change in which the scientific basis of innovation 
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is moving from or~ranic chemistry to biochemistry and cell biology. 
Large resources are needed if the transition is to be made smoothly 
and rapidly and without losing ground to, for instance, the Japanese. 
New skills have to be acquired and new personnel employed. Even more 
important, novel ctpproaches inevitably carry an enhanced risk of 
failure. For the sake of the future these risks must be accepted. For 
the research-oriented company, this requires that cash flow be 
maximised. The un-ification of the market presents a variety of 
opportunities to do so. These opportunities, however, will favour the 
companies who already have the resources to exploit them - those which 
are 1 arge, have diversified markets, are organised on multinational 
lines and are successful innnovators. Such firms are British and 
American, less certainly German or Swiss, and very doubtfully French 
or Italian. 
6. 5 Further actitm by the Co11111uni ty 
To what extent might the Community assist the process of unification 
by further action? 
Based on the analysis presented above, a number of directly relevant 
steps may be envisaged. In rising order of political complexity they 
are: 
establishment of a pan-Euorpean registration agency. Subject to 
the qualifications expressed earlier {chapter 3.4), such an 
agency would SE!em to have appreciable advantages over a system 
of mutual recognition; 
those provisions in the transparency 
tend to reduce the unnecessary 
facilities within the Co11111unity 
vigorous prosecution of 
directive which might 
multiplication of company 
{chapter 5.2-5.4); 
further action to reduce price differentials between member 
nations. A firs.t priority should be to harmonise VAT rates and 
distributors• margins on pharmaceuticals {table 4.1}. In the 
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longer run an agreement to move over a period of years towards a 
band of prices sufficiently narrow to make parallel importing no 
longer worthwhile (chapter 4.4) might be encouraged. 
As has previously been emphasised, though, such measures would most 
probably increase the dominance of the existing major firms and in 
particular those based outside the Community. It might therefore be 
thought desirable to stimulate competition by assisting the emergence 
of new research-based companies on the one hand, and a generic sector 
on the other. Measures to these ends might include: 
promotion of research into less time-consuming ways to establish 
the safety and efficacy of new products (chapter 6.2 above); 
the arrangements for prescribing and dispensing drugs within the 
Community should be harmonised in order to remove artificial 
barriers. National regulations which discourage the use of 
generics should be a prime target (10). 
A further aim might be to promote the well-being of the 
Community-based industry. Such an objective would call for: 
stimulation of biomedical and biotechnological research within 
the Community; 
arrangements parallel to the directive on patent protection for 
novel research-based pharmaceuticals to ensure adequate prices 
for such products. 
These measures are not mutually exc 1 us ive, but represent a menu of 
possible steps which might help to reconcile divergent aims. The steps 
already taken are likely to have a considerable impact during the next 
decade and those who interests are affected negatively may well call 
for concessions in return. An approach which leads to an optimal 
compromise would probably be the most productive. 
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NOTES 
1. A similar order is obtained if the number of NCEs introduced is 
used except that the FRG is now the runner-up to the USA. 
2. Relations between the international companies and Greece are cool 
for a number of reasons and several of them have already 
withdrawn. 
3. Average labour costs in both countries are taken as ECU14,000 per 
capita; the plants are assumed to be relatively simple and at the 
bottom of the cost range (cf chapter 5.3). 
4. These figures suppose that the indigenous industry is unable to 
adjust in the short run. 
5. The actual net saving will be lower since direct costs in the FRG 
are unusually high (cf table 4.4). 
6. Variations in exchange rates makes comparison difficult, but 
among the top 50 research-based firms operating in the Community 
the only new entrants have been the Swedish company Astra, the 
French firms Sanofi and Sythelabo, both formed by amalgamations 
in the 1970s, and the British company Boots. The only one to 
disappear from the ranks of the research-oriented was the 
Anglo-Australian Nicolas. 
7. An approximate calculation is possible. In 1984 the total output 
of the pharmaceutical industry in the FRG was ECU10,140m of which 
ECU3040m were e~;ports. Assuming the cost structure of 1983 (table 
4.4), then total costs were ECU9,075m. Taking the situation where 
e = 0.5 in tablE! 6.4, sales witMn the FRG fall by 34.7 per cent 
to ECU5.350m, the change in the value of exports to the Community 
being small. Total output is now approximately ECU8,400m and, if 
costs remain unc:hanged, an overall loss of ECU675m would result. 
Since, however, the volume of production for the German market 
would have increased by 33%, a substantial increase in total 
costs is almost certain and the loss would be correspondingly 
higher. In the same way, increased prices in France and Itfay 
would increase r~evenues and reduce volume and therefore costs. 
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8. See table 2.1. The very large difference between the margins in 
the case of the UK arises in part from UK sales to high-price 
areas such as the USA. 
9. The changes calculated - for sales through retail pharmacies only 
- were ECU -400m for German companies, 143m for French ones, -40m 
for those of the USA, -16m for British firms and -12m for those 
of Switzerland. For the importance of particular national markets 
to companies of particular nationalities in 1982 seeM L Burstall 
and I S Senior; The Community's pharmaceutical Industry-Evolution 
of Concentration, Competition and Competitive Strength, 1985, 
Brussels; European Commission, table 9.4, p115. 
10. M L Burstall: Generic Pharmaceuticals in Europe - Blessing or 
Threat?, 1986, London; Economists Advisory Group, chapter 4, pp 
47-70. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE EUROPEAN PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY 
There are considerable difficulties in measuring production, 
consumption and trade in the pharmaceutical industry. Because there 
are many products, economic activity must be expressed in monetary 
terms. 
1 CONSUMPTION 
The data available are only approximate. The statistics of total 
national consumption used in, for instance, table 2.1, were supplied 
by IMS Ltd, and refer to human pharmaceuticals only. They have been 
compiled from national sources and cover all drugs, whether supplied 
through retail pharmacies, hospitals or other outlets. They are 
expressed at manufacturers• selling prices. 
A larger number of tables, including most of those in chapters 2, are 
based on the regul a·r audits of retai 1 pharmacies carried out by IMS 
Ltd. They are somewhat less accurate than the national figures for the 
following reasons: 
except in the case of the Netherlands, no. data about sales 
through other outlets is given. Typically, retail sales are about 
80 per cent of the total in the European Community. 
coverage of retail sales is not quite complete, although it is 
normally about 90 per cent. Sales by companies with only small 
proportion of the market are often omitted. 
In total, therefore, about 70-75 per cent of national sales are 
identified. It is possible that these figures under-estimate the share 
of small local firms in national markets. The IMS audit service covers 
all member countries of the European Community except Denmark. 
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2 PRODUCTION 
Production statistics are compiled on bases which vary from nation to 
nation. They may or may not include veterinary as well as human drugs, 
and, again, may or may not include intermediates and active compounds 
that are later converted into dosage forms. For these reasons, 
production normally exceeds consumption by an appreciable margin. 
3 TRADE 
Trade statistics at·e gathered on a uniform basis. They differentiate 
between medicinal E!tc products (SITC 541) and various sub-categories, 
of which medicaments (SITC 5417) is the most important. This latter 
inc 1 udes a 11 products made up ready for reta i 1 sa 1 es, together with 
bulk mixtures requiring conversion into dosage forms. In this report 
category 5417 is referred to as •finished drugs•. 
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APPENDIX B 
Two problems arise in the estimation of costs. 
The first concerns the capital employed. A sample of 23 mainly 
Amerkan multinational firms, extracted from Scrip's Pharmaceutical 
Company League Tables 1985/6, 1987, Richmond: PJB Publications, 
generated ECU1.12 of turnover per ECU of capital employed in their 
world-wide pharmaceutical operations, with marginal productivity of 
ECU1.21. The relationship was: 
(capital employed) = 0.828 (turnover) + 100 (r = 0.89) 
The average ratio of fixed capital to turnover was found from UK 
company data (Business Ratios - Pharmaceuticals, 1987) to be between 
1:2.8 and 1:3.5 for firms involved mainly or entirely in 
pharmaceuticals. This was no systematic variation with turnover. This 
ratio was therefore taken as 1:3. The same source suggested that the 
ratio of depreciation to fixed capital was between 1:8 and 1:13. 
Accordingly, it was taken to be 1:10. 
These relationships were assumed to hold for all member nations and 
are the basis for the estimates of capital employed and depreciation 
given in table 4.4. Although they are highly approximate, it may be 
noted that the profit margins and profitability figures which result 
are in reasonable agreement with the quantitative judgements of 
informed observers. Profit margins are in any case relatively 
insensitive to errors in estimating depreciation payments, since the 
latter are in comparatively small proportion of total costs. 
The second problem concerns the estimation of the costs incurred 
within the Community by firms of particular nationality. In an 
industry dominated by multinational companies this is difficult: our 
enquiries show that such firms operate on a world-wide basis and that 
the allocation of costs between countries is largely arbitrary. In 
this report we have nevertheless attempted to do so in the following 
way: 
- 174 - - 82 -
a. The total tiUrnover of the Community industry was taken from 
tables 4.4: allowing for production in Greece, the Netherlands 
and Portugal, a figure of ECU34,000m for the total costs of the 
Community phcirmaceutical industry was obtained. 
b. Production in each country by firms of particular nationality 
was calculated from the data of tables 2.5-2.7 and grossed up to 
cover all J>harmaceuticals from that of table 2.1. To the 
resulting we1re added estimates of the exports by such firms from 
each countryi these are based on fragmentary sources and are open 
to a large element of error. The totals obtained were then 
multiplied by the cost ratios of table 4.4 to yield the 
corresponding costs. 
The tota 1 cost found in (a) above was .then apportioned among the 
companies of particular nationality in proportion to the estimates of 
(b). This suggests that German firms bore 26.2 per cent of the total 
cost, US 21.2, Fr1ench 16.8, British 10.1, Swiss 6.3 and those of other 
nationalities 19.4 per cent. 
These estimates were used in chapter 6.1 of the report. It should be 
emphasised that they are highly tentative. In addit}on to the obvious 
problems of allocation already indicated, the cost structures taken 
are unavoidably national averages, which do not allow for differences 
between the operations of firms which are based in particular country 
and those which, say, have only a formulation plant there. It is 
probable that tht~ costs attributable to US companies have therefore 
been overstated and those attri butab 1 e to those of • other 
nationalities• ha1ve been understated. This does not, however, alter 
the sense of the main conclusion of chapter 6.1 ie that the reductions 
in unit costs W()Uld be concentrated disproportionately on American 
firms. 
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